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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the social and environmental impacts that have resulted 
from the construction and operation of the Channel Tunnel. Nord-Pas de 
Calais, Kent, France, Britain and Europe were all affected through the 
establishment of the Channel Tunnel. Three sections make up the body of this 
thesis: 
 
i. context and theory 
ii. social, environmental and economic impacts associated with the 
construction and operation of the tunnel   
iii. acknowledgement of the impacts that this development has had on 
the European Union.  
 
This study draws from an extensive body of literature in identifying and 
examining the issues that preceded and followed this development. The social 
and environmental impacts associated with public opposition, environmental 
impacts, land possession, soil disposal, environmental disturbance, water 
pollution, noise disturbance, energy consumption, water contamination, fire 
safety and asylum seekers remain the principal discussion points identifiable 
throughout this piece. These issues are largely concentrated on the areas of 
Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent, although they are infiltrating the wider 
European Union in a number of ways. The social and environmental impact 
assessments conducted prior to the construction of the of the Channel Tunnel 
proved to be tools that helped ensure that the bodies driving the development 
were made accountable for the impacts that arose. These processes also 
facilitated public involvement through public consultation in the development 
of social and environmental impact assessment. Early identification and 
recognition of the social and environmental issues identified by these reports 
led to a more comprehensive approach to project design, construction and 
operation.    
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1.0  Introduction     
 
This thesis is a social and environmental impact assessment (S&EIA) that 
examines the construction and operational issues that arose as a result of the 
development of the Channel Tunnel1. This development has had, and 
continues to have, a direct impact on the environment, society and economy 
of Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent. Environmental restoration, noise, pollution, 
asylum seekers, security threats, safety issues and visual impacts are the 
main issues that arose from this venture. This thesis examines these issues 
illustrating how they affected individuals living in close proximity to the 
Channel Tunnel entranceways. While these impacts were concentrated on the 
areas of Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent, they did infiltrate into other areas of 
France, Britain and wider Europe. In light of this, the final sections of this 
thesis examine the wider impacts of this development.  
 
 1.1  The Channel Tunnel 
 
The signing of the Channel Tunnel Act 1987 and the Treaty of Canterbury 
1986 signaled the beginning of, what would become in the years that followed, 
a wonder of the modern world. The awarding of the mandate to construct and 
operate the Channel Tunnel triggered the largest bi-national venture of the 
twentieth century. This event resulted in an unprecedented level of 
cooperation between the British and French in the years that followed. It has 
been recorded that this development came at an overall cost of £6bn 
(Grayson, 1990, 29). The Channel Tunnel opened for business in1994 and 
since that time it has proved itself to be an important piece of transportation 
infrastructure.  
 
Eurotunnel is a bi-national company of Anglo-French descent. This 
consortium has the mandate to operate and manage the Channel Tunnel until 
December 2054 (Eurotunnel, 2003, 5). As a transport entity, Eurotunnel owns 
and operates nine car and coach shuttles along with 16 truck shuttles 
(Eurotunnel, 2003, 5). Under the management umbrella, Eurotunnel “ensures 
the safe, efficient passage of trains belonging to various rail operators: 
passenger trains (Eurostar) and goods trains” (Eurotunnel, 2003, 5). In 2003, 
the Channel Tunnel transported on average 350 trains a day (Eurotunnel, 
2003, 5). These 350 trains were occupied by some 45,000 people, 6,300 cars 
and 3,500 trucks (Eurotunnel, 2003, 5).  
 
The Channel Tunnel holds a different meaning to us all. While some see it as 
merely an effective means of transportation, others hold more insight into the 
actual extent and significance of this project. Whatever one’s viewpoint it is 
indisputable that the Channel Tunnel has posed a number of challenges and 
raised an assortment of issues during both construction and since operations 
commenced in 1994.  
 
                                                 
1 The Channel Tunnel is the name of the development that was chosen to physically bridge 
the English Channel. This development is also commonly referred to as the ‘Chunnel’.  
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The Channel Tunnel has transcended political, logistical, financial, legal and 
environmental boundaries. The importance of this venture is illustrated by the 
number of academics, professionals and government organisations that have 
taken the time to investigate, analyse and critique this development from a 
variety of perspectives. These pieces all make for interesting reading whether 
one is interested from an academic perspective or not. The assortment of 
articles available on this topic discuss the legislative, financial, political, social, 
environmental, engineering and biological issues faced during the 
construction and current operation of this development. Consultation of these 
reports allows assumptions to be drawn about the impacts that the Channel 
Tunnel had on the social and environmental spheres of Nord-Pas de Calais, 
Kent, France, Britain and Europe. 
  
1.2  English Channel passageway  
 
The English Channel is part of the Atlantic Ocean that separates Britain from 
Northern France (Dictionaries, 1). In French, the English Channel is formally 
known as La Manche (the sleeve). The Channel Tunnel is 560 km long and at 
its widest it is 240 km (Dictionaries, 1). The two principal groups of islands 
located on the English Channel are the Isle of Wright and the Channel 
Islands.  
 
The shortest distance across the English Channel is a 34 km wide span from 
Dover to Cape Gris-Nez (Dictionaries, 1). Part of this stretch of ocean is 
known as the Strait of Dover which connects the English Channel with the 
North Sea. The strait is one of the busiest seaways in the world connecting 
the four major ports of Dover, Folkestone, Calais and Boulogne. This can be a 
treacherous, unpredictable piece of ocean that has seen a great deal of 
tragedy. Weather permitting, from Cap Gris on the north coast of France you 
can gaze across the English Channel to the Chalk cliffs that form on the Kent 
coast. This crossing takes about ninety minutes by ferryboat, 40 minutes in a 
hovercraft or one can swim it in around twelve hours (Newman, 1994, 37).  
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Figure 1.2.1  The Channel Tunnel 
 
 
 Sourced from (Mapquest, 2004, 1).  
 
 
This map provides a geographical representation of the relevant part of the 
English Channel. The route that the Channel Tunnel takes is shown as is the 
relative locations of Sangatte and Folkestone (Mapquest, 2004, 1). 
 
1.3  The aims and purpose of this research 
 
This thesis is a Social and Environmental Impact Assessment2 that examines 
the constructional and operational impacts the occurred as a result of the 
development of the Channel Tunnel. Environmental assessments is a 
discipline in which the environmental effects of a project [are] collated, both by 
the developer and from other sources, and taken into account by the planning 
authority in forming their own judgment on whether the development should 
go ahead (Goodenough & Page, 1994, 33). Impact Assessment’s are 
currently used as tools to help reduce and mitigate the concerns that various 
environmental groups, local government organisations and the general public 
may have about a particular development.   
                                                 
2 Social and Environmental Impact Assessment (S&EIA) is a term used to refer to the process 
of examining the potential impacts on the daily lives of individuals and communities by 
assessing the consequences that a project or policy decisions may bring (Burdge & Vanclay, 
1995, 1). While environmental impact assessments (EIA) characteristically address social 
impacts, social impact assessments (SIA) do not necessarily recognise environmental 
impacts.  
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Social and environmental awareness grew over the last half of the nineteenth 
century. This fueled the desire to understand and effectively manage the 
impacts that came as a result of particular developments. Large scale 
developments are of particular interest to social researchers because of the 
magnitude of impacts that are commonly associated with them. The Channel 
Tunnel is one example of a large scale venture that brought forward a 
conglomeration of important issues. To understand this development a 
number of questions are considered, discussed and examined throughout the 
following thesis. The questions central to this work are:  
 
A) What is the Channel Tunnel? Where is it? Why is it important? 
B) What were the impacts that arose from the construction and 
operation of the Channel Tunnel?  
C) How did the impacts identified, affect people living in Nord-Pas de 
Calais and Kent? How were these impacts mitigated? 
D) Did these impacts extend into other areas of France, Britain and the 
European Union (EU)? If so, how did these impacts affect people within 
these areas?   
E) What methods did Eurotunnel employ to manage and mitigate the 
issues that came about as a result of the construction and operation of 
the Channel Tunnel?  
 
The aim of this thesis was to thoroughly investigate and answer this set of 
questions in relation to the development of the Channel Tunnel.  
 
This thesis is of benefit for two dominant reasons. Firstly, this study is a useful 
reference source for developers who are looking to initiate large scale 
transportation developments. It is of particular use because the issues that 
arose as a result of this development will occur with virtually any large 
transportation venture. In being a source of reference this study fills a need as 
it gives developers an overview of issues that may occur and gives insights 
into how these issues may be effectively managed and mitigated. Secondly, 
this thesis provides some suggestions on how to address the ongoing issues 
associated with this development. The analysis and recommendations 
provided pose interesting discussion points that are of use to the bodies 
responsible for preventing and mitigating the issues at hand.  
 
“The evolution of the SIA discipline has promoted the predictive or ‘ex-ante’ 
model of assessment” (Sampson et al., 2006, 4). This has lead to ex-ante 
assessment practice being emphasised and applied over ex-post models 
(Baines et al., 2003, 23). There are, however, important benefits of ex-post 
impact assessment studies. This is because post-ante impact assessment 
identifies actual effects, in contrast to ex-ante studies which only access the 
projected effects associated with a particular development. In addition, 
temporal location of ex-post assessment allows for the consideration of 
broader change processes along with the identification of specific impacts 
(Sampson et al., 2006, 3). The longer the time frame, the easier it is to identify 
broader change processes. In light of this, the breadth and integrity provided 
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by ex-post assessment is that it can be used to inform more robust ex-ante 
conceptual frameworks.  
 
This thesis explores the impact that the Channel Tunnel has had on Nord-Pas 
de Calais and Kent, however, there are parts of this thesis that focus on the 
impact that this venture had within Britain. Furthermore, while notes are 
provided on the governmental institutions and the legislative frameworks 
within France and Britain, parts of the following analysis focuses on these 
aspects from a British perspective. This thesis has taken this format as a 
result of time and literature constraints as recognised in the concluding 
chapter of this thesis. 
 
 1.4  Thesis format 
 
Ten chapters make up the body of this thesis. Chapter Two provides an 
historical overview of where the idea of physically connecting Europe and the 
UK originated. In doing this, the early attempts to bridge the English Channel 
and the reasons behind the abandonment of these earlier attempts are 
discussed.  An accompaniment to this explanation is provided. It 
demonstrates how the context of the 1980s allowed for this initiative to be 
made a reality. This chapter illustrates how the political context of this time 
period allowed for the development to proceed.  
 
Legal aspects are discussed in Chapter Three. The legislative background 
governing this development is identified and the relationships between issues 
and the legislative background are explored. Environmental impact 
assessment (EIA) played an important role in the development of the 
legislation. The role that EIA played in this process and how the contents of 
these reports were recognised is well demonstrated. The construction and 
purpose of the Channel Tunnel Act (CTA) and the role and function of public 
contestation are the focal points of this chapter. In addition to the CTA, the 
role and function of the Treaty of Canterbury is outlined.  
 
The social, geographical, political and environmental contexts of Kent and 
Nord-Pas de Calais are acknowledged in Chapter Four. Part of this 
explanation examines how the contexts of these two areas facilitated or 
hindered the development of the Channel Tunnel. Particular attention is paid 
to the governmental structures that governed this development in France and 
Britain. EIA played a central role in the project development. The role of EIA 
and the theoretical framework of these reports are examined. This explanation 
justifies the methods and format taken by this thesis. In addition, examination 
of these reports allows us to trace how the issues associated with the Channel 
Tunnel were identified, mitigated and managed.  
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Chapter Five explains why the decision to bridge the English Channel was 
made and how this decision was formed. The project tenders submitted by 
Channel Expressway, Channel Tunnel Group- Franche-Manche, Eurobridge 
and Euroroute are all discussed in this chapter. In addition, the reasons why 
the Channel Tunnel Group- Franche-Manche was awarded the mandate to 
design, construct and operate the Channel Tunnel are examined. Design and 
construction components of this proposal are documented and notes are 
provided that show the political, economic, environmental and construction 
issues that were projected to come as a result of this proposal.  
  
The issues that arose because of the construction of the Channel Tunnel are 
presented in Chapter Six. This chapter focuses on how these impacts 
affected the social contexts of Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent. The issues 
examined throughout this piece include, public opposition, environmental 
impacts, land possession, soil disposal and noise pollution. As part of this 
examination information is provided that illustrates how these impacts affected 
the lives of those living in close proximity to the Channel Tunnel.  
 
Chapter Seven explores the impacts that have arisen since the Channel 
Tunnel opened for operation in 1994. Public opposition, environmental 
disturbance, water pollution, noise disturbance, energy consumption, water 
contamination, fire safety and asylum seekers are the main discussion points 
of this chapter. The methods employed to manage and mitigate these impacts 
and the impact that these issues have had on the social and environmental 
contexts of the regions neighboring the two Channel Tunnel entranceways are 
examined in relation to the issues identified.  
 
The economic implications that have arisen as a result of the Channel Tunnel 
are discussed in Chapter Eight. Market considerations, employment, 
employment statistics, tourism, investment, the demand and supply of 
transportation facilities, regional development and the wider economic 
implications for neighbouring regions make up the body of this chapter. These 
economic impacts are discussed and analysis is provided relating to how 
these impacts affected society. This chapter draws a distinction between the 
projected economic impacts and the actual impacts that arose as a result of 
this development.  
 
Chapter Nine examines the impact that the Channel Tunnel has had on the 
European Union (EU). This section takes some of the issues identified in 
chapter seven bringing them into a broader context. As part of this analysis, 
the reactions of the French and Kent governments are appraised and the 
attempts that were made to address the issues at hand are discussed. A 
summary of the asylum problem is given and recommendations are provided 
about possible solutions that may be employed to further manage this 
predicament. How these issues affected individuals living within the EU 
remains a focal discussion point of this section. In doing this, the main issues 
are identified and summaries of how these issues affected society are 
provided.  
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Chapter Ten concludes this thesis. This section recaps on the central themes 
discussed throughout the earlier chapters. The main issues identified 
throughout the construction and operation of the Channel Tunnel are outlined 
and reference is made to how these issues affected and continue to affect 
individuals living in Nord-Pas de Calais, Kent, France, Britain and the 
European Union. This chapter provides a summary of the Social and 
Environmental Issues that have come as a result of the construction and 
operation of the Channel Tunnel development.  
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2.0  Background 
 
In this chapter, we shall look at the ancient forms of travel between Britain and 
France. As part of this, the problems associated with travelling between the 
two countries and how travel changed over time is examined. Following this, 
the various attempts that were made to connect France and Britain are 
discussed. In studying these proposals, notes are made as to why each 
earlier attempt was abandoned. Although each proposal was postponed for a 
variety of reasons, a similar set of issues prevailed throughout all early 
attempts. The political context, financial imperatives and a general level of 
suspicion from the British towards the French, were all reasons central to the 
abandonment of these attempts. For this reason, these issues remain central 
discussion points of this chapter.  
 
The final section of this chapter outlines how the political, social and financial 
context of the 1980s allowed for the Channel Tunnel to be completed. In this 
section particular attention is paid to the role that globalisation and the 
European Union played in facilitating the building of the Channel Tunnel.   
 
The Channel Tunnel has a complex history. In understanding issues that were 
important in the building of the Channel Tunnel and the impact that these 
issues had on society in the 1980s, it is important to glance towards the 
history of the idea itself. Although the Channel Tunnel came to fruition in 
1994, history demonstrates that the notion of a fixed transportation link 
connecting the British and French actually dates back to the time of Napoleon 
Bonaparte. Since the 1800s a number of different proposals were presented 
to French and British individuals of standing. The idea of a tunnel always had 
its promoters and detractors but for a variety of reasons each and every one 
of the proposals submitted prior to 1986 was abandoned.  The earlier 
attempts are of particular interest as the challenging issues that were 
associated with the attempts prevailed throughout the construction and 
development of the Channel Tunnel in 1994.  
 
 2.1  Ancient methods of travel 
 
Although the Channel Tunnel was constructed and opened for business in 
1994, the concept of constructing a fixed transportation link between Britain 
and the European Continent dates back over two and a half centuries. It is 
arguably the most significant international transportation project since the 
Panama Canal. The tunnel is a tool that has united two influential commercial 
world powers that are a mere 34 kilometres apart (Neerhout, 2001, 2). Until 
the twentieth century the only means of travelling between France and Britain 
was by boat. The shortest route across the English Channel was also the 
most perilous route (Neerhout, 2001, 2). Characteristically, travellers could 
expect to travel for six or seven hours to get from one destination to the other 
(Neerhout, 2001, 2).  
 
The English Channel is known to mariners as “one of the world’s most 
dangerous passages, with its tidal streams, untidy currents” and it’s frequently 
enveloping “thick fog” (Hunt, 1994, 11). In 1873, while sailing across the 
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English Channel Edward Gibbon wrote to Lord Sheffield saying what “a 
cursed thing to live on an island! This step is more awkward than the whole 
journey” (Hunt, 1994, 11).   
 
The swift winds, strong tides and dense fog means that the English Channel 
serves up a concoction of challenges. For travellers and cargo ships these 
elements often served as deadly combinations. Dense fog fills the English 
Channel on average one day in every fourteen (Jensen, 2). In line with this, 
travelling between France and Britain is highly subject to weather conditions. 
Travellers can sometimes be delayed for days (Neerhout, 2001, 2). On 11 
January 1971, a tanker Texaco Caribbean collided with the Peruvian navel 
ship Paracas resulting in nine recorded deaths (Jensen, 2). Sometime during 
the night Brandenburg, a German cargo ship, struck the wreck of the Texaco 
Caribbean causing 17 more deaths (Jensen, 2). The discomfort and 
uncertainty of crossing the Channel was an accepted price paid for Britain’s 
isolated location. 
 
 Figure 2.1.1  Area of interest 
 
 
 
(Microsoft, 2005, 1). 
 
Figure 2.1.1 above provides a geographical representation of that area that is 
under examination throughout this thesis. The English Channel is clearly 
shown and the representation allows us to identify how this piece of ocean 
divides Britain and Europe.   
 
The nature of travelling between these two nations changed with the advent of 
the airplane. During the later part of the twentieth century, flying became a 
commercial enterprise. Travellers were the main beneficiaries of this 
technological development. Although airplanes were used to ferry some 
cargo, the volume of materials they were able to transport was, and continues 
to be, limited. In light of this, trade between France and Britain was still 
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typically done by sea, via the English Channel crossing. Towards the end of 
the twentieth century the airplane industry became increasingly competitive. 
The changing nature of this industry meant that travel between France and 
Britain became relatively inexpensive and a viable means of travel for the 
average household.  
 
 2.2  Early attempts 
 
The idea of connecting Britain to France is an age old-idea that has taken 
centuries to come to fruition. The concept of constructing a fixed link to 
connect the two countries can be traced back over two centuries. The first 
recorded transportation link proposal dates back to Napoleon’s time. In 1802, 
during a short period of peace between France and Britain, a French engineer 
by the name of Albert Mathieu-Favier presented Napoleon with a tunnel 
scheme that was designed to link the UK with Europe (Anderson & Roskow, 
1994, 3). Mathieu-Favier’s proposal suggested that two tunnels needed to be 
constructed. The first tunnel was to be lit by candle light and ventilated by 
chimneys stationed at regular intervals (Neerhout, 2001, 2). This tunnel was 
designed for horse drawn carriages while the second tunnel was needed to 
drain away water seepages (Anderson & Roskow, 1994, 3). The plan 
proposed an artificial island midway through the tunnel so that horses could 
be changed (Neerhout, 2001, 2). This scheme only ever existed on paper, the 
technological aspects of the proposal were never fully investigated and further 
geographical and technological knowledge was still needed.  
 
In 1857, Joseph-Aimé de Gamond presented Napoleon III with more tunnel 
plans. Gamond had done extensive research on the viability of a tunnel 
examining the financial, technological and geographical aspects relevant to 
digging a tunnel under the English Channel (Invicta Media, 2002, 2). He had 
extensively researched a range of options but concluded that the most 
feasible alternative was to build a tunnel (Hunt, 1994, 26). Gamond’s 
examination included economic approximations and travel forecasts (Hunt, 
1994, 26). He estimated that the tunnel would come at a cost of “170 million 
gold francs (then equivalent to about ₤8½ million)” (Hunt, 1994, 26).  
 
Napoleon organised a meeting with the British statesman Charles James Fox 
to discuss the programme (Jensen, 2). This meeting served to be the first time 
in which both nations had met to discuss the idea of a transportation link that 
would physically connect the United Kingdom with Europe. Despite 
Napoleon’s enthusiasm, a large number of British citizens, political leaders 
and members of the military were suspicious of Napoleon’s motives 
(Neerhout, 2001, 2). This skepticism inevitably meant that this tunnel initiative 
was dropped. 
 
The next recorded attempt to connect Britain and France was made in 1881 
when the French and British governments of the time agreed to construct 
experimental tunnels (Kirkland, 1995, 1). Sir William Watkin led a team that 
embarked on some exploratory work at Shakespeare Cliff in 1881 (Neerhout, 
2001, 2). Following this, in 1883 Colonel Beaumont led a construction team 
that bored nearly two kilometres of tunnel from Dover towards France using a 
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recently modified rotary boring machine (Noulton, 2001, 3). The French began 
working on a similar tunnel starting from Sangatta, heading towards Dover 
(Noulton, 2001, 3). Financial imperatives questioned the viability of this 
proposal. To combat this, a company was established and a small quantity of 
money was raised through share floats.  
 
In 1882, the French Prime Minister Gambetta resigned and the governmental 
institutions within France became somewhat precarious (Hunt, 1994, 46). As a 
consequence of the insecure French political arena, the Commercial Trade 
Treaty between France and Britain was cancelled and tariff barriers between 
the two countries rose dramatically (Hunt, 1994, 47). In 1883, further 
excavation of the tunnel was forbidden (Invicta Media, 2002, 4). The primary 
reason for this was because British defense establishment was strongly 
opposed to the development. British defense organisations played a crucial 
role in persuading the British government to suspend the project by putting 
pressure on the government (Noulton, 2001, 3). The age-old suspicions 
between the British and French were reaffirmed and the lukewarm interest 
that had been shown towards bridging the English Channel was once again 
rendered invisible in light of concerns towards Britain’s national defence. 
 
By 1973 it appeared that the obstacles to constructing a tunnel had been 
overcome and the idea of a tunnel was once again under investigation. This 
attempt was activated in 1974 but had been discarded by the end of 1975 
(Hunt, 1994, 146). A £500,000 tunneling machine was purchased by the 
British government and 250 metres of tunnel was dug at Dover prior to the 
project’s abandonment (Kirkland, 1995, 2). The primary reason for the 
rejection of this scheme has been attributed to financial concerns of the then 
British Labour government. The government was seen to have other priorities 
and the idea of a transportation link that connected France and Britain was not 
deemed to be a fundamental development component of the 1970s.   
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2.2.1  Summary of historical dates relevant to the idea of 
physically connecting France and Britain 
 
1802: Albert Mathieu-Favier presents Napoleon with the vision of building a 
tunnel to connect Britain and France 
 
1803-1815: Napoleonic Wars continue throughout Europe
 
1857: Napoleon III presented with plans to build a tunnel, by Joseph-Aimé de 
Gamond. Gamond proceeds to do exploratory work at Shakespeare Cliff 
 
1881: The French and British governments agree to construct experimental 
tunnels. Sir William Watkin leads a team that embark on some exploration 
work at Shakespeare cliff 
 
1957: France joins the European Union 
 
1973: Britain joins the European Union 
 
1974: The French and British governments agree to construct experimental 
tunnels but discard the idea by the end of 1975  
 
1979: Margaret Thatcher’s becomes Prime Minister of Great 
 
1981: Francois Mitterrand becomes President of France 
 
1986: Prime Minister Thatcher and President Mitterrand met at the Lille 
summit meeting to discuss the Channel Tunnel. 
Information sourced from (Hunt, 1994, 46).  
 
This timeline outlines important dates relating to the idea of building a fixed 
transportation link between Britain and France. 
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 2.3  Reasons behind the abandonment of earlier attempts 
 
Despite French enthusiasm for a tunnel, there were a number of reasons that 
the Channel Tunnel was not completed until well into the twentieth century. 
Although each earlier attempt was abandoned due to particular social, 
financial and political climates, history illustrates that a number of similar 
issues prevailed in the abandonment of each earlier attempt. Uncertainty 
within the political arena, a general level of apprehension from the British 
towards the French and financial imperatives were the main aspects that 
played a portentous role in influencing the decisions to abandon the notion of 
building a physical transportation link to connect the two countries.   
 
Europe has a colourful past inundated with violent wars and political 
instability. Our history books are filled with references to the great wars that 
plagued Europe for centuries. In light of this volatile environment, political 
security became a mechanism that was seen to reflect the likelihood of a 
nation becoming a potential threat. Characteristically, the more unstable the 
political arena was, the more precarious the area in question was viewed as 
being. In accordance with this, the idea of connecting France and Britain was 
only recognised when the political context allowed for it. The attempt in 1880 
was abandoned as a direct result of changes in the French political 
environment. This reiterates the fact that the political climate played an 
imminent role in all the abandonment of the Channel Tunnel attempts prior to 
1994. 
 
For decades the British have had security fears about the French. The British 
looked upon their continental neighbours with “considerable suspicion” 
(Neerhout, 2001, 1). “They were semi-detached, part of Europe when it suited 
them, distinct from Europe when it did not” (Neerhout, 2001, 3). 
 
History illustrates Europe as an arena of major political and military unrest. 
Throughout the conflicts that have been fought and resolved within Europe, 
Britain preserved a sense of security. The primary reason Britain was able to 
maintain this was because of its geographical location.  Protected by the 
Atlantic Ocean, English Channel and the Irish Sea, Britain resides in splendid 
isolation secure from land invasion. This protective barrier of ocean was 
different from anything their European counterparts were resourced with. Two 
notable occasions this defensive shield helped to ensure that the British were 
protected from European wars was during the Spanish Armada in 1588 and 
again in 1940 when Hitler’s armed forces occupied Northern Europe (Noulton, 
2001, 2).  Shakespeare makes reference to Britain’s geographical defense 
layer in Richard ll, Act 2, Scene 1, where he writes. 
 
This precious stone set in the silver sea, 
Which serves it in the office of a wall 
Or as a moat defensive to a house, 
Against the envy of less happier lands (Dictionaries, 1). 
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This splendid location allowed Britain to intervene in European conflicts when 
needed yet preserve a level of security unknown to their European 
neighbours.  
 
More important than the physical separation of the two nations was the 
psychological separation that the English Channel manifested in the minds of 
the British public. The idea of connecting France and Britain was seen to 
jeopardise the natural defense barrier that had for hundreds of years 
protected British shores from invasion. In addition, the Channel Tunnel was 
seen as a psychological threat in the minds of the British public and British 
political representatives. In the late 1800’s Admiral Cooper Key substantiated 
this in his letter to the First Lord of the Admiralty by writing, “Any machinery for 
destroying the Tunnel in an emergency could not be relied upon. After seizing 
the Tunnel, the enemy would march on London, with the Navy a powerless 
spectator” (Hunt, 1994, 46). This letter was presented to the British 
Commission in an attempt to voice concerns about building a fixed 
transportation link that would connect the two nations. Lord Palmerston, the 
Tory Prime Minister is quoted as greeting one proposal with the comment 
‘You surely do not expect me to agree to shorten a distance I already consider 
short enough?’ (Noulton, 2001, 2). These concerns were reestablished and 
heightened during times of political unrest in Europe. In accordance with this 
idea, the political situation played a fundamental role in hindering or allowing 
for the establishment of a Channel Tunnel. Interestingly, but not surprisingly, 
the history of the Channel Tunnel reflects European history, mirroring, as it 
does, the relationship between France and Britain. 
 
Financial considerations were also an important and challenging aspect of the 
Channel Tunnel attempts as previously discussed. The bi-lateral nature of this 
development played an important role in enhancing the financial tribulations 
associated with the building of a tunnel. From the outset, financial imperatives 
had been important. In 1856, the estimated cost of a tunnel was £8½ million, 
in 1948 the estimated cost was to be £50 million and by 1960 it was 
anticipated that the tunnel would come at a cost of £200 million (Hunt, 1994, 
109). Recognising that these amounts are specific to the value of the dollar at 
the time, a tunnel connecting the two continents was an expensive endeavour.  
 
In 1975 the British government reaffirmed that there would be no public 
funding for any form of tunnel venture nor would there be any guarantees 
made of a financial or commercial nature (Noulton, 2001, 16). The French 
government was initially prepared to contribute some public funding to the 
development but after consultation with the British government they accepted 
the British insistence that the venture should be exclusively privately funded 
(Noulton, 2001, 16). To date this prospect remains one of the most financially 
complex developments ever undertaken. Funded exclusively through the 
private sector under a bilateral arrangement, the financial advisors were, in a 
sense, pioneers that had to work in an unpaved, heavily legislated 
environment. 
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2.4  The context of the 1970s and 1980s that facilitated the 
establishment of the Channel Tunnel 
 
In addition to financial considerations, the political context of the 1970s played 
an important role in facilitating the establishment of the Channel Tunnel. In 
addition to the political context, the wider social, environmental and economic 
realms of contemporary society also acted as influential change agents. The 
political leaders of the time, the establishment of and strengthening power of 
the EU, globalisation and increases in consumer demands, all endorsed and 
supported the idea of a tunnel that would connect Europe and the United 
Kingdom.    
 
Although it was not anticipated at the time, Margaret Thatcher’s appointment 
as Prime Minister in 1979 laid the foundation that would allow for the Channel 
Tunnel to come to fruition before the end of the twentieth century. Part of the 
reason that positive outcomes from negotiations between the British Prime 
Minister Margaret Thatcher and the French President Francois Mitterrand 
were not anticipated was because these two leaders came from totally 
opposing ideological positions. Thatcher was a cavalier political leader who 
strongly supported the eradication of socialist ideologies. On the other hand, 
Mitterrand’s leadership pushed France in a socialist direction. That said, these 
two leaders did strongly support international trade. This factor alone meant 
that the idea of physically bridging the Channel Tunnel became an attractive 
proposition for both political leaders.     
 
In 1981 the Prime Minister Thatcher and President Francois Mitterrand met to 
set up a Joint Technical Commission. The sole purpose of this commission 
was to discuss the viability of a fixed transportation link between the United 
Kingdom and Europe (Jensen, 3).  Five years later in 1986, Prime Minister 
Thatcher and President Mitterrand met at the Lille summit meeting to discuss 
the Channel Tunnel (Hunt, 1994, 178).  
 
A joint statement was released announcing that the mandate had been 
awarded for the “development, construction and operation of a fixed link 
across the English Channel” (Hunt, 1994, 178). The establishment of the 
European Community (EC) 3 played a principal role in allowing for and 
increasing, the need for a transportation link between Britain and France. Few 
countries realised that they were joining a dynamic process designed around 
European integration that would in years to come play an increasingly 
powerful role. Since its establishment the EC has played an eminent role in 
European politics and it is currently playing an increasingly prominent role as 
an international actor on the world stage.  
 
In 1981 the European Parliament asserted that they were enthusiastic 
supporters of a fixed link (Grayson, 1990, 5). In essence the European 
Parliament saw this form of venture as an instrument that would lead to 
                                                 
3 The European Community (EC) was originally founded March 25, 1957 under the alias of 
the European Economic Community (EEC).  In 1992 the ‘economic’ was removed and the EC 
became the title for what would in the years that followed become formally known as the 
European Union (EU) (Europa, 1). 
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greater unification between Europe and the United Kingdom. Many British 
citizens still remain far from enthusiastic supporters towards the ideas that 
underpin the European Union (EU). While a large number of EU countries are 
fully supportive of a single European currency (the Euro)4, the British still 
possess reservations towards the idea. In line with this, the British have 
chosen to withstand pressure from the EU holding the Pound as their primary 
currency. The EU has in many ways integrated Europe with the United 
Kingdom. This new found unification has laid to rest some of the 
apprehensions that the British had towards physically and mentally connecting 
themselves to Europe.  
 
In addition to the European Union, globalisation was a driving force that 
heightened the need for a financially competitive and assessable means of 
transporting products between France and Britain. A direct consequence of 
globalisation is that goods and services that were once protected by local 
markets now compete on a global stage for market share. Businesses have 
become increasingly aware that trade between Britain and their European 
neighbours is a crucial mechanism that could help to ensure market strength 
and buoyancy. Trade within the EU was growing and the British were 
increasingly isolated from easy access to these markets (Neerhout, 2001, 2). 
British exporters were at a great disadvantage because of the travel times and 
ferry charges associated with transporting freight by water across the English 
Channel. (Anderson & Roskow, 1994).  Astoundingly the actual ferry crossing 
times in 1975 were no quicker that they had been in 1875 (Neerhout, 2001, 3). 
In light of this, the demand for a fixed transportation link between the two 
neighbours gained an immense amount of support from the British business 
community.  
 
Aside from trade, a number of other independent enterprises sanctioned the 
development and building of the Channel Tunnel. Construction companies 
welcomed the proposal foreseeing that there was an immense amount of work 
and financial benefits to be accrued (Anderson & Roskow, 1994, 34). 
Business travellers were another group that were particularly supportive of a 
tunnel link between the two continents. Flying time, long waits in crowded 
terminals and travelling to and from airports meant that travelling between the 
two countries could consume almost an entire working day. In addition, travel 
forecasts predicted that demand for travel between the two countries would 
dramatically increase by the end of the twentieth century (Neerhout, 2001, 3).   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 The European Union (EU) was originally established as the EC until the title was EU was 
adopted in 1992 (Europa, 2). The EU has a single Commission, Council of Ministers and 
Parliament (Europa, 1). See Appendix Two for a diagram that illustrates the evolution of the 
structures of the European Union.   
 16
2.5  Conclusion 
 
The idea of constructing a fixed transportation link to connect Britain and 
France is an ancient idea that has taken centuries to come to fruition. 
Travelling by boat between Britain and France was a long, treacherous 
journey.  Although this environment changed with the introduction of the 
airplane there still remained a demand for a cost effective, time efficient way 
to travel from Britain to the continent. In light of this demand, a number of 
proposals were submitted and scrutinised.  In 1881 and 1974 two major 
attempts to build a tunnel were made. The major reason for the abandonment 
of the 1881 proposal was political instability and financial pressures. The 
attempt in 1974 was suspended because the French President resigned 
which resulted in heightened political instability in France. 
 
Leadership changes in the 1980’s directly influenced the ability of both 
countries to work together in recognising the long terms benefits that would be 
associated with the building of a tunnel. In addition to the changes in the 
political arena, globalisation and the establishment of the EU acted as 
influential change agents that allowed for and heightened the need for a fixed 
transportation link between the two continents. The Channel Tunnel is a 
significant development that has changed the nature of travel and trade for the 
UK and wider Europe. The financial and political issues associated with this 
form of development plagued developers for years. It is a tribute to all the 
actors involved that the Channel Tunnel actually came into existence. The 
Channel Tunnel is now an influential part of European infrastructure and is 
symbolic of a new found unity and common purpose that would have been 
impossible prior to 1989.  
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3.0  Legislative background 
 
Back in the 1800s, when the idea of physically bridging the English Channel 
first became a discussion point, it was identified that the engineering, 
financial, project management, social and environmental components of this 
development would venture into new territory. In addition to these facets, the 
legal aspects of this project were also addressed in an interesting manner. For 
this reason the legal framework underpinning this development is the main 
topic of this chapter.  
 
The manner in which EIA was addressed throughout the project development 
had a large impact on the issues that eventuated from the Channel Tunnel 
venture. In light of this, the role that EIA played in the construction of the 
legislative framework is extensively examined. Following this, the systems 
implemented that allowed for individuals to voice their concerns are critiqued.  
In addition, discussion is provided about how the Channel Tunnel Act was 
established, the role that this piece of legislation played and the issues that 
arose from the operation and implementation of the Act. The following section 
also investigates the issues that arose in the development of the legislative 
background and how these issues in turn affected society. In addition, 
financial aspects of the development are appraised. The final part of this 
section demonstrates why the Act of Canterbury was constructed and the role 
that the legislation played throughout the design and construction of the 
Channel Tunnel. 
 
3.1  Environmental awareness and developmental consents 
processes 
 
The developmental processes underpinning the Channel Tunnel development 
can be better understood when one understands the context of the time 
period within which the development was conducted. The political context of 
the 1980s and 1990s has been characterised by the ‘new radical right’ which 
is representative of a shift in focus towards a particular political philosophy 
and environmental planning (Essex & Gibb, 1994, 51). Economic prosperity 
was the primary focus of the governments of the time. One way in which 
governments sought to enhance economic growth was through the promotion 
of the free market. Governments sought to achieve this by promoting “the free 
market and reduce[ing] levels of public expenditure” (Essex & Gibb, 1994, 52). 
The Channel Tunnel is an example of one project that came to be conducted 
without any form of public funding. 
 
In Britain and France throughout the 1980s there was no uniform consents 
procedures that could be applied to public or private development. Prior to this 
time there was a limited level of concern towards the social and environmental 
impacts associated with different developments. This changed in the latter 
part of the twentieth century as government officials, community organisations 
and the general public became increasingly aware of, and concerned with, the 
impact that developments were having on society and the environment  
(Sheail, 2002, 147). As awareness increased, so to did the numbers of 
environmental organisations and their memberships. This is reflected by the 
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fact that one environmental organisation, the Royal Society for the Protection 
of Birds, recorded a membership increase from 10,500 in 1960 to 56,000 in 
1970 (Sheail, 2002, 147).   
 
Increasing public environmental awareness fuelled the need for governments 
and the agencies driving development to be made accountable for the 
adverse effects that came as a consequence of their particular developments. 
In line with this, a more strategic view of planning emerged within the British 
government and the wider constituency of the conservation movement and 
industry (Sheail, 2002, 147). In addition, as environmental awareness 
heightened the assortment of environmental organisations that were 
concerned with the social and environmental impacts of development began 
to have the opportunity to have their voices heard (Sheail, 2002, 271). Public 
participation also became a corollary of this heightening of awareness and in 
turn, the general public began to play a more active role in project 
development.  
 
The Channel Tunnel proves to be one of the earliest British examples in which 
this changing philosophy is palpable. The Channel Tunnel Act has paved a 
unique place in developmental history. In some instances the legal 
foundations underpinning this development stopped issues from developing 
but also made Eurotunnel accountable for employing strategies to mitigate 
and manage issues as they arose. On the other hand, a number of issues 
arose because the legal foundations allowed them to do so.  
 
The Channel Tunnel Act is a significant piece of legislation that explicitly 
illustrates the movement towards greater social and environmental 
awareness. In the 1980s there were no regular processes governing large 
scale developments in Britain or France. The planning procedures employed 
throughout the development of the Channel Tunnel have been extensively 
examined and thoroughly critiqued. Critics have indicated that the consents 
process lacked information and knowledge which eventually led to regions 
around the Channel Tunnel entrance ways not knowing how to maximize the 
benefits of the Channel Tunnel development (Essex & Gibb, 1994, 63).  
 
Criticisms of this nature have in part been attributed to the fact that there was 
a “lack of orientated transport policy, the absence of an agreed strategy or 
planning framework to oversee Channel Tunnel developments and the 
financial restrictions imposed on British Rail…made the planning task 
extremely difficult” (Essex & Gibb, 1994, 65). To this day there are still no 
comprehensive formal consent processes or planning procedures governing 
developments of this nature in either nation. There are though, a number of 
provisions that can be applied to private and public developments. The lack of 
tried and tested planning procedures had a considerable impact on the 
legislation that was eventually constructed as is illustrated throughout the 
following pages. 
 
The main body of legislation that was the backbone to the Channel Tunnel Act 
was the Town and Country Planning Act 1968 (Popham, 2002, 141). A large 
number of principles underlying the Channel Tunnel Act originated from this 
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act but were revised and reworded to fit the Channel Tunnel development. 
When reading the two pieces of legislation together, examples of common 
themes between the two pieces of legislation become clearly visible. The 
principle underpinning land acquisition is an example of one provision that 
was taken from the Town and Country Planning Act and modified to fit the 
Channel Tunnel Act (Channel Tunnel Act, 1989, 1900).   
 
It is interesting to note that in accordance with the legal guidelines governing 
development, France and Britain evaluated alternative means of physically 
bridging the English Channel in an ‘in house’ manner (Gossop, 1986, 225). 
That so, the decision made was at the discretion of the French and British 
governments leaving little or no room for input from the general public. This 
procedure has been criticised because it lacked public involvement (Gossop, 
1986, 225). It has also been argued that this process excluded a 
comprehensive evaluation as to whether the project was actually required 
(Gossop, 1986, 225).  
 
If this development had been conducted with public funding the accepted 
procedure would have called for some form of public enquiry (Gossop, 1986, 
225). As no public funding was made available, no public inquiry was required 
and the legal hearings proceeded via a private parliamentary bill (Gossop, 
1986, 225). It has been suggested that a public enquiry was “avoided in order 
to prevent delays in the construction of the Channel Tunnel ” (Essex & Gibb, 
1994, 53).  
 
Lack of consultation about alternative proposals meant that members of the 
general public were not able to voice opinions or concerns about each 
proposal. The design, construction and operational components of each 
proposal submitted were diverse (Grayson, 1990, 5). With this in mind the 
collection of issues that came as a result of each development were different.  
As the public was not part of the project submission process, there was no 
opportunity for the public to converse with the bodies driving the development. 
 
Part of the justification given for choosing the Channel Tunnel development 
was that the impact on marine life was minimal. The flip side of this is that 
there was an immense amount of concern expressed about noise eventuating 
from Channel Tunnel operations (Eurotunnel, 2003, 6). If the government had 
chosen a bridge, the constructional impacts may have been more detrimental 
to the environment but noise may not have been a continuous long term issue 
for local residents. While the developers may have thought that marine 
ecology was an important fact to consider, it cannot be known if the general 
public would also have held the same perception. This helps to show that just 
because one individual places importance on one issue or aspect of a 
proposal, it does not necessarily mean that everyone holds the same opinion. 
This is an important point that needs to be addressed and allowed for 
throughout the selection, design and construction phases of all developments. 
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3.2  The Channel Tunnel Act 
 
Given that the decision had been made to bridge the English Channel with a 
tunnel, the next question to be addressed was what legislation would be 
applied to this development. The Channel Tunnel Act received the Royal 
Assent on      23 July 1987 (Patterson et al., 1992, 6). The passing of the Act 
meant that building the Channel Tunnel was now formally ratified and 
Eurotunnel, who held the mandate to construct and build the Channel Tunnel, 
was given the final stamp of approval. This piece of legislation granted the 
concession for Eurotunnel to hold operational rights to the Channel Tunnel 
until 2042 (Patterson et al., 1992, 6). In other words, the Act stipulated that 
Eurotunnel had the right to a 55 year reign over the operation of the Channel 
Tunnel. In essence the Channel Tunnel Act provides:  
 
for the construction and operation of a railway 
tunnel system under the English Channel, together 
with associated works; to provide for connected 
improvements in the road network near Ashford, in 
Kent, and in the rail network in South Eastern 
Britain; to incorporate part of the railway tunnel 
system into the United Kingdom and to provide for 
the application and enforcement of law in relation 
to, and matters connected with it; to provide for the 
construction of certain highways and associated 
works in the vicinity of Folkestone; and for 
connected purposes (Channel Tunnel Act, 1989, 
1903).  
 
The primary purpose of the Act as defined by the legislation is to “provide for 
the construction and operation of the [Channel] Tunnel rail link” (Channel 
Tunnel Act, 1989, 1908). This piece of legislation provides the legal 
framework in which the Channel Tunnel development was designed around, 
constructed and operated under. The Channel Tunnel Act is an all-
encompassing piece of legislation that had an immense impact on the 
developmental processes of this venture. These impacts occurred because 
the Channel Tunnel Act provided a number of comments and restrictions on 
aspects of the development such as roading.  
 
These aspects included financial components, system design, time 
dimensions, the role of the contractor, definitions relating to important 
components of the project such as “shuttle train”, construction regulations 
such as land acquisition, planning permission, safety provisions, nature 
consultation, highways, public compensation and participation. This document 
defined the process in which land could be temporarily acquired for 
construction purposes, the procedures for which individuals and groups could 
seek compensation and the consents process that needed to be fulfilled prior 
to construction commencing. It also set out a number of important guidelines 
relating to tunnel ownership, facets the tunnel was required to have, 
regulations of operation and the role of local government organisations 
("Channel Tunnel Act, 1989, 1900). One important aspect in the construction 
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of the Act was that the legislative framework allowed for public petitions to be 
heard by the select committee. The impact and role that these petitions played 
is examined further in the following sections.  
 
On the whole this document proved to be the most influential piece of 
legislation applied throughout the development of the Channel Tunnel. It 
proved to have a direct impact on the design, construction and operation of 
the development.  The sole purpose of the Channel Tunnel Act was to provide 
for and govern the Channel Tunnel development.  
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Figure 3.2.1  Timeline of planning procedures for the Channel 
Tunnel 
 
 
31 October 1985 
Submission of Proposals 
20 January 1986 
Governments’ decision 
12 February 1986 
Signing of Anglo-French Treaty 
Spring 1986 
Agreement on concessions 
1986/87 Session of UK parliament 
Government sponsored ‘hybrid bill’ 
introduced to the UK 
 
Mid 1987 
Construction begins 
 
 
 
 
Spring 1991 
Completion of main tunnels 
 
 
 
 
Summer 1993 
Operations begin 
 
 
 
Sourced from (Kershaw & McCulloch, 1993, 21). 
 
The Channel Tunnel Act was constructed as a hybrid bill5. 
                                                 
5 A hybrid bill is a bill that affects the private interests of a particular person or organisation. It 
is initiated by non-Parliamentary petitioners such as local authorities or public organisations 
and is treated as a private bill for part of its passage through Parliament. This gives people an 
opportunity to oppose the bill or to seek its amendment before a select committee in either 
one or in both Houses. Once the bill passes through the select committee and the House of 
Commons it most often becomes treated as a public bill. It is not routine but possible for 
Hybrid bills to also be termed as a "private bill". A private bill is the term used for legislation 
that originates from a particular member of a legislature or parliament or from a member of 
the public. Private bills developed in the United Kingdom as a means of obtaining redress 
from a specific wrong or obtaining a benefit that was not otherwise available through statute 
or the common law (Encyclopedia, 1). 
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Generally private bills are applied to authorise works but there are a small 
number of cases in which hybrid public bill procedures have been applied 
(Popham, 2002, 6). Examples of such projects include the Port of London bills 
1903 and 1908, the London Passenger Transport bill 1931, the Bank of 
England bill 1945 and the Transport (London) bill of 1968-69 (House of 
Commons, 2003, 2). The Channel Tunnel Act was passed a Hybrid bill which 
was termed to be a Public bill. Although it is labeled to be a Public bill there 
were private sections added to the bill during its creation (Wilson, 1991, 31).  
A hybrid bill is in most instances deemed to be a Public Bill this is because it 
relates to the issue of public policy (Popham, 1986, 351). The Channel Tunnel 
development affects public policy as it was seen to directly impact on people’s 
rights and property (Popham, 1986, 351).  
 
From the promoters point of view there are two distinct advantages of having 
a development proceed as a hybrid bill. Firstly, there is “greater certainty of 
success than by way of the planning procedure” and the on the whole the 
process is normally quicker” (Popham, 1986, 351).On the other hand, from the 
public’s point of view the hybrid bill procedure does not leave opponents in an 
optimal position. A quick passage through the select committee can mean that 
petitioners’ cases are sometimes not given an adequate hearing.  
 
There are a set of procedures to review and pass a parliamentary act when a 
development is deemed to be a hybrid bill. Firstly, the proposal is reviewed by 
the House of Commons and/or the House of Lords. At this stage it has already 
been decided that the project is going to go ahead. After the second reading 
the proposal is passed on to a select committee which is made up of a 
number of members of parliament. Following this, the select committee are 
entrusted with the responsibility to “hear the affected parties who petition, and 
to reduce as far as possible the hardship and inconvenience which would be 
inflicted on them if the bill passed into law” (Popham, 1986, 351).   
 
One major criticism with using the hybrid bill procedure is that the select 
committee and the government decide upon the need for the development 
and the project details are passed on to the House of Commons and the 
House of Lords. Petitioners are then given the opportunity to express their 
concerns but they were not able to prevent the actual development (Essex & 
Gibb, 1994, 53). This means that they are able to push for changes in the 
project design but not able to challenge the idea of building a tunnel. Overall 
the select committee heard 4852 petitions which eventuated in 70 changes 
being made to the Channel Tunnel Act (Essex & Gibb, 1994, 53). The majority 
of these changes were deemed to be of minor significance and it was judged 
that the remainder of the petitions were not significant enough to warrant 
modifications being made to the Act.   
 
 
Due to the scope of this report it is not realistic to examine all the provisions 
illustrated within the Act or to provide an extensive examination into the 
means of construction of all the legislative provisions. That said, the provision 
for the land entitlements will be examined to enhance our understanding of 
the role and nature of the Channel Tunnel Act. It is important to remember 
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throughout reading this piece that the systems employed throughout the 
establishment of the Channel Tunnel were done so in compliance with this 
legal statute. This being said, Eurotunnel was not necessarily concerned with 
the social and environmental impacts associated with the Channel Tunnel 
development but they had to manage the impacts in accordance with the 
regulations set out by the Channel Tunnel Act.   
 
3.3  The process of contestation  
 
One important issue that arose as a result of this development was public 
concern towards the impact that this venture would have on the environment 
and the social contexts of Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent. The Channel Tunnel 
Act was the tool that determined how, when and where individuals could 
contest this development. As earlier stated the Channel Tunnel Act is a hybrid 
bill and as such the accepted legislative procedure was that objections should 
be heard and considered by a select committee constructed from within the 
House of Commons and the House of Lords (Wilson, 1991, 31). In line with 
this, objections to the Channel Tunnel development were presented, heard 
and considered in accordance with this procedure. Any individual or group 
wanting to have their case heard had to be deemed ”locus standi” (Popham, 
1986, 351). Locus standi implies that the bill will impinge on an individual or 
group’s interests or property (Popham, 1986, 351).  
 
The definition of ‘Locus standi’ had a direct impact on the way the individual 
concerns were addressed. Only the parties that were deemed to be directly 
affected by the developments had the opportunity to petition against the 
proposal (Popham, 2002, 7). This put the objectors of the proposal at a direct 
disadvantage. Had the Channel Tunnel been as a public bill then anyone who 
wanted to have their concerns heard could have presented their viewpoint to 
the select committee. Those that were seen to be locus standi would have 
their submissions heard providing the “evidence was relevant and not 
repetitious” (Popham, 2002, 7). When an act is constructed as a hybrid bill it is 
up to the discretion of the select committee to deem whether the petitioners’ 
submissions are relevant and if the select committee perceived so the public 
is given the opportunity to voice their concerns and opinions to the select 
committee.  
 
Procedures such as this are obviously extremely subjective as someone else 
is making a judgment as to whether they believe an individual is going to be 
affected. This procedure remains heavily dependent on an individual’s ability 
to provide a brief outline of their concerns. Given that the general public often 
does not have the public speaking skills or knowledge of how to appropriately 
outline an argument this opens the door for individuals who should have had 
the chance to voice their concerns with no opportunity to do so. That said, 
petitioners could only request to have the Channel Tunnel design or 
operational components of the development amended on the grounds that the 
impacts would impinge directly upon their rights and interests (Popham, 2002, 
7).   
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Extensive debate has emerged in relation to the process of contestation that 
governed the Channel Tunnel development. Numerous scholars have 
discussed the process employed as under the hybrid bill procedure. One 
school of thought suggests that local community interests are destined to take 
a back seat at committee hearings under this procedure (Gossop, 1986, 225). 
When looking at the reality of power relationships within such a development it 
seems apparent that some inequality will exist. This rings true as community 
groups and organisations often have limited financial resources and restricted 
access to professional experts. In line with this, it seems obvious how the 
larger more influential organisations with a greater resource base are able to 
present stronger arguments. The impact of such power relations is an 
important component to recognise in understanding the development process. 
This topic will be discussed in further later in this chapter.  
 
Public hearings for individuals or groups who felt that their interests were 
directly affected by the Channel Tunnel began on 24 June 1986 (Gossop, 
1986, 225). In total 5,000 petitions were submitted to be heard by the House 
of Commons and 1,600 to the House of Lords (Wilson, 1991, 31). The House 
of Commons select committee met on 35 different occasions to hear 
objections to the Channel Tunnel development (Wilson, 1991, 31).  This 
development can lay claim to having been involved in the longest select 
committee hearing case to date. The Commons select committee heard 
petitions for a staggering 320 hours (Thompson, 2002, 9).  The proposal then 
went to the House of Lords whose select committee heard petitions for a 
further 248 hours (Thompson, 2002, 9).  
 
Petitioners were able to state their case to the select committee. Time 
restrictions became a contentious issue as many of the petitioners felt that 
they were not given an adequate amount of time to provide the select 
committee with their argument. The sheer volume of petitions resulted in the 
committee instructing groups to proceed with brevity and speed. It has 
subsequently been argued that there were indeed times that the court did not 
accomplish its stated aim of considering “…..the contentious issues in a way 
which gives every petitioner a fair hearing” (Popham, 1986, 351).    
 
A collection of groups, individuals and organisations went to the court room to 
state their cases against the Channel Tunnel development. While some of 
these petitioners came from government organisations a large number of 
groups were community based. Some of the individuals attending the court 
sessions included concerned farmers, environmental specialists, local council 
organisations and other concerned parties. Although the processes governing 
how individuals could petition against the Channel Tunnel have been 
extensively criticised, the developers and government officials remain 
adamant that the correct channels were followed throughout all stages of the 
hearings.  
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 3.3.1  Diagram of the process of contestation 
 
 
 
↓ 
 
 
↓ 
 
↓ 
↓ 
 
 
↓ 
The second reading establishes the Act’s principals. 
The special select committee considers the details of the project and opens the process 
for petitioners to appeal aspects of the development. 
Petitioners travel to Westminster to open their case to the select committee who called 
for evidence from the promoter when required. 
The committee then decides if the promoter has to reply. They make their decision 
based upon the facts presented. 
 If the decision goes in favour of the petitioner their concerns are legislated for in the Act 
under construction.  
 
Information adopted and collated from (Popham, 2002, 6). 
 
The diagram above illustrates the legislative channels that guided the 
contestation process. (Popham, 2002, 6). 
  
Although the legislative framework was adhered to throughout the consent 
process this does not necessarily imply that the rights and demands of the 
individuals living in and around the Channel Tunnel entranceways were met. 
On the contrary, individuals and minority groups did take a back seat to the 
more powerful petitioners. Powerful petitioners had technological knowledge, 
financial resources and were able to present their cases in an articulate and 
persuasive manner. British railways are an example of one group that 
presented a powerful case to the select committee.  
 
One issue that further demonstrates the fact that the process of contestation 
is not entirely fair is that the petitioners had to travel to Westminster this to 
have their case heard. Given that not everyone has the opportunity to take 
time off work or the financial resources to travel to Westminster illustrates how 
this process can be unfair. While there appears to have been adequate 
measures enforced to ensure environmental sustainability, there is a lack of 
evidence to suggest that the concerns of local residents were adequately 
addressed. This is exemplified by the fact that when searching through the 
environmental reports released by Eurotunnel, environmental concerns 
frequently feature while social issues are examined only briefly, if at all 
(Eurotunnel, 2003, 1). 
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The points made above are further reiterated by Popham whom asserts that 
the hybrid bill is outdated and “unfair to petitioners……It also cannot be right 
that a petitioner against the bill for a major scheme, whose property may be 
being compulsorily purchased or badly impacted upon, should have a 
markedly less fair hearing that he or she would have obtained at an inquiry 
under the general law had the scheme been of less importance” (Popham, 
2002, 7). Had this development been conducted as a public bill everyone who 
wanted to have there case heard would have had the opportunity to do so 
without having to prove ‘Locus standi’. 
 
3.4  The role of Environmental Impact Assessment in the 
development process 
 
EIA played an important role in the establishment of the Channel Tunnel Act. 
The value of engaging with environmental impact assessment in the 
development of the Channel Tunnel was recognised from the outset. The 
original tenders submitted for the mandate to build the fixed transportation link 
between Britain and Europe were required to contain an environmental impact 
assessment that outlined the major issues that would come as a result of each 
individual proposal. The EC directive declared that these reports had to “cover 
the direct effects and any individual, secondary, cumulative, short, medium 
and long-term permanent and temporary, positive and negative effects of the 
project” (Kershaw & McCulloch, 1993, 19). The impacts identified were 
categorised in accordance with a predetermined format. These prerequisites 
meant that all reports identified the site and context of the proposed 
development, the method of determining impacts, discussion of the projected 
impacts of both the construction and operation of the scheme and measures 
that could be taken to mitigate these projected impacts (Kershaw & 
McCulloch, 1993, 19). 
 
An extensive debate emerged over whether the early environmental 
assessments should be released to the public. Eurotunnel eventually agreed 
that the contents of these reports should be made public. Information 
pertaining to the development and all of the environmental reports about the 
project were placed in Kent County’s public library (Kershaw & McCulloch, 
1993, 19). All of this information was made available to any interested party 
(Kershaw & McCulloch, 1993, 19). Kershaw suggests that the motivation 
behind releasing these reports was not so much to inform the public but rather 
to enhance the level of public trust for both the government and the 
consortium that has been awarded the mandate to develop and operate the 
fixed transportation link (Kershaw & McCulloch, 1993, 20). Whatever the case, 
the public release of these reports had a considerable impact on people’s 
ability to identify and project the impacts associated with the Channel Tunnel 
development. While these reports identified the major issues, they also helped 
people understand how this development would impact on everyday 
components of their lives. Furthermore, these reports gave petitioners who 
opposed parts of the development’s design the ability to trace their concerns 
back to some hard evidence as identified within these reports.   
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Eurotunnel insisted that consultation was a constituent that was recognised as 
being an essential part of the development process from the beginning 
(Eurotunnel, 2002, 6). Statutory organisations and other independent bodies 
were consulted in relation to the development of the Channel Tunnel. In total 
45 organisations were conferred with in an attempt to establish the issues that 
were deemed to be of importance (Kershaw & McCulloch, 1993, 29). Although 
Eurotunnel did engage in consultation it can be argued that consultation was 
not adequately sought throughout all the stages of the development. 
 
One area where consultation was apparent was in relation to environmental 
issues. Environmental consultants were used throughout the consents 
process in relation to the construction of the EIA (Kershaw & McCulloch, 
1993, 19). In total 46 recommendations were made by the Environmental 
Consultants and 42 of these recommendations were incorporated into the 
Channel Tunnel Act, the remaining concerns were deemed to be not 
applicable (Kershaw & McCulloch, 1993, 19).  The early 1985 specialist 
reports examining the environmental issues associated with the Channel 
Tunnel were collated, the main impacts that appeared in these reports are 
summarised as follows, 
 
1. Landform evaluation 
2. Groundwater and hydrogeology 
3. Soils, land quality and agriculture 
4. Terrestrial ecology 
5. Coastal hydrograph 
6. Marine ecology and fisheries 
7. Archeological features 
8. Architectural heritage 
9. Population housing and recreation 
10. Electricity infrastructure and telecommunications 
11. Water and gas infrastructure 
12. Energy consumption 
13. Design principles and visual impact 
14. Transport networks 
15. Residues and emissions- sound and vibration 
16. Residues and emissions- air 
17. Residues and emissions- water 
18. Residues and emissions- spoil and waste. (Kershaw & McCulloch, 
1993, 20). 
 
These issues became a focal point of parliamentary discussions throughout 
the consent phase of the development. 
 
Recognition of these issues is easily identifiable when examining the Channel 
Tunnel Act. Within the Act provision is made for all of the issues identified 
above (Channel Tunnel Act, 1989, 1900). The primary reason that these 
issues remained major discussion topics throughout the parliamentary 
process is because they all affected the social and environmental contexts. 
The terms “population, housing and recreation” give us indications of the 
aspects of people’s lives that would be affected by the development. Housing 
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is used as a term of reference for the impact that the Channel Tunnel was 
projected to have on households. For example, part of this terminology related 
to the everyday disruption that households would be subject to. 
 
While at first glance these issues appear to impact predominantly on the 
environment in closer examination it becomes apparent how these issues also 
all directly affect the social. While recreation relates to the environment it also 
has a direct impact on people’s ability to use recreational facilities. The EIA 
reports created prior to the construction of the legislative framework allowed 
developers, government bodies and the public to identify the range and 
variety of issues that were projected to occur as a result of the construction 
and operation of the Channel Tunnel.  
 
Lessons can be learnt by examining the early EIA’s after the event. Given that 
the Channel Tunnel was constructed under the English Channel sea bed, the 
impact on marine life and ecology was minimal. The other side of this is that 
because a tunnel structure was chosen there were a large number of logistical 
issues that arose. These logistical issues meant that a large volume of land 
needed to be acquired for construction purposes. It was these reports that 
originally identified the volume of land that was needed. These reports also 
allowed local resident to identify what impact the development was going to 
have on the environment and their lives.  
 
The major criticism of the EIA in relation to the Channel Tunnel development 
is that the reports lacked accurate project definitions and the time constraints 
placed upon the project were too stringent (Kershaw & McCulloch, 1993, 29). 
Channel Tunnel Group- Franche-Manche (CTM-FM) released comments on 
the early EIA’s stating that these studies were “generally thorough, methodical 
and supported by good technical detail, meeting the government’s 
requirements in almost all areas” (Kershaw & McCulloch, 1993, 20). This 
claim has been rebutted by critics of the scheme and one school of thought 
that has emerged criticises the initial consultancy reports and policy 
recommendations as they were all encompassing which meant they were not 
specific enough to directly influence the governments’ and select committees’ 
decision making processes (Essex & Gibb, 1994, 58).  
 
All the major impacts identified within these reports were addressed 
throughout the parliamentary consents process (Kershaw & McCulloch, 1993, 
20). This illustrates the crucial role that EIA played in the consent process, 
development and design phases of the Channel Tunnel development. The 
early EIA reports laid the foundations for the issues that would be addressed 
and mitigated for throughout the later construction and operation phases of 
the Channel Tunnel development.  
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3.5  Consents process 
 
Although the legislative framework governing this development was in some 
aspects comprehensive, this was not the case with regards to the consents 
process that provided the framework for the construction of the Channel 
Tunnel Act. One important issue that sat behind the construction of the 
Channel Tunnel Act was the consents processes adhered before the Bill 
reached the House of Commons and the House of Lords. At the time this 
development was initiated there was no uniformed consents procedure about 
how to deal with major developments in place in either France or Britain. The 
lack of strategic planning is shown by the procedures adopted by both 
governments to establish legal authorisation for the Channel Tunnel (Essex & 
Gibb, 1994, 53). It has also been suggested that the construction of new 
legislative procedures requires “the fullest consideration of all the 
consequential procedures” (Kershaw & McCulloch, 1993, 30).  
 
The lack of systematic procedures also means that major projects such as the 
Channel Tunnel are characteristically dealt with in the same overall manner 
that smaller developments are conducted under. It was ultimately the 
consents processes that allowed for the Channel Tunnel Act to be constructed 
as a Hybrid Bill.  
 
Vickerman and Popham have produced a large amount of, often critical 
literature, on the planning policies employed throughout the construction of 
the Channel Tunnel. Their evaluations identified that there were a number of 
fundamental and structural inadequacies in the planning policies utilised 
throughout various stages of the development. It has been argued that 
inadequate planning policies overlook the needs of minority groups such as 
the poor, the elderly, unemployed and disadvantaged (Essex & Gibb, 1994, 
52). In addition, there appears to be a lack of “local accountability as 
decision[s] are reached by market criteria or by central government 
intervention” (Essex & Gibb, 1994, 52). Another point made by Essex is that 
policies tend to be focused on short term profit maximization which in many 
instances can preclude “the longer-term investment necessary to achieve self-
sustaining economic prosperity” (Essex & Gibb, 1994, 52).   
 
There was no effective national transport policy in the UK and “decision 
making relating to transport, policy making and planning degenerates into the 
realms of the ad hoc” (Goodenough & Page, 1994, 47). This is illustrated by 
the fact that the building of motorways and trucking roads are promulgated by 
the Department of Transport while railway developments are done under the 
decree of the specific developer (Goodenough & Page, 1994, 47).   The effect 
of these separate consents procedures is that “no mode of transport is 
properly considered against the viable alternatives, nor is there an opportunity 
for effective assessment of alternative ways of meeting desired objectives” 
(Goodenough & Page, 1994, 47). 
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3.6  Land acquisition 
 
In an examination of the issues associated with the legislative background it is 
helpful to take one provision of the Channel Tunnel Act and examine it further. 
A number of legislative provisions are outlined relating to land acquisition 
throughout the Channel Tunnel Act (Channel Tunnel Act, 1989, 1901"). These 
provisions stipulate when, how and for what duration the developers were 
able take possession of land. Land acquisition of this nature has a massive 
impact on people. The livelihoods and lifestyles of people were directly 
impacted through Eurotunnel taking temporary possession of land. While 
financial reimbursement was given to people who had land taken for 
construction purposes, this action had a massive impact on the lives of people 
who ended up in this situation. The primary purpose of this examination below 
is to show how the Channel Tunnel Act legislated for this issue. 
 
This legislative piece set out the grounds that the Railways Board could “enter 
upon and take possession of the areas specified in columns (2) and (3) of the 
table for such purposes as are specified in column (4) and may, for any such 
purposes, remove any structures on those lands and provide means of access 
to those lands” (Channel Tunnel Act, 1989, 1900).  
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Figure 3.6.1 Temporary Land Possession  
 
(1) 
Works Nos.  
 
(2) 
Area 
(3) 
Number of land shown 
on deposit plans 
(4) 
Purpose for which  
23, 23A and 23B 
 
 
 
 
 
25A, 25B and 25C 
 
 
26 and 26A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28A and 28B 
 
London borough of 
Wandsworth 
 
 
 
 
London borough of 
Hammersmith and  
Fulham 
 
District of Tandridge 
(parish of Nutfield) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
District of Tandridge 
(parish of 
Bletchingley)  
 
 
 
 
Borough of 
Maidstone (parish of 
Lenham) 
26 
 
 
48 
 
 
4 and 8  
 
 
 
1, 2,  
4 to 7 
and 7A 
 
 
 
 
 
1,2 
and 
5 to 7 
 
 
 
 
2 and 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 and 11 
The provision of 
vehicular access for 
construction. 
The provision of a 
working site and 
vehicular access for 
construction. 
The provision of a 
working site and 
vehicular access for 
construction. 
The provision of a 
working site and 
vehicular access for 
construction for 
Coopers. 
Hill Road at the point 
marked A on the 
deposit plans. 
The provision of a 
working site and 
vehicular access for 
construction to 
Outward Lane at the 
point marked A on 
the deposit plans. 
The provision of a 
working site and 
vehicular access for 
construction to Ham 
Lane at the point 
marked A on the 
deposit plans. 
The provision of a 
working site and 
vehicular access for 
construction to 
Lenham Road at the 
point marked B on 
the deposit plans. 
Sourced from (Channel Tunnel Act, 1989, 1902). 
 
The table above was used by Eurotunnel to decipher when, how and for what 
means they could acquire land for construction purposes (Channel Tunnel 
Act, 1989, 1902). The Act also legislated for the ‘environmental’ regulations 
that had to be adhered to when land was returned to its original owners. In 
addition, when permanent land ownership was necessary the Act illustrated 
how the figure for compensation would be decided upon (Channel Tunnel Act, 
1989, 1902).   
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3.7  Treaty of Canterbury 
 
In addition to the Channel Tunnel Act the Treaty of Canterbury was 
constructed to govern the political entities involved in the development. The 
bi-national nature of the project meant that some form of legislative framework 
had to be constructed to define the roles and regulations of the political 
entities concerned. This legal framework came under the umbrella of the 
Treaty of Canterbury. The Treaty of Canterbury was signed by Margaret 
Thatcher and Francois Mitterrand on 12 February 1986 (Wilson, 1991, 31). 
This piece of legislation “laid down the legal, financial and administrative basis 
on which the two nations would co-operate” (Wilson, 1991, 31). While the 
Channel Tunnel Act primarily relates to the development itself, the primary 
purpose of the Treaty of Canterbury was to provide a political framework for 
the French and British governments to work under.  This document provides 
the legislative framework for matters such as the question of jurisdiction, 
government involvement and national boundaries (Wilson, 1991, 31). 
 
The responsibilities of the British and French governments as outlined in the 
Treaty of Canterbury as quoted in the statue are as follows: 
 
Acticle 2 (1) - High Contracting Parties shall take measures which are 
necessary to ensure that the construction and operation of the Fixed Link shall 
be consistent with their international obligations”.  
 
Article 10 (1) - an intergovernmental Commission shall be established to 
supervise….all matters concerning the construction and operation of the Fixed 
Link”.   
 
Article 10 (3)(f) - considering…..any other matter which appears to it to be 
necessary to consider.  
 
Article 10 (3) (f) leaves the door open for the French and British governments 
to ‘intervene’ in the construction and operation of the Channel Tunnel  venture 
providing that they can justify that it is ‘necessary’. An example of this is 
illustrated in relation to the asylum problem that currently plagues France. 
This issue and the impacts that this issue has will be discussed in depth in the 
later sections of this thesis.  
 
 3.8  Financial considerations 
 
One of the most significant decisions made by the French and British 
governments was to allow the project to proceed as a private development. 
Under this umbrella the mandate to develop and operate the Channel Tunnel 
was awarded to the successful applicant until 2042 (Holliday & Vickerman, 
1989, 3). Opting for this form of concession meant that the British and French 
governments positioned themselves outside the immediate parameters of the 
Channel Tunnel development (Holliday & Vickerman, 1989, 3). This decision 
played an influential role in the legislation that would come to underpin the 
Channel Tunnel development along with dictating the governments’ future 
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involvement in the Channel Tunnel venture. From the outset the French and 
British governments announced that the chosen proposal would have to be 
funded by the private sector. In accordance with this the Channel Tunnel 
came to be a privately funded venture.   
 
The scope of this report does not allow for extensive investigation into the 
financial aspects of this development. Detailed inspection of the financial 
components of the project would add little value to the evaluation. While it is 
not ideal to ignore the financial nature of the project, the major point to keep in 
mind throughout reading this piece is that due to the private nature of 
investment, Eurotunnel has been made openly accountable for funds spent 
throughout the design, development and currently, the operation of the 
Channel Tunnel. In addition to this, there was an immense amount of 
pressure for Eurotunnel to operate the development in a financially viable 
way. This has proved to be yet another challenge for the consortium in charge 
of Channel Tunnel operations. 
   
3.9  Conclusion 
 
The Channel Tunnel Act and the Treaty of Canterbury were instrumental 
pieces of legislation enacted to govern the Channel Tunnel development. The 
primary purpose of the Channel Tunnel Act was to provide for the construction 
and operation of a railway tunnel system under the English Channel. The 
Treaty of Canterbury defined the roles and regulations of the political entities 
involved. The governments behind the development called for EIA to be 
recognised throughout the development phase. The movement towards 
recognising the importance of EIA came as a result of the increasing level of 
social and environmental awareness. EIA reports had a direct impact on the 
legislative process in the way they alerted the select committee and the public 
of the issues that would come as a result of the Channel Tunnel development.  
 
In accordance with the legal foundations underpinning the development 
petitioners were given the opportunity to state their cases against aspects of 
the development that they deemed would be detrimental to society and the 
environment. These petitions resulted in a number of provisions being 
adapted in the finalisation of the Channel Tunnel Act. These provisions helped 
to ensure that Eurotunnel was made accountable for the impacts associated 
with the building and operation of a railway link that lay beneath the Channel.  
The inclusion of the large number of provisions reflects an attempt by 
government to ensure that Eurotunnel constructed and operated the Channel 
Tunnel in a satisfactory manner, in accordance with acceptable regulations.  
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It was the philosophy of the governments in power at the time that allowed for 
the Channel Tunnel to be established as a private entity. This had an 
important impact on the legislative processes that came to be associated with 
the Channel Tunnel development. As no public enquiry was conducted it has 
been suggested that in some instances the legal foundations underpinning the 
development did not recognise the interests of minority groups. It would be 
unrealistic to think that every individual concern could be satisfied, yet the 
overall process would have been improved if the consent process had allowed 
all individuals and groups the chance to express their concerns and opinions.   
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4.0  Scoping and profiling 
 
As shown earlier, environmental and social impact assessment was employed 
as a tool in the construction of the legislative framework. This chapter 
explores the theoretical framework of social and environmental impact 
assessment which provides some justification for the method and format 
taken by this thesis. This involves the processes of scoping and profiling. In 
this chapter, profiling refers to processes such as the identification of key 
issues, boundaries for the study and identification of areas of likely impact 
(Taylor, et al., 2004, 63). To do this, the chapter pays particular attention to 
the role and purpose in which environmental impact assessment played within 
the developmental stages of the Channel Tunnel proposal. In addition, notes 
are provided about the guidelines constructed to govern EIA and SIA within 
the EU. As an accompaniment to this, discussion is presented about the 
problems associated with data collection.  
 
The scoping section of this chapter refers to the process of analysing and 
identifying the social context and historical trends as relevant to the regions of 
interest (Taylor et al., 2004, 67). This section of this chapter examines the 
social and environmental contexts of Nord-Pas de Calais, Folkestone and 
Sangatte. This is because these areas house the Channel Tunnel 
entranceways and Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent remain major axes where 
international passengers, goods flows and communications converge. The 
topic areas discussed throughout this section include landscape, ‘traditional’ 
industries, local government structures, landscape characteristics and historic 
buildings.  
  
 4.1  Social and Environmental Impact Assessment 
 
The twentieth century marked the beginning of the rise in environmental 
consciousness (Sheail, 2002, 147). As the public became more concerned 
with the impact that developments were having on the environment, social 
pressure was put on the bodies driving development to be accountable for the 
adverse affects that came as a result of their ventures (Sheail, 2002, 147). 
One reaction to this pressure was to use social and environmental impact 
assessment as a tool that could help reduce and mitigate the concerns of 
various environmental groups, local government organisations and the 
general public.   
 
The definitions of social and environmental impact assessment are diverse, 
yet there are common themes throughout the definitions provided by different 
writers. Social assessment can be defined as the process of examining the 
potential impacts on the daily lives of individuals and communities by 
assessing the consequences that a project or policy decision may bring 
(Burdge & Vanclay, 1995, 1). Environmental impact assessment can be 
defined as “a study of the probable changes in the various socioeconomic and 
biophysical characteristics of the environment which may result from proposed 
or impending actions” (Balbach et al., 2001, 5).   
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Whether this study is referenced as being a social impact assessment or an 
environmental impact assessment, the implications are similar. The reason 
being, that all environmental impacts have social implications. That said, 
these ‘professional terms’ come to mean one and the same thing. When 
examining the environmental issues in some shape or form the social is 
recognised. For example, while dust at first appears to be an environmental 
impact, the main impact of this issue is concentrated on local residents. While 
initial identification of this issue may analyse how the waste materials were to 
be covered while they were transported, it is the concern towards the impact 
that this issue is having on the ‘social’ that drives the analysis (Taylor et al., 
2004, 67). In light of this, groups, environmental bodies, individuals and the 
general public are all representative of the ‘social’.  
 
Social and environmental impact assessment procedures are now required as 
part of the development process in a large number of countries.  
There has been a global push towards sustainable development. In 
accordance with this, interest has been shown towards measures that can be 
used to mitigate and manage environmental impacts. Social and 
environmental impact assessment is a tool used to help alert developers and 
governments about the adverse effects that come as a result of particular 
developments. Environmental assessments have been established as a: 
 
technique and a process by which information about the 
environmental effects of a project [are] collated, both by the 
developer and from other sources, and taken into account by 
the planning authority in forming their own judgment on 
whether the development should go ahead (Goodenough & 
Page, 1994, 33). 
 
Social and Environmental Impact Assessment encourages the bodies driving 
the development to act in a proactive rather than reactive manner. This is 
achieved through early issue identification which allows developers to adapt 
plans and implement strategies that will allow for these impacts to be 
effectively mitigated. Early impact identification enables proponents to design 
and implement effective mitigation strategies to ensure that the social and 
environmental ‘costs’ associated with developments are minimised while the 
positive benefits are able to be enhanced.  
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Figure 4.1.1  Social and Environmental Impact Assessment project 
cycle 
 
 
Sourced from (Taylor et al., 2004, 78).   
 
The figure above illustrates components of the social impact assessment 
process. The stages in this process are clearly visible along with notes made 
relating to the activities that characteristically occur within each phase.  
 
There is as yet no officially recognised unified form that governs the field of 
social and environmental assessment in Britain or France. For this reason EIA 
and SIA reports remain somewhat inconsistent. There are however, some 
general principles increasingly adhered to within this field. Currently “a 
fundamental measure of success of the appraisal is whether it is complete, 
adequate and an honest attempt to make a full disclosure of all the impacts” 
(Goodenough & Page, 1994, 46).   
 
As time has progressed, social and environmental impact assessment has 
become an integral part of modern day development. Changes over the last 
decade have meant that EIA and SIA have become fundamental elements of 
development within the EU. In 1988 the Commission of the European 
Communities (CEC) brought the Directive on Environmental Impact 
Assessment into force (Balbach et al., 2001, 233). In addition to this, in 1990 
the EU created the European Environmental Agency (EEA) (Balbach et al., 
2001, 233). The main rationale behind establishing this organisation was to 
develop a universal environmental policy for the EU member states (Balbach 
et al., 2001, 233). The Executive Director of the EEA declared that this agency 
is an EU institution that aims to serve the community and the member states 
with information to “support policy making for environmental protection put in 
the perspective of sustainable development” (Balbach et al., 2001, 223). While 
the guidelines set out by the EEA are not obligatory, this organisation does 
provide guidelines for EU member states to refer to when constructing EIA or 
SIA and when examining environmental effects.  
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 Figure 4.1.2  Annex IV of 1985 CEC Environmental Directive 
 
TABLE 9.1 Annex IV of 1985 CEC Environmental Directive (as amended 
in1997) 
Description of the project*, including in particular: 
 
• A description of the physical characteristics of the whole project and the land-use 
requirements during the construction and operational phases 
• A description of the main characteristics of the production processes, for instance, 
nature and the quality of the materials used 
• An estimate, by type and quality, of expected residues and emissions (water, air 
and soil pollution, noise, vibration, light, heat, radiation, etc.) resulting from the 
operation of the proposed project 
 
An outline of the main alternative studied by the developer and an indication of the 
main reasons for his or her choice, taking into account the environmental effects. 
 
A description of the aspects of the environment likely to be significantly affected by 
the proposed project, including, in particular, population, fauna, flora, soil, water, air, 
climate factors, material assets, including the architectural and archeological 
heritage, landscape, and the inter-relationship above the above factors. A description 
of the likely significant effects of the proposed project on the environment resulting 
from: 
• The existence of the project 
• The use of natural resources 
• The emission of pollutants, the creation of nuisances and the elimination of waste, 
and the description by the developer of the forecasting methods used to assess the 
effects on the environment 
 
A description of the measures envisaged to prevent, reduce, and where possible, 
offset any significant adverse effects on the environment.  
 
A non-technical summary of the information provided under the above headings. An 
indication of any difficulties (technical deficiencies or lack of know-how) encountered 
by the developer in compiling the required information.  
 
This description should cover the direct effects and any indirect, secondary, 
cumulative short, medium, and long term, permanent and temporary, positive and 
negative effects of the project.   
Sourced from (Balbach et al., 2001, 234).  
 
The framework above sets out the guidelines for effectively constructing an 
impact assessment as defined by the EU. While these points remain 
guidelines, this outline is a useful source of reference for what impact 
assessment should contain and address in order to be comprehensive and 
effective (Balbach et al., 2001, 234).  
 
At the time the Channel Tunnel was developed environmental and social 
awareness was a relatively new phenomenon in both Britain and France. In 
line with this, as illustrated throughout the body of this thesis, the methods 
employed to construct EIA and SIA were not governed by comprehensive 
guidelines as compared to the reports that would be required today.   
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4.2  Geographical layout of Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent 
 
Kent is located on the south east corner of Britain between the Thames 
estuary and the Channel Tunnel6. It is the closest Kent county to the 
European continent.  Kent has a population of over 1.33 million and the Kent 
County Council remains the largest county authority in Britain(Collier, 2001, 
3). Kent’s GDP per capita falls below the national average which currently sits 
at 97% of the EU15 average (Collier, 2001, 3).  
 
Two internationally recognised landmarks that are symbolic to the Kent area 
are the Straits of Dover and the White Cliffs. This area was under continuous 
threat from invasion throughout the European wars. In addition to this, Kent 
remains a historic embarkation point for overseas travellers entering and 
leaving Britain. Dover is a seaport located in Kent. Folkestone is located about 
8 miles South West of Dover (Dictionaries, 1). Shakespeare Cliff is situated 
northeast of Folkestone. There are currently three historic coasts located in 
South East Britain. One of these is Shakespeare Cliff. The road from Dover to 
Folkestone follows the sea around Shakespeare Cliff. These cliffs have 
emerged as being a natural wonder of the modern world. As the course of the 
Channel Tunnel ran beneath these cliffs they have gained an immense 
amount of international exposure.  
 
Nord-Pas de Calais is the most northern region in France. The region extends 
from just south of Boulogne which is adjacent to Picardie, to its most northern 
point which meets the Belgian border neighbouring West-Vlaanderen and 
Hainault (European Commission, 1996, 30). Crévecoeur and d’Armes are the 
two towns that make up Nord Pas de Calais (Eperon, 1991, 156).  Nord-Pas 
de Calais has a population of approximately 4 million (Council, 2004, 4).  
 
Historically this area was an industrial region that remained excessively 
dependent on a select range of abating industries (Bruyelle & Thomas, 1994, 
91). In 1990, the last coal mine was closed and since this time vigorous 
regional development strategies have been developed in an attempt to offset 
the substantial job losses that had come as a result of the loss of traditional 
industries (Bruyelle & Thomas, 1994, 92). Although these strategies did 
promote new economic growth, particularly in the vehicle industry, 
unemployment continued to rise throughout the 1990s (Bruyelle & Thomas, 
1994, 92). Nord-Pad de Calais, in a similar way to Kent, has a GDP per capita 
below the national average sitting at 80% of the current EU15 figure (Collier, 
2001, 3).  
 
From a geological perspective Nord-Pas de Calais is divided into three parts, 
these being the Artois hills in the west, the Lille basin in the east and the 
marshlands that run parallel to the Channel coast  (European Commission, 
1996, 30). The ‘Métropole Nord’, Lille-Roubaiz-Tourcoing is the most densely 
populated area and the commecial hub of the Nord-Pas de Calais region 
(European Commission, 1996, 30). Sangatte is located west of Calais and is 
the site where the Channel Tunnel first reaches French soil. Slightly inland 
                                                 
6 See Map 1.2.1 in Chapter One. 
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from Sangatte in a wedge of country engulfed by steep walls of the chalk 
downs became the site where the majority of construction material was stored 
and transported throughout the making of the Channel Tunnel.  
 
From an environmental perspective both Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent proved 
to be areas that were adequately resourced to allow for easy construction and 
operation of the Channel Tunnel. The primary reason for this can be attributed 
to the abundance of uninhabited land evident in and around these regions.  
Much of the British land needed for the Channel Tunnel is “protected 
landscape of attractive topography or of high agricultural quality” (Simmons, 
1986, 15). On the French side, large land resources of flat land were available 
for construction purposes (Simmons, 1986, 15).  Much of the land used for 
operating and constructing the Channel Tunnel was cultivated for agricultural 
purposes. This meant that the direct impact that the Channel Tunnel had on 
individuals was minimised. If the land used had been urbanised large 
numbers of people would have been directly affected. In line with this, these 
two regions possessed adequate amounts of uninhabited land that allowed for 
ease of construction of the Channel Tunnel. 
 
4.3  The social contexts of Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent  
 
The English Channel which separates Kent from Nord-Pas de Calais remains 
a physical barrier that denotes both a cultural and linguistic barrier. Aside from 
the fact that both these regions exist in Europe, there are notable cultural 
differences apparent between the French and Kent. Aside from the linguistic 
barrier these areas have quite different governmental institutions and social 
characteristics.   
  
In understanding the social contexts of both Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent, it is 
important to recognise the regional autonomy of both these regions. The 
Channel Tunnel is of primary concern to Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent. The 
social makeup of these regions will be “transformed, both directly or indirectly, 
as local and regional planning strategies seek to maximize the benefits which 
may be accrued from the Channel Tunnel project” (Bruyelle & Thomas, 1994, 
87). Regional impacts of this development were influenced by their existing 
public policy structures. In addition the contrasting public policies and 
responses in the two regions have provoked divergent “public policy priorities 
and response to its short term impacts” (Collier, 2001, 3).  
 
Within Britain regional bodies hold advisory roles to national government 
(European Commission, 1996, 51). In this sense they are able to pressure 
government bodies and local authorities. However, it must be noted that the 
decision making processes are conducted outside the realms of the regional 
arena. Kent’s location and size enables it to place a considerable amount of 
pressure on central government, while the smaller less influential regional 
authorities find it harder to pressure the bureaucratic machine. While Kent 
holds a considerable amount of power in contrast to other regional bodies, the 
decisions made that affect Kent are predominantly made from within the 
London metropolitan area, Kent’s northern neighbour.  
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Although France’s governmental institutions are centrally organised, regional 
authorities have some power to self govern. Nord-Pas de Calais utilised this 
and developed a strong profile of “future orientated regional policy-making and 
planning” (European Commission, 1996, 51). Although this has given the 
region slightly more clout when it comes to influencing national government, 
Nord-Pas de Calais has not historically been an area of major interest for the 
French national government.  
 
Figure 4.3.1  Outline of the structure of the British Government 
  
Derived from (Wikipedia, 2005, 1) 
Parliament 
Monarchy House of Lords House of Commons 
Queen Elizabeth II  People with inherited and assigned titles Prime minister and members of 
parliament 
Secretary of States 
County Councils
 
The diagram above shows the basic hierarchy of the British government 
institutions. As apparent by this representation the national government holds 
supreme power in the governmental hierarchy7 (Wikipedia, 2005, 1). 
 
Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent are seen to place a considerable amount of 
emphasis and recognition on their heritage. Both regions respect and 
celebrate the historic landmarks specific to their region. Appreciation of their 
historical landmarks meant that the impact on these movements was 
monitored under the watchful eye of local residents. Recognised attractions 
include bridges, castles, statues, churches and so forth.  
 
4.4  The economic status of Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent 
 
In the early 1900s the two major industries in Kent were agriculture and 
mining. Kent maintained an adequate level of economic buoyancy through its 
agriculture (Dictionaries, 1). The three major agricultural industries that 
occupy the landscape of Kent are orchards, hop-gardens and livestock. Kent 
is resourced with an abundance of fertile agricultural land. This attribute has 
resulted in Kent being promoted as “the garden of England” (European 
                                                 
7 See Appendix One for further explanation on the structure and role of the separate divisions 
of the British Parliament. 
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Commission, 1996, 30). Paper, brewing, pharmaceuticals and chemicals are 
other industries that make up the economic landscape of Kent. 
 
While Kent is mainly a rural area, it also has a reasonably sized suburban 
culture. This suburban character comes because of Kent’s close proximity to 
metropolitan London. The railway transportation system that links Kent and 
London has augmented the establishment and intensification of the suburban 
character currently identifiable within Kent. This has occurred because a large 
proportion of Kent’s residents commute into the London area to work.  In the 
1980s, Kent’s economy stagnated after the demise of a large number of 
coalmines. Industrial closures of this nature resulted in a number of job losses 
(Collier, 2001, 3).  This decline was in part combated through transportation 
and communication restructuring which now prop up Kent’s economy. Up until 
the early 1980s, Kent remained a relatively depressed region.  In line with this, 
the idea of any infrastructure that would increase employment and inevitably 
fuel economic growth was welcomed warmly from an economic perspective 
(Holliday & Vickerman, 1989, 4). This is reiterated by the fact that economic 
projections associated with the Channel Tunnel remain a major focus of 
reports produced prior to the establishment of the Channel. 
 
Except for the port activities in Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne the vast majority 
of France’s northern coastal region remains rural in character (European 
Commission, 1996, 26). Nord-Pas de Calais’s economy is predominantly 
driven by old industry. Mining and business generated through ports remain 
the dominant industries of this region. Historically, this area was one of the 
major industrial centers in France with coal mining, steel and textiles all 
playing prominent roles.  
 
Over the last two decades there has been major restructuring of industry. In 
line with this, the viability of industries such as textile and coal mining has 
dramatically declined. Nord-Pas de Calais has recently become a region 
focused on high-tech industries such as plant breeding, seed improvement, 
microcomputers, lasers, infrared technology, hygiene products, composite 
materials and surgical instruments (European Commission, 1996, 39). 
 
Nord-Pas de Calais suffered a series of economic crises throughout the 1960s 
and 1970s. Calais almost universally welcomed the renewed interest in 
physically bridging the English Channel. This standpoint was fuelled by the 
need for economic revitalisation. Support for the Channel Tunnel was almost 
exclusively balanced on the ability of the developers to convince residents and 
local government bodies that financial benefits would accrue from the venture 
(Grayson, 1990, 6).   
 
Both Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent act as gateways for entering and exiting 
Britain and Europe via the English Channel. These two regions are endowed 
with amenities in respect to railways, ferry ports and motorways (European 
Commission, 1996, 44). These facilities proved to be important resources for 
travellers, freight transferral, business people and so forth.  
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4.5  Conclusion 
 
Increasing awareness of social and environmental issues put pressure on the 
bodies driving developments to be accountable for the impacts that would 
arise as a result of their ventures. Environmental impact assessment was 
recognised as a tool that could help developers manage and mitigate the 
issues at hand. SIA & EIA are iterative processes that allow for early issue 
identification which enables developers addressed the important issues in the 
beginning stages of the developmental process. The EU has established a 
framework to assist developers construct effective and consistent SIA & EIA 
reports.  
 
Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent once relied on industries such as coal, mining 
and textiles. The demise of these industries towards the end of the nineteenth 
century forced these two areas into a period of economic uncertainty. As a 
result of this, the economic benefits projected to come as a result of the 
Channel Tunnel development were warmly welcomed by both these regions. 
Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent are socially, politically, economically and 
culturally diverse. Regional bodies in Britain hold advisory roles to national 
government while France’s government institutions are more centrally 
organised. The main similarity between Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent is their 
landscape. Both regions have considerable amounts of uninhabited farmland. 
This resource proved to be useful for storing construction materials while it 
also allowed for the establishment of the Channel Tunnel terminals.        
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   5.0  Alternatives 
 
In the early 1980s various French and Kent community groups, business 
representatives and government officials voiced interest in establishing and 
selecting a structure to bridge the English Channel. This chapter identifies the 
project proposals submitted for the mandate to physically bridge the English 
Channel. The reasons behind the eventual decision are explained and the 
justification that the select committee gave for making their final decision is 
identified. In addition to this, geological considerations, financial imperatives 
and technical aspects of the proposal that was chosen are examined. 
Following this, the route options that were considered are explored. The 
reasons given for the selection of the chosen route are also provided as an 
accompaniment to this discussion. The design and construction components 
of the chosen structure are also documented. Graphical depictions are 
provided to give an accurate representation of the structure and form of the 
chosen design. The final section of this chapter presents a summary of the 
issues that were anticipated to be of importance in the venture that would 
physically bridge the English Channel.  
 
 5.1  Project options 
 
In 1984, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and President Francois Mitterrand 
met to discuss the notion of building a fixed transportation link that would 
connect Britain and France (Grayson, 1990, 5). In April 1985, a joint working 
group of officials commissioned independent studies on the viability of 
designing a fixed transportation link to connect the two countries. (Grayson, 
1990, 5).  Proposals submitted for tender were to be received by 31 October 
1985 (Wilson, 1991, 15). 
 
A number of restrictions were placed on the tenders. The fixture had to be 
fixed, not floating and the engineering had to be robust (Kirkland, 1995, 2). 
Robust engineering in this context meant that developers had to illustrate that 
they would be using tried and tested technology and methods that were 
consistent with acceptable practice and international standards (Kirkland, 
1995, 2). Any physical structure that would connect Britain and France would 
be a complex venture from both a development and engineering perspective. 
The technological, geographical and financial components of the project 
needed to be fully investigated and extensively understood by developers, 
government bodies and the financial backers. The sheer logistics and size of 
this venture meant that engineers, corporate bodies and developers had to 
think outside the square to produce viable transportation link alternatives. 
 
The tender process was opened to the public. There were however, no 
financial resources made available to help with the research and production 
costs of developing a viable proposal. The proposals submitted had to meet 
the interests of the governments and specialists involved in the consultation 
process. In accordance with this, the contending proposals for the mandate to 
build the Channel Tunnel were in some senses constrained. The main 
objective of a fixed transportation link was to facilitate travel and cargo 
distribution between the two countries. Once these prerequisites were 
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satisfied, the proposal then had to be financially viable. In addition, the 
proposals sought to satisfy the interests of the selection committee. This 
committee consisted of government officials, transportation expects and public 
consultants from within Britain and France (Grayson, 1990, 5). These 
measures were by no means easy to satisfy. The assortment of tenders 
submitted by individual companies emphasises the dynamic nature of this 
exercise. The range of alternatives were extensive, the means of construction 
varied and each proposal was a pioneer in comparison to projects of a similar 
nature previously developed.   
 
Ten proposals were received but after official consultation by the selection 
committee a short list was established which comprised of contenders to be 
further scrutinised (Grayson, 1990, 5).  The four proposals contrasted greatly 
and varied in design, cost and mode of transport. Four private entities were 
responsible for the submissions. In deliberations over the applications, the 
entities that had submitted proposals were scrutinised along with the viability 
of the proposals themselves.  
 
The four submissions that were short listed were as follows: 
 
A) The Channel Expressway application was tendered for by Sealink UK 
which remains a subsidiary of British Ferries (Hunt, 1994, 173). This scheme 
proposed “two road/rail tunnels, each 11 metres (36 feet) in diameter, with a 
single rail track running down the centre of each tunnel” (Hunt, 1994, 173). 
The single rail track was to allow one train per hour in each direction. The cost 
was estimated to be around £2.6 billion (Grayson, 1990, 5).   
 
B) Channel Tunnel Group- Franche-Manche (CTG-FM) submitted a proposal 
that consisted of a “two single track bored tunnel for through and shuttle 
services together with a linked service tunnel” (Grayson, 1990, 5). The 2,500 
page report projected that the tunnel would come at a cost of £2.6 billion 
(Grayson, 1990, 5).   
 
C) Eurobridge’s proposal consisted of independent road and rail links. They 
suggested “a four-deck bridge with spans 5km long plus a single track bored 
tunnel for BR/SNCF8 through service” (Grayson, 1990, 5). The rail link would 
be operated through a single bored tunnel while the road link design 
suggested a series of suspended bridges that were enclosed in a tube 
(Kirkland, 1995, 5).  At £5.3 billion this was the most expensive application 
submitted (Grayson, 1990, 5).   
 
D) Euroroute was the fourth tender in the short listed group. This proposal 
included a road and rail link (Kirkland, 1995, 5). The rail link arrangement was 
designed in two bored single track tunnels (Kirkland, 1995, 5). The road 
design comprised two artificial islands at “ the edges of the main shipping 
lanes joined to shore by bridges and to each other by an immersed tube 
                                                 
8 BR/SNCF stands for British Rail and the Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francis. In 
1978, this group started planning a single track rail tunnel that was specifically designed for 
through rail services. This became known as the “Molehouse” proposal when plans were put 
forward to government officials in 1979. (Grayson, 1990, 5).   
 47
tunnel” (Grayson, 1990, 5).  In addition, two track bored tunnels designed for 
through services of BR/SNCF were part of the proposal.  It was anticipated 
that this venture would come at a cost of around £5 billion (Grayson, 1990, 5).   
 
Each contender had invested a considerable amount of time, energy and 
financial resources into their proposal. As a result of this, they all possessed a 
healthy interest in acquiring the contract to build the fixed transportation link. 
Because of the large amount of resources that were invested in the proposals, 
each entity put a substantial amount of energy into making sure that the 
selection committee was aware of their proposal’s merits.  
 
The schemes presented were scrutinised by a team of specialists. This group 
consisted of senior representative officials from both governments, the House 
of Commons Transport Committee and British Land Use Consultants 
(Grayson, 1990, 5). On 1 November 1985, the Transport Secretary Nicolas 
Ridley spoke in the House of Commons after receiving the proposals 
(Anderson & Roskow, 1994, 30). He stated, “Today is a very important day in 
the long saga of whether there should be a fixed link between Britain and 
France. The most important requirement is that whatever link may be chosen, 
it must be capable of being financed without any support from local 
government funds or government guarantees against commercial or technical 
risks” (Anderson & Roskow, 1994, 30). Deliberations commenced and the 
remaining four proposals were considered against the conditions that had 
been outlined when the contact had been initially put up for tender. Discussion 
points important to each proposal were as follows: 
 
A) The Channel Expressway was a main contender for the contract, although 
officials felt that this venture might cost more than the proposal predicted. In 
addition, it was thought that there would be some engineering challenges 
associated with establishing a road tunnel. This is because road tunnels 
involve much larger bore holes than rail tunnels and this can present serious 
engineering problems and require costly solutions (Anderson & Roskow, 
1994, 34). Officials also questioned how people would cope with driving 
through a tunnel for a prolonged period. Overseas research suggested that 
drivers travelling through tunnels for extended periods “have trouble keeping 
to lanes” (Anderson & Roskow, 1994, 34). In line with this, there were 
concerns that a tunnel of this nature may result in large numbers of casualties. 
In addition, ventilation mechanisms for extracting exhaust fumes were a 
concern. The proposal submitted was not comprehensive enough to dispel 
concerns about exhaust fume extraction. 
 
B) Channel Tunnel Group- Franche-Manche produced a well researched 
proposal. CTG-FM was made up of sixteen separate entities these being five 
British contractors, three British banks, five French contractors and three 
French banks (Neerhout, 2001, 5). This consortium had acquired a 
reasonable amount of financial support. Japanese banking institutions had 
expressed an interest and prior to the mandate being announced. CTG- FM 
had received over £4 billion of provisional loan commitments (Anderson & 
Roskow, 1994, 26). As the international banking community was seen to 
support this venture CTG-FM was a step ahead of their competitors. The 
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technological aspects of this form of development were tried and tested. It 
was an unpretentious, technologically sound, functional proposal that was 
backed by many from the outset. 
 
C) Although Eurobridge had mustered support from some reputable bankers, 
the viability of this project was questionable from the beginning. The primary 
reason for this was technological concerns. The selection committee had 
strong doubts as to whether bridge technology had advanced far enough for 
such a project. The bridge spans were 5km long which was over three times 
the length of the Humber Bridge which still remains one of the longest bridges 
in the world (Anderson & Roskow, 1994, 31).  
 
D) EuroRoute sought to open a rail link 18 months after the completion of the 
road link (Anderson & Roskow, 1994, 31). This proposal was later modified so 
that the rail and road links would be opened at the same time (Anderson & 
Roskow, 1994, 31). In addition, financial commitments to this project were 
unstable and there were some technological concerns about the project’s 
overall design. EuroRoute with its bridge/tunnel scheme was at one point 
seen to be a favourable option. The primary reason for this was that Prime 
Minster Thatcher was known to have preferred this tender “as it could not be 
threatened by rail unions and because most motorists would probably prefer a 
straight drive across” (Wilson, 1991, 15). 
 
After a short period, two major contenders emerged. The race to win the 
mandate to design, build and run the fixed transportation link came down to 
CTG-FM and the scheme dubbed EuroBridge. Later discussions suggested 
that EuroBridge was never a real threat to CTG-FM due to the financial and 
technological concerns associated with the building of such an enormous 
bridge. In December 1985, the French and British governments made a joint 
announcement (Grayson, 1990, 5). The winner was the tunnel/shuttle scheme 
that had been submitted by the consortium Channel Tunnel Group- France- 
Mache SA (CTG- FM).  In the time following, the consortium responsible for 
constructing and operating the Channel Tunnel came to be dubbed 
Eurotunnel. The Eurotunnel stamp is now the internationally recognised name 
for the consortium that developed, and currently owns and operates the 
Channel Tunnel.  
    
In early 1986 Prime Minister Thatcher and President Francois Mitterrand met 
and made a joint announcement confirming that CTG-FM had been awarded 
the mandate “for the development, construction and operation of a fixed link 
across the English Channel” (Hunt, 1994, 178). Mitterrand remarked at the 
event enthusiastically that “France is delighted to bear witness to the fact that, 
when one has the will, it is always possible to unite people who are already 
drawn together by so many things…” (Hunt, 1994, 178). Prime Minister 
Thatcher marked the event with a somewhat more pragmatic response 
proclaiming that “We have made the right choice and passed a fundamental 
stage in the co-operation between the UK and France…the project is not the 
last word, it is the first step. It will be judged a thrilling undertaking” (Hunt, 
1994, 178). The consortium of experts that had deliberated over the submitted 
proposals released information outlining the reasons for preferring the 
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tunnel/shuttle scheme. There were a number of reasons given for the decision 
to adopt the CTG-FM scheme. They can be summarised as shown below. 
  
1. Financially, it was the most sound 
2. It carried the minimum amount of technological risks  
3. It was viewed to be the safest alternative for passengers 
4. Maritime problems were rendered invisible 
5. It was seen to be the least vulnerable to terrorist threats and 
sabotage 
6. Experts anticipated that the environmental impacts associated with 
this proposal could be adequately contained (Hunt, 1994, 179).   
  
From both an engineering and financial perspective this development was an 
unprecedented venture. This project had to be exclusively funded through the 
private sector. As a result of both governments’ reiterating that this venture 
had to be privately funded, financial imperatives become an increasingly 
important facet. The financial backing obtained for Eurotunnel’s scheme was 
an important factor that enhanced the viability of the Channel Tunnel 
proposal. 
 
In addition to these factors, a number of other aspects played a role in the 
final decision of choosing Eurotunnel’s scheme. Back in 1857, Gamond had 
done extensive investigation into the viability of an underground tunnel that 
ran beneath the English Channel. During his explorations he discovered that 
“the chalk measures underlying Kent and Nord/Pas de Calais also lay beneath 
the sea bed” (Neerhout, 2001, 38). Later geological studies exposed that the 
chalk measures merged with clay forming almost a uniform stratum of chalk 
marl. This stratum began only 40 metres below the seabed of the English 
Channel (Neerhout, 2001, 38). Throughout the geological world it is a 
commonly known fact that chalk marl is one of the best tunnelling mediums. 
The existence of this natural resource meant that a tunnel, according to 
geologists was a sound and viable option.   
 
Along with support from the geological community there were other institutions 
and factors that sanctioned the development of a tunnel. It was widely 
acknowledged that the English Channel is an incredibly busy seaway that 
carries over 600 ships each day (Neerhout, 2001, 38). Any structure that was 
constructed over the English Channel would in due course be hazardous to 
ships crossing the strait. The treacherous conditions provide enough 
challenges for sailors but adding a fixed structure into the mix would have 
inevitably been at some point a deadly hazard for shipping. Environmental 
considerations also sanctioned the viability of this specific development. The 
fact that that CTG- FM proposed that the tunnel would run entirely 
underground meant that the link would not interfere with the marine 
environment (Eurotunnel, 2003, 5). In light of all this, the decision was made 
and the English Channel that had divided two nations since the last ice age 
was going to be bridged by a fixed transportation link.   
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 5.2  Tunnel route options  
 
Once Eurotunnel had been given the mandate to design, build and operate 
the Channel Tunnel, the next question was what route this structure would 
take across the English Channel. One of the significant factors that had 
facilitated the decision to build the Channel Tunnel was that the rock that lay 
beneath the English Channel was idea for tunnelling. The logistical demands 
of construction and use of a marine tunnel increase as the length of a tunnel 
increases.  In light of this, the initial proposal for the Channel Tunnel was to 
cross the Strait of Dover. This was primarily because this section of water 
crosses the narrowest corridor of sea that separates France and Britain. This 
corridor spans at its most southern point from Folkestone to Cap Blanc-Nez to 
the North from St Margaret’s Bay to Sangatte (Darby et al., 1992, 43). 
Naturally the shortest route across the English Channel would have been the 
favoured route, yet geology ultimately decided what route would be chosen.   
 
As mentioned earlier Gamond did exploratory work on the seabed during the 
1880s. It was his work that first advocated the route from Shakespeare Cliff to 
Sangatte. Drawing on the work done by Gamond, developers in the 1990s 
sought to gain a more extensive understanding of the geological makeup of 
the ocean bed. In investigating this, geologists took samples from the sea-bed 
off jack up platforms which worked rather like miniature oil rigs (Wilson, 1991, 
39). The main objective of this form of exploration was to determine how the 
different sediments would react to drilling. This in turn allowed geologists to 
detect faults and fissures in the sea bed. Evidence collected confirmed that 
the chalk cliffs that run along the banks of the English Channel also continue 
throughout the Strait of Dover and these chalk cliffs appeared to contain no 
major faults (Kirkland, 1995, 21). In addition, it was found that chalk marl 
formed the lower third of the chalk layer that lay under English Channel and 
had a clay content of between 30 and 40% (Kirkland, 1995, 21).  
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Figure 5.2.1  Borehole testing 
 
 Sourced from (Kirkland, 1995, 23). 
 
The picture above illustrates the borehole tests carried out under the English 
Channel. A significant proportion of these tests were done during historical 
attempts to bridge the English Channel (Kirkland, 1995, 23). 
 
Middle chalk is poor material for boring through (Wilson, 1991, 39). Beneath 
this lies lower chalk which comprises of a mixture of chalk and clay (Wilson, 
1991, 39). This rock consists of “cyclic alternations of grey marly chalk with 
stronger limestone bands” (Darby et al., 1992, 43). Lower Chalk is an 
adequate medium to bore through and geological studies illustrate that the 
qualities possessed by chalk marl proves to be superior for this form of 
excavation.  This substance is a strong, slightly plastic soil that rarely 
fractures. Another important attribute of chalk marl is that it is impervious 
(Eurotunnel, 1994, 26). Impervious implies that this substance is essentially 
waterproof. Recognising this, engineers decided to follow the chalk marl 
through the ocean floor. Chalk marl undulates through the sea bed and as a 
result the Channel Tunnel also had to do so.  
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Figure 5.2.2  Layout and geological composition  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sourced from (Biggart et al., 1992, 57). 
 
This graphical representation illustrates the geological composition of the 
English Channel seabed.  This picture also demonstrates the line that the 
Channel Tunnel was designed to take through the seabed from Sangatte to 
Shakespeare Cliff (Biggart et al., 1992, 57).  
  
The route selected spans from the Folkestone terminal at Cheriton to the 
terminal at Coquelles, which is near Nord-Pas de Calais (Hunt, 1994, 184). 
The Cheriton terminal is located near Folkestone in Kent and the Coquelles 
terminal is close to the French village of Frethun in Nord-de-Calais (Neerhout, 
2001, 7). The French terminal covers 1,186 acres of land while the Kent 
terminal covers 346 acres of land (Neerhout, 2001, 7). The main reason for 
the variation in surface coverage is that the British terminal was geologically 
constrained which resulted in considerably more land being destroyed in 
France. In turn with this, the environmental impacts associated with land 
excavation were more apparent in France than Britain. 
 
The Channel Tunnel would run on average 45 metres below the seabed 
(Kirkland, 1995, 13). The route that was eventually decided upon dived into 
the seabed at Sangatte in France and travelled underground until 
Shakespeare Cliff in Britain, where it tracked inland until it reached Folkestone 
terminal (Jensen, 3).  The Channel Tunnel travels for 23.6 miles under the 
seabed and is 31.35 miles long (Jensen, 4). Overall, the route forms a ‘w’ 
shape with the highest points being at the two entrances where the Channel 
Tunnel connects with land.  
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5.3  Design and construction components of the chosen 
proposal 
 
The scheme Eurotunnel submitted to tender of the contract to build a fixed 
transportation link between Britain and France was a complex proposal. In 
order to understand the issues that arose from this particular proposal it is 
important that the proposal itself is extensively examined.  
 
CTG- FM decided that the Channel Tunnel would be drilled by tunnel boring 
machines. Tunnel boring machines are “mobile excavation factories that 
combine drilling, material removal, and the process of shoring up the soft and 
permeable tunnel walls with a concrete liner” (Dictionaries, 1). Tunnel boring 
machines look like huge cylinders and extend up to the length of two football 
fields (Jensen, 4). They have massive “wheel wields tungsten teeth” that chew 
through chalk at an average rate of 15 metres per hour (Jensen, 4). The soil 
excavated by these machines was to be extracted via conveyor belts which 
would be located behind the machines. The logistics of digging two tunnels 
over 30 metres apart in alignment with one another are profound. It was 
essential that Eurotunnel ensured that the tunnels intersected at the same 
point. Providing the machines met within 250 centimetres of themselves they 
could be bridged (Jensen, 5). It would have been disastrous for Eurotunnel if 
the passageways were off course by over a radius of themselves (Jensen, 5). 
In accordance with these concerns, radar waves and conceptualised laser 
guidance systems were to be employed as mechanisms to ensure that the 
two boring machines remained on track.           
 
Although, geological tests proved that the seabed contained chalk marl which 
provides favourable for tunnelling there were some challenges associated with 
the tunnelling of the Channel Tunnel. Firstly, the length of Channel Tunnel to 
be excavated was in excess of 20km longer than any tunnel previous 
excavated (Dictionaries, 3). Secondly, in order to meet the construction 
programme requirements an extremely high rate of advance was required 
(Dictionaries, 3). In addition, as with any venture of this nature there are often 
geological complications. Surveying cannot provide absolutely comprehensive 
findings thus there was always the possibility of tunnelling into unexpected 
ground conditions (Dictionaries, 3).    
 
The CTG- FM proposal was a rail transport scheme that would directly link the 
UK rail networks with those in and around continental Europe (Biggart et al., 
1992, 18). One major component of this scheme was that it would link the 
existing transportation schemes in Britain and France with one another. This 
development was an essential component in the idea of connecting Europe’s 
high speed railway infrastructures with those in the United Kingdom.  
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Figure 5.3.1  Proposed European high speed fixed transportation 
network 
 
 Sourced from (Biggart et al., 1992,).  
 
The picture above shows a graphical depiction of the idea of establishing a 
high speed fixed transportation link in and around the United Kingdom and 
Europe. The Channel Tunnel proves to be an important link in this initiative 
(Biggart et al., 1992,). 
   
From a design perspective there were a number of interesting elements 
apparent within Eurotunnel’s design. These were: main tunnels, cross 
passage and equipment, pressure relief ducts, pumping stations, crossovers 
and tunnel drives (Biggart et al., 1992, 18).The Channel Tunnel proposal 
consisted of three 59km tunnels that ran parallel to one another (Kirkland, 
1995, 13). These tunnels were lined with “pre-cast concrete segmented rings, 
except for areas of poor ground or at tunnel connections or intersections, 
where ductile iron linings were used” (Neerhout, 2001, 7). Tunnels are often 
lined with ductile iron although in the case of Channel Tunnel particular care 
was taken to ensure that the materials used were of the highest quality. To 
decide on the materials and design of the tunnel lining 18 development 
studies were carried out by CTG- FM (Neerhout, 2001, 7). The materials used 
have 120 year longevity meaning that the Channel Tunnel structure should 
not encounter any significant deterioration before the year 2114.       
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Two main tunnels were designed in the plans. Each tunnel held a “single rail 
track, and a separate service tunnel lying midway between the running 
tunnels and connecting them by cross-passages” (Biggart et al., 1992, 18). 
The rail tunnels transport trains in one direction. The trains do not reverse but 
rather change direction by travelling around loop systems situated at the 
Folkestone and Coquelles terminals. The main motivation behind developing 
two separate rail tracks was to minimise construction risks and to ensure that 
the environment established would allow for easy long term operation and 
maintenance. These two main tunnels were designed to carry trains North and 
South while the third smaller tunnel was intended to serve as an access 
tunnel to allow for maintenance (Dictionaries, 2). The primary function of the 
service tunnel was to “provide access to and from the running tunnels 
throughout their length in both normal and emergency conditions, and it allows 
the tunnels to be evacuated within 90 minutes” following any emergency 
halting of trains (Biggart et al., 1992, 19).  
 
Every 375 metres, the two main tunnels and the service tunnel are connected 
by cross passages that are used for service, ventilation, emergencies and 
maintenance (Kirkland, 1995, 14). The crossovers connect the main tunnels 
and service tunnel while they also house equipment such as transformers, 
switchgear and signalling equipment (Biggart et al., 1992, 19).  
 
Pressure relief ducts are an essential part of any underground tunnel system. 
The main tunnels are joined every 250 metres by pressure relief ducts which 
allow for the exchange of air (Kirkland, 1995, 14). Air pressure and 
aerodynamic resistance increases as trains travel long distances through 
enclosed structures. In line with this, without pressure relief ducts, the power 
needed to fuel a train dramatically increases which means that the train will 
become inefficient from a resource perspective. The design proposed that five 
pumping stations would be assembled along the tunnel structure. 
Maintenance and operational requirements meant that four double crossovers 
needed to be incorporated “between the two terminals to allow trains to cross 
from one running track to the other; two crossovers lie close to the two 
terminals; the other two lie under the sea and divide the tunnel length into 
three approximately equal sections” (Biggart et al., 1992,19).   
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Figure 5.3.2  Layout of the Channel Tunnel development 
  
 
 Sourced from (Biggart et al., 1992, 19). 
 
Figure 5.3.2 provides a basic illustration of the layout of the Channel Tunnel 
project. Sangatte and Shakespeare Cliff were the two major construction sites 
needed for this venture. As both areas were rural they proved to be well suited 
for construction and operation purposes.  
 
Special trains were needed to transport cargo and passengers through the 
Channel Tunnel. Ordinary locomotives posed a variety of concerns for 
developers. In light of this, Le Shuttle and Eurostar trains were the trains 
chosen to operate in the Channel Tunnel (Jensen, 6). Le Shuttle trains 
transport passengers, cars, vans, goods vehicles and cargo in specially 
designed shuttle wagons (Kirkland, 1995, 14). Eurostar accommodates 
automobiles and passengers crossing the English Channel. The main concern 
with ordinary diesel locomotives is that they would emit too much pollution into 
the tunnel passageways. The benefit of Le Shuttle and Eurostar is that both 
trains are electronically propelled. They are also sculptured in an aerodynamic 
manner which helps to reduce air friction and minimise the temperature within 
the Channel Tunnel. 
 
5.4  Issues specific to the chosen transportation route 
 
In examining what route the Channel Tunnel should take, decision makers 
had to identify the issues specific to each viable route. It was inevitable that 
with a development such as this numerous social and environmental issues 
would arise as a consequence of both the establishment and operation of the 
Channel Tunnel. While some impacts would only exist in the short term, 
others would have a long term impact on society and the surrounding 
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environment. These issues will be further examined in the following sections 
of this report but for now it is essential that they are recognised. They are as 
follows:   
 
A) Construction; the volume of materials and machinery needed was 
immense. Developers needed to ensure that both Sangatte and 
Shakespeare Cliff had the space to store and leave equipment needed 
for digging and constructing the Channel Tunnel.  
 
B) Economic implications on communities at Sangatte and Shakespeare 
Cliff; the economic implications on these two areas would be 
substantial. This impact was split into three distinct categories, these 
being; employment; tourism and manufacturing; and other service 
industries (The Royal Town Planning Institute, 1990, 24).  
 
C) Wider economic implications for the two countries; it is inevitable that a 
link such as this would have a huge impact on aspects of the 
economies within France and Britain. While this seems obvious, it was 
important that developers were able to substantiate that the economic 
benefits of this structure would outweigh the economic downfalls.  
 
D) Environmental implications on marine life and the natural habitat of the 
two areas because of construction and the long term operation of the 
Channel Tunnel; the environmental implications associated with the 
development of the Channel Tunnel are large. While disruption to land 
was unavoidable, developers needed to ensure that measures to 
mitigate and manage these impacts were identified and implemented.   
 
E) The political implications; it was inevitable that this venture would have 
some impact on the political climate in Europe. While it was unlikely 
that it would result in hostility between European nations, it was 
important that developers recognised that the Channel Tunnel would 
have some impact on the political arena. 
   
5.5  Conclusion 
 
There were a number of project proposals submitted in an attempt to win the 
mandate to physically bridge the English Channel. Euroroute’s road and rail 
link, Eurobridge’s deck bridge, Channel Tunnel Group- Franche-Manche’s 
(CTG- FM) two single track bored tunnel and Channel Expressway’s Sealink 
were the final four proposals scrutinised by the selection committee. The 
Channel Tunnel Group- Franche-Manche’s (CTG- FM) tunnel design was 
eventually awarded this mandate. The reasons given in favor of this scheme 
included: 
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1. Financially it was the most sound 
2. It carried the minimum amount of technological risks  
3. It was viewed to be the safest alternative for passengers 
4. Maritime problems were rendered invisible 
5. It was seen to be the least vulnerable to terrorist threats and 
sabotage 
6. Experts anticipated that the environmental impacts associated with 
this proposal could be adequately contained.  
 
Geological considerations, land resources and population issues were also 
components of the Channel Tunnel proposal viewed favourably by the 
selection committee. It was decided that this structure would cross the English 
Channel reaching Britain at Folkestone and France at Sangatte. These two 
areas in turn came to house the two Channel Tunnel entranceways. Two main 
tunnels, cross passage and equipment, pressure relief ducts, pumping 
stations, crossovers and tunnel drives were the important design components 
of Eurotunnel’s proposal.  
 
Political implications, economic impacts on Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent, 
economic implications for the European Union, construction disturbance and 
environmental issues were all identified as impacts that would be central to 
the development of this particular scheme. These impacts become central 
discussion points throughout the remainder of this thesis.  
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6.0  Development and construction Issues 
 
Construction on the Channel Tunnel began in 1986 and by 1994 the facility 
was ready to begin operations. A number of significant issues came out of the 
construction phase of this development. This chapter identifies why and how 
Eurotunnel made an attempt to manage and mitigate the issues that arose 
during the construction of the Channel Tunnel. Following this, the 
methodologies that were used to evaluate the impacts of the venture are 
discussed. Notes are provided on the role that public opposition played in the 
development and construction phases of this development. The positive 
impacts that came as a result of this development are also outlined.  
 
The nature of the complaints voiced by local residents during the construction 
phase of the Channel Tunnel is a significant discussed point of this chapter. 
The issues surrounding temporary and permanent land acquisition are shown 
and particular attention is paid to how this issue was legislated for in the 
Channel Tunnel Act. Soil disposal and noise pollution are two issues that 
occurred as a result of the construction of the Channel Tunnel are discussed 
throughout this chapter. In addition, soil transportation and the impact that this 
issue had on local residents are explored. The impacts that these issues had 
on the social contexts of Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent is demonstrated in 
relation to all of the issues identified. Furthermore, the mitigation methods 
Eurotunnel employed in an attempt to mitigate the affects of these issues are 
discussed. The final part of this chapter provides a summary on Eurotunnel’s 
performance.  
 
 6.1  Eurotunnel’s role and assessment of impacts  
 
Worldwide interest in the Channel Tunnel can in part be attributed to the 
development size, logistical demands, engineering requirements, geological 
considerations, financial imperatives, legislative framework as well as the 
political arena in which this development was conducted within. All these 
aspects influenced what issues arose as a result of the Channel Tunnel 
development and the methods that were used to mitigate these issues. The 
manner in which the environmental and social impacts were addressed and 
mitigated have made the Channel Tunnel development a pioneering project of 
its time for Britain and France.  
 
From the outset Eurotunnel openly pledged that environmental considerations 
would remain a focus throughout the development and the operation of the 
Channel Tunnel. In accordance with statutory requirements, Eurotunnel has 
had to produce environmental reports that examine the immediate and long 
term impacts that have come to be associated with the construction and 
operation of this piece of infrastructure (Goodenough & Page, 1994, 26). The 
contractor was required to “design and construct the works to reduce and, 
where practical, to avoid all harmful effects on the environment and 
inconvenience to local communities as a consequence of the design, 
construction, commissioning and maintenance of the works” (Kershaw & 
McCulloch, 1993, 22). Additional notes were made about how to appropriately 
manage ‘noise, dust and other emissions, disposal of liquid and solid waste, 
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protection of water bodies and remedial measures for any uncontrolled 
emissions” (Kershaw & McCulloch, 1993, 22).    
 
It is essential that the methodology that was used to evaluate these impacts is 
noted. Data were collected from regulatory bodies and interest groups and 
used in conjunction with existing information about the landscape 
(Goodenough & Page, 1994, 42). This data was collated, analysed and scores 
were allocated to visual and landscape impacts along with the source of the 
impacts themselves (Goodenough & Page, 1994, 42). The scores acted as a 
guide for developers allowing them to identify significant issues early on in the 
developmental phase. Micro survey reports were also conducted. 
(Goodenough & Page, 1994, 42). The primary motivation behind these reports 
was to allow for the development of effective mitigation proposals 
(Goodenough & Page, 1994, 42).  
 
Photomontage techniques were used to help developers understand the level 
of effectiveness of different mitigation strategies for various impacts 
(Goodenough & Page, 1994, 42). This form of analysis is a relatively 
unbiased, environmental tool, which helps to give a visualisation of future 
environmental conditions (Goodenough & Page, 1994, 42). Although the 
examination of landscape and visual impacts is inevitably somewhat 
subjective, this form of technique helps ensure that landscape and visual 
impacts are recognised throughout the development phase.  
 
It was unavoidable that this particular development would come at a 
considerable cost to the social and environmental contexts of Nord-Pas de 
Calais and Kent. In accordance with the governing legislation Eurotunnel was 
required to project, identify and address the issues at hand. This is illustrated 
by the fact that Eurotunnel formalised its environmental management 
strategies by establishing the Environmental Management System (EMS): an 
organisation created to ensure continuing improvements in Eurotunnel’s 
environmental performance and to help control the actual and projected 
impacts that would come as a result of the Channel Tunnel venture 
(Eurotunnel, 2002, 3). The main objectives of Eurotunnel’s environmental 
policy were to: 
 
• continually improve their environmental management  
• maintain regulatory compliance 
• prevent pollution 
• voluntarily communicate with the pubic (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 9). 
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6.2  Public opinion 
 
As a background to understanding why Eurotunnel was seen to be committed 
to managing and mitigating the social and environmental issues associated 
with the Channel Tunnel it is valuable to explore public perceptions towards 
the development. The public was opposed to aspects of the Channel Tunnel 
before its inception (Essex & Gibb, 1994, 57). This opposition can in part be 
attributed to the wide variety of impacts that were projected to be felt within 
Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent. Environmental protests in Nord-Pas de Calais 
and Kent become frequent events once it was publicly announced that 
Eurotunnel had been given the mandate to build and operate the Channel 
Tunnel. A corollary of this opposition was that environmental concerns came 
to the attention of national and international media organisations. Such 
attention meant that Eurotunnel had to be seen to recognise the 
environmental issues from the outset. French environmental groups were not 
as active as the British groups and as a consequence additional 
environmental constraints were placed on the construction of the Channel 
Tunnel in Britain (European Commission, 1996, 82).   
 
A large proportion of local residents in Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent strongly 
opposed the Channel Tunnel development. Public agencies in these two 
areas gathered information to lobby against aspects of the development 
(Essex & Gibb, 1994, 57). With the proposal being given the go-ahead and 
the legislative background established to allow for the development, the public 
was forced to focus on ensuring that appropriate measures were taken to 
protect the public and the environment from the detrimental effects that would 
come as a result of this venture. To do this the developers and councils 
publicly released reports such as the Kent Impact Study to help outline to the 
public the impacts projected to arise as a result of the Channel Tunnel 
development. These reports were then used by the public when they 
presented issues of concern to Eurotunnel.  
 
Regional authorities, local residents and environmental organisations were 
given the opportunity to voice their concerns providing that they could prove 
locus standi. Although people were given this opportunity, the overall process 
of contestation has been openly criticised. This has in part been attributed to 
the fact that at the time of the development there was no comprehensive 
process governing how to deal with social and environmental impacts. This 
meant that the process employed by the developers as not necessarily tried 
and tested.  Eurotunnel endeavoured to annul public concern by establishing 
organisations and structures while conducting research in an attempt to find 
solutions that would satisfy local residents. In light of this, a number of social 
and environmental issues were addressed prior to the construction of the 
Channel Tunnel. Examples of issues that were addressed in this way include 
roading and land acquisition as outlined in Chapter Three. 
 
The general public was concerned about the disruption that construction 
would have on their daily lives. Eurotunnel used public consultation and public 
exhibitions to help identify the concerns of local residents. This gave 
Eurotunnel the opportunity to explore mechanisms that might be employed to 
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mitigate the issues accordingly. Although it was impossible to render invisible 
all the issues, developers did attempt to address and manage the issues 
under the watchful eye of local residents and authorities. The level of public 
participation in the design, construction and operational phases of this 
development is difficult to determine. The primary reason for this is that a 
large proportion of the literature produced on public consultation is 
“constrained by the need for confidentiality” (Goodenough & Page, 1994, 45). 
This means that drawing precise conclusions about the mitigation methods 
Eurotunnel used to dispel public concern is difficult to accurately determine.    
 
 6.3  The positive impact 
 
In order to comprehensively examine the Channel Tunnel development it is 
necessary to place some emphasis on the positive impacts that this 
development has had on the environment and society. Measuring positive 
impacts is characteristically subjective, ambiguous and difficult to quantify. 
This occurs because there is often no direct link between the development 
and the social and environmental benefits. In line with this, the points made 
below remain subjective and for this reason they have been identified and 
supplied as a supplement to the overall themes in this chapter. Two social 
benefits that have been reported to be associated with the development of the 
Channel Tunnel are the reduction in road accidents and road congestion 
(Devon et al., , 43). These benefits have been attributed to the transfer of 
freight from road to rail (European Commission, 1996, 82). It was projected 
that freight transference or ‘piggy-backing’ would also help curb traffic 
congestion (TED Case Studies, 3).  
 
Although there has been a tangible reduction in freight traffic due to the 
transfer from road to rail, it is important to recognise that this does not 
necessarily mean that there was a net reduction in road usage. This is 
because the reduction in traffic volumes from the transference in the mode of 
freight transportation, may have been counteracted by the increase in traffic 
flows in Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent from the construction and operation of 
the Channel Tunnel. It has been reported that, on the whole, traffic volumes 
have risen, although the exact figure is difficult to quantify because of data 
gaps. Problems with data comparisons occur as there was a limited amount of 
statistical data collected on traffic volumes in and around Nord-Pas de Calais 
and Kent prior to the establishment of the Channel Tunnel. In light of this, no 
accurate traffic volume comparisons can be made.  
 
While the transfer of freight from road to rail may have had a positive impact 
on the environment through declining pollution levels, the increase in road 
usage from people travelling via the Channel Tunnel has arguably increased 
the overall vehicle pollution levels emitted within Nord-Pas de Calais and 
Kent. In addition, while construction noise levels may also have declined since 
the end of the construction period there has been additional noise created 
from the operation of the Channel Tunnel which has in effect resulted in noise 
transference rather than a net reduction in noise.  
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6.4  The environment 
 
It is undeniable that the local landscape was significantly affected by the 
construction of the Channel Tunnel. One environmental issue that was of 
concern to environmentalists and the general public was the acquisition and 
conversion of agricultural land. A large area of land was adapted for 
construction purposes. Much of the land used by Eurotunnel had traditionally 
been used for agricultural means. The vast majority of this land was however, 
returned to the owners once it was no longer required. Land possession of 
this nature had a direct impact on the environment. This is demonstrated by 
the fact that a large volume of vegetation was destroyed on land that was 
temporarily and permanently acquired for the construction and subsequent 
operation of the Channel Tunnel.  
 
The temporary and permanent acquisition of land had a significant impact on 
local residents. Although financial compensation was granted when people 
were forced to relocate, people in this predicament had their lives 
transformed. Daily routines, income, lifestyle and schooling are some common 
examples that illustrate how everyday aspects of local residents’ lives were 
affected. 
 
Landscape was another environmental concern that took centre stage for 
locals and the developers. This issue was of particular concern for residents 
living in and around the Channel Tunnel entranceways. People often choose 
to live in a certain area because of its surrounding habitat. That said, it is not 
surprising that the prospect of the woodlands that people once admired from 
their kitchen window being replaced with concrete walls was not an appealing 
exchange. People who were going to be affected in this way openly voiced 
concern to the developers. This concern resulted in Eurotunnel being made 
accountable for ensuring that the visual landscape of the area was left or 
restored to be aesthetically pleasing.  
 
Considerable emphasis was placed on Eurotunnel to be accountable for the 
impacts associated with land excavation. Parliamentary petitioners, local and 
statutory authorities, members of the public and conservation bodies called for 
Eurotunnel to give public affirmation outlining the “extent and horticultural 
details [of] the landscape proposal” (Kershaw & McCulloch, 1993, 62). In 
addition, the House of Lords select committee was obliged to publicly release 
material about the development sites so the public could identify areas of 
concern. In an attempt to address the concerns expressed by local residents 
Eurotunnel submitted a proposal to the local authorities reaffirming that 
vegetation would be replanted and agricultural land restored to its original 
state.  
 
In keeping with the natural landscape Eurotunnel chose to replant species that 
were reflective of the local environment (Channel Tunnel Rail Link, 2002, 7). 
The restoration plan sought to ensure that the landscape was restored to be 
aesthetically pleasing, that vegetation screened the railway where appropriate 
and that the landscape encompassed woodlands that would be made publicly 
accessible (Channel Tunnel Rail Link, 2002, 7). In addition to restoring 
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agricultural land, Eurotunnel had to ensure that soil structures were preserved 
while being relocated and that soil was adequately stored. This helped to 
ensure that only minimal intervention was needed to alleviate residual 
compaction during restoration (Channel Tunnel Rail Link, 2002, 11).  
 
It is interesting that chalk grassland topsoil was taken from temporary work 
areas, re-spread at different areas, managed for the duration of construction 
period (three years) and then replaced in the areas that it had been taken 
from (Kershaw & McCulloch, 1993, 24). Eurotunnel was also seen to take 
some responsibility for the environment through the application of their 
Environmental Management System (Channel Tunnel Rail Link, 2002, 11). 
Within this work area Eurotunnel employs full time site managers and support 
staff who are responsible for environmental protection (Channel Tunnel Rail 
Link, 2002, 11). The Environmental Management System project coordinators 
worked closely with local authorities to manage and mitigate the 
environmental issues that arose as a result of the construction of this 
development.  
 
Damage to the landscape was an issue that was covered in the early EIA 
reports. The Nature Conservancy Council was one party that outlined a 
number of concerns to the select committee. Holywell Coombe was one area 
that the Council petitioned strongly against being disturbed by the project. 
They opposed key geological deposits being disturbed during the construction 
period. Due to geographical and track work constraints Holywell Coombe 
could not be left totally undisturbed but a mitigation method was adopted 
which saw Eurotunnel leave half this area undisturbed.   
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Figure 6.4.1  Holywell Coombe 
 
 
Sourced from (Biggart et al., 1992, 13). 
 
 
The picture above was taken in 1986 prior to the construction of the Channel 
Tunnel. 
  
 
Sourced from (Biggart et al., 1992, 13). 
 
The illustration above shows Holywell Coombe in August 1989 at the peak of 
construction. This picture shows the portion of this area that was left 
undisturbed.  
 
There has been an apparent lack of literature released on ‘green’ opposition 
during tunneling (TED Case Studies, , 2). Although some reference was made 
towards the impact that this development had on the environment, literature 
focuses on logistical aspects of this venture. Page provides insight into why 
this may have occurred. He asserts that although a “number of assessments 
of the Channel Tunnel’s potential impact on the human and physical 
environments have been undertaken by economists and geographers….these 
have not been disseminated widely, since much of the research has been 
technical, and in some cases confidential to clients when undertaken on a 
consultancy basis” (Page, 1994, 3). Recognising the complaints received from 
the public throughout the construction phase provides insight into the issues 
that the public were concerned about between 1986 and 1994. 
 
By the end of 1990, 378 people out of a population of 37,960 living in the Kent 
region had lodged 618 complaints against the construction works (Kershaw & 
McCulloch, 1993, 27). In other words, one percent of Kent’s population made 
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a formal complaint against the development in question in 1990. A significant 
proportion of Kent’s population does not live in close proximity to the Channel 
Tunnel terminals. This means that a significant proportion of the public living 
in close proximity to the construction sites felt they were adversely affected. 
These complaints were logged by public relations staff and environmental 
staff were on hand to provide information and technical know-how when 
required (Kershaw & McCulloch, 1993, 27). Some attempt was made to 
mitigate grievances. To do this, Eurotunnel liaised with the general public and 
the Channel Tunnel Complaints Commissioner followed up genuine 
complaints with the local authorities (Kershaw & McCulloch, 1993, 29). 
 
6.4.2 Construction complaints  
 
 
 
The graph above outlines the number and nature of monthly complaints 
received by Eurotunnel from the general public during the construction of the 
Channel Tunnel (Kershaw & McCulloch, 1993, 27).  
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6.5  Land Issues 
  
The land that was permanently and temporarily taken for construction 
purposes was a contentious issue from the beginning. Temporary and 
permanent land possession was legislated for in the Channel Tunnel Act. As 
demonstrated in Chapter Three this piece of legislation set out how, when and 
by what means, Eurotunnel could take short term or permanent possession of 
land for construction purposes. 
  
A portion of the land that was used for construction purposes was government 
owned. In addition, only a small proportion of land was permanently required 
by Eurotunnel to manage and operate the Channel Tunnel. In light of these 
two points, only a small proportion of local residents have to permanently give 
up their land and homes. However, this does not detract from the fact that the 
social costs of land acquisition were significant. Although some of the social 
impacts were short term in nature there were some long term concerns 
associated with land acquisition. Examples of long term issues include visual 
landscape and land restoration.  
 
In accordance with the legal foundations governing land acquisition, a large 
proportion of the high grade agriculture land that was utilised for construction 
purposes, was restored to its former condition and returned to the faming 
community after the construction of the Channel Tunnel had been completed 
(Channel Tunnel Rail Link, 2002, 3). Compensation was awarded to 
landowners who had to give Eurotunnel permission to use their properties 
temporarily or permanently. The dominant means of reparation was financial 
reimbursement for inconvenience and loss of income. Adequate financial 
compensation was a contentious issue. Obviously Eurotunnel wanted to pay 
the minimum possible while people in this position needed to feel that they 
were being satisfactorily compensated.  
 
A number of land disputes ended up in court. In most instances Eurotunnel 
and the claimants negotiated the compensation figure. The general idea 
underpinning these negotiations was the greater the impact the larger the 
figure of financial compensation that was awarded to the affected parties. 
Those who received financial compensation were not necessarily happy with 
the amount they received however given the contentious nature of financial 
compensation disparities of this nature are somewhat inevitable.  
 
Land valuation and the resale price of properties proved to be another 
controversial impact fuelled by the establishment of this piece of 
infrastructure. Land depreciation caused a great deal of ill feeling. This is 
demonstrated by one example where three claimants sought an injunction 
against Eurotunnel as they believed they had been unable to sell their 
properties for the “true market price” (LexisNexis, 1995, 1).  
 
A number of other cases illustrate how local residents felt that the Channel 
Tunnel development had an impact on the resale value of their homes 
(LexisNexis, 1995, 1). A number of people proceeded with grievance cases 
via the legal system. In these instances the claimants sought compensation 
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under private law which meant that they had to pay to file legal proceedings 
(LexisNexis, 1995, 1). Compensation awarded was done so in accordance 
with the Channel Tunnel Act. Some of the cases that proceeded to court went 
in favour of the complainant, although the figures and details of such 
settlements are confidential. Concern relating to land depreciation was 
expressed by residents from the early stages of the project design. This is not 
surprising given that noise disturbance caused by the construction of the 
Channel Tunnel did in some instances affect the land value of the properties 
in and around the immediate vicinity of the two Channel Tunnel entranceways.  
 
6.6  Soil disposal 
 
Early on in the design process developers acknowledged that soil disposal 
was an issue that needed to be managed. It was known that the Channel 
Tunnel would have a mammoth impact on the landscape due to earthworks. 
Sand was pumped rather than trucked to reduce the environmental impact of 
this activity (Duggleby & Pilkington, 1993, 42). Duggleby suggests that soil 
disposal had a significant impact on land and vegetation (Duggleby & 
Pilkington, 1993, 42). Other negative impacts that came from redistributing 
soil included salt drainage and dust (Duggleby & Pilkington, 1993, 43).     
 
A large volume of surplus soil, greensand and gault clay was generated 
through the excavation of the Channel Tunnel. At the conclusion of the 
construction period, tunnel workers had mined 10 million cubic metres of soil 
from under the English Channel (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 5). Eurotunnel had to 
design a plan that would satisfy governments, environmental bodies and the 
general public. Two major schemes were eventually adopted to mitigate the 
effects of soil disposal. The final product of these two schemes would come to 
be known as Fond Pigon and Samphire Hoe.  
 
Soil disposal proved to be a problem as soil needed to be transported and 
disposed of at varying locations. Both construction sites were underpinned by 
greensand and gault clay (Duggleby & Pilkington, 1993, 42). In France and 
Britain greensand was used as a foundation for embankments while the sand 
was pumped into lagoons (Duggleby & Pilkington, 1993, 42). On the French 
side, the soil that had been extracted was mixed with water to form a slurry 
and was then pumped to Fond Pigon (Jensen, 5). Over time this mud mixture 
solidified and this soil provides the grounding for a park which is now known 
as Fond Pigon. This park was designed to be aesthetically pleasing so that it 
would fit into the landscape of Cape Blanc-Nez (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 5). At the 
completion of construction Eurotunnel replanted this area which is nowadays 
a nature reserve that is a popular site for wildlife (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 5). This 
reserve also provides for a variety of recreational activities such as walking 
and biking. A French coastal conservation authority (Conservatoire du Littoral) 
has been entrusted with the responsibility to ecologically manage this area 
(Eurotunnel, 2003a, 5).   
 
At the British end, excess soil was disposed of along Shakespeare Cliff 
(Jensen, 4). The main intention of placing soil in this location was that it was 
anticipated a small level bed on the waterfront would be a useful tool for 
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storing equipment needed for the construction of the Channel Tunnel (Jensen, 
4). Eurotunnel made a effort to avoid transporting soil on public highways and 
to reuse soil (Channel Tunnel Rail Link, 2002, 4). From an environmental 
perspective it was inadequate to dump the soil on the waterfront, so, 
Eurotunnel decided to construct a “seawall” which came to be know as 
Samphire Hoe (See Author). This 75 acre area is essentially a new piece of 
British land which is found at the foot of the Dover cliffs (See Author). 
Although this area was primarily designed for construction purposes at the 
completion of the Channel Tunnel, this land was made available to the public.  
 
In July 1997, part of Samphire Hoe was opened to the public for recreational 
activities such as bird watching, walking and sea angling (See Author).  
Particular attention was paid to ensure that there is continual wildlife 
conservation and visitor management in this area. This site provides a habitat 
for about “130 species of plant, 80 species of bird and over 200 species of 
invertebrates” (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 5). These two areas, Fond Pignon and 
Samphire Hoe are the largest visible legacies left from the construction phase 
of the Channel Tunnel (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 5). 
  
 6.7  Noise pollution 
 
Noise pollution was an issue of concern for local residents from the outset. A 
significant volume of noise was generated through transporting materials 
needed for the construction of the Channel Tunnel. In addition to construction 
materials, transporting soil, sand and gravel was an issue that took centre 
stage for developers (Deakin, 1986,112). The noise and dust created from 
transporting materials exasperated local residents. In an attempt to mitigate 
this issue, developers ensured that transported material was sprayed with 
water, covered and moved during working hours (Kershaw & McCulloch, 
1993, 27). This helped ensure that dust was contained to a minimum and 
residents were not disturbed during the evening by heavy vehicles. 
Transporting materials for construction purposes was also confined to daylight 
hours.  
 
Although this mitigation strategy was effective for people who worked outside 
of their homes during the day, this issue still had a considerable impact on 
shift workers, homemakers, the elderly and home based employees and 
employers. Although noise pollution from the construction of the Channel 
Tunnel was a concern for developers and the public, the short term nature of 
this problem meant that developers and local communities placed greater 
emphasis on mitigating the issues that occurred through the operation of the 
Channel Tunnel. This issue is examined in more depth in Chapter Seven.  
 
In addition to noise pollution, road congestion became a contentious issue. 
Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent are rural areas and as a result the roading 
networks in these two areas are not adequate to accommodate large volumes 
of traffic. Lorries travel more slowly than cars and are often the catalyst to 
traffic delays and congestion. The terrain in Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent is 
varied and each region has a number of windy narrow sections of road. Not 
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surprisingly, being stuck behind traffic travelling these routes was 
exceptionally frustrating for local residents.   
 
 6.8  Conclusion 
 
Eurotunnel was forced to work towards finding methods to mitigate and 
manage issues early in the development and construction phases of the 
Channel Tunnel. The legislative framework enacted to govern this 
development made Eurotunnel legally accountable for managing the social 
and environmental issues. The increasing level of public concern towards 
social and environmental impacts was the driving force behind the legislative 
framework being enacted in a manner that made Eurotunnel accountable for 
the detrimental impacts that came as a result of the Channel Tunnel. The 
early EIA’s conducted during the development phase meant that social and 
environmental issues were recognised from the outset. Issues that were 
identified from these EIA’s included public opposition, environmental impacts, 
land possession, soil disposal and noise pollution. While these impacts all 
affected the environment they also affected the social contexts of Nord-Pas de 
Calais and Kent.  
 
The significant environmental impacts associated the construction of the 
Channel Tunnel as discussed in this chapter were land possession, soil 
disposal and pollution. All these impacts had social implications. Impacts on 
society clearly visible from the construction phase were; road congestion, dust 
contamination, noise disruption from transportation of soil and materials, 
aesthetic disruption to the landscape, loss of income and disruption to 
lifestyle. Eurotunnel developed a variety of mitigation strategies to combat 
these issues. Dampening, covering and restricting the hours of transportation 
are all examples of mitigation methods. Although none of the issues identified 
throughout this chapter were rendered invisible, Eurotunnel was seen to make 
an effort to address and manage the concerns that came as a result of the 
construction of the Channel Tunnel. Nevertheless, it is clear that construction 
works resulted in significant quasi-permanent impacts on the landscape, 
hydrological systems and ecosystems in Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent (Hay et 
al., 2004a, 21). 
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7.0  Post development issues that have arisen since the 
Channel Tunnel commenced operations in 1994 
 
Extending on from the construction period, this chapter identifies the issues 
that have prevailed since the Channel Tunnel opened for business in 1994. 
Since this time, the importance of some operational issues has grown, while 
other concerns have been annulled through measures designed by 
Eurotunnel and respective governments.  
 
The issues examined in this section include public opposition, environmental 
disturbance, water pollution, noise disturbance, energy consumption, water 
contamination, fire safety and asylum seekers. These issues have affected 
every facet of society in the two regions under examination. The effect of 
these impacts on the people living in Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent is analysed 
throughout this chapter.  
 
The mechanisms employed to combat these issues are varied. Consultation 
between Eurotunnel, the French and British governments and the general 
public remains a constant and essential theme that has helped to ensure that 
the issues are addressed and resolved where possible. 
 
7.1  Public opinion 
 
In understanding the pertinent issues it is important to recognise that these 
issues have not necessarily arisen due to poor planning and management by 
the Eurotunnel syndicate. On the contrary, there are long term problems that 
arise as a result of any form of development. It is important to keep this in 
mind throughout the following analysis and to remember that responsibility for 
these issues falls on a number of bodies. The main caretakers of the Channel 
Tunnel are the French and British governments, the EU and Eurotunnel.   
 
It is also important to recognise that these issues, while important, are only 
some of the effects that have occurred as a result of the construction of 
Channel Tunnel. Due to the scope of this report it has been impossible to 
examine all the matters that have arisen from this development. This piece 
focuses on the issues that have reoccurred throughout the literature 
examined. In light of this, I have deemed them to be important for the purpose 
of this report. 
  
As identified in the previous chapter, the Channel Tunnel has always had its 
promoters and detractors. A large portion of those who opposed the Channel 
Tunnel development in the initial design and construction phases, are satisfied 
with the eventual development. Although this may be in part true, there are a 
number of other factors that may have influenced the level of visible public 
opposition. Some reasons behind the reduction in opposition may be 
attributed to the fact that people may be satisfied with the methods Eurotunnel 
has been seen to employ. In addition, the impacts that once concerned 
groups may no longer exist. The other feasible scenario is that groups have 
not been able to sustain the time and energy that goes into opposing an 
extremely powerful bureaucratic machine. There is still however, some 
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concern from groups pertaining to the ongoing social and environmental 
impacts associated with the running of the Channel Tunnel. Post 
development, issues relate to the continuous disruption that this development 
has on local residents. Since the Channel Tunnel began operating the three 
issues of major concern for local residents have been traffic management, 
road conditions and noise and vibration (Channel Tunnel Rail Link, 2002, 16).  
 
7.2  Eurotunnel’s role 
  
Eurotunnel is obliged to mitigate the operational impacts that the Channel 
Tunnel is having on the environment and society. In accordance with this, 
Eurotunnel has committed to employing a variety of measures to minimise the 
environmental impact of this development. As legislated for in the Channel 
Tunnel Act 1987, Eurotunnel was allowed to retain ownership of some land for 
operational purposes. The two areas of land still owned by the Eurotunnel 
consortium are found at Sangatte and Cheriton. These areas are currently the 
sites of the two Channel Tunnel entranceways.      
 
In adherence with the legislative framework governing this development, 
Eurotunnel has committed to post construction monitoring and evaluation of 
habitats and species. Special attention has been given to the re-colonisation 
of rare plants and consideration paid to the habitats of breeding birds and 
amphibians to ensure they are not being destroyed (Channel Tunnel Rail Link, 
2002, 9).  
 
This level of monitoring comes at a considerable cost to Eurotunnel, so why 
are they still seen to be addressing environmental and social concerns? From 
the developers viewpoint, continuing to produce environmental reports and 
consulting with groups comes at a considerable financial cost. These financial 
costs are invariably ones Eurotunnel would prefer not to bear. The main 
reason behind Eurotunnel’s continuing commitment to providing such reports 
and services is legislation. During the planning phase of this development, 
social and environmental concerns were publicly heard, and in turn, social and 
environmental awareness enhanced. As a result, the legislative framework 
established made Eurotunnel accountable for the adverse effects that would 
occur as a result of the Channel Tunnel development. In agreement with 
these legislative requirements, Eurotunnel has to continue to recognise 
environmental concerns, managing and mitigating them accordingly. 
 
7.3  Water pollution 
 
Water Pollution has been a significant environmental issue since the Channel 
Tunnel commenced operations in 1994. Environmental provisions hold 
Eurotunnel responsible and make them legally obliged to manage the 
environmental concerns accordingly. The protection of surface and ground 
water is one factor that was recognised as an area of concern for local 
residents. As a result, structures were implemented to ensure that silt 
contamination was kept to a minimum. Although precautionary measures 
were taken, silt deposits did accumulate and streambed cleaning had to be 
undertaken by Eurotunnel to cleanse the waterways to evade damaging 
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stream flora and fauna (Channel Tunnel Rail Link, 2002, 11). It is interesting 
that this environmental concern was addressed in a reactive rather than a 
proactive manner.   
 
In addition to sampling and surveying, Eurotunnel has taken a more active 
role in protecting the purity of water in and around the Channel Tunnel 
terminals. This is demonstrated by the fact that Eurotunnel built an urban 
biological purification plant in France (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 13). The purification 
plants Eurotunnel already operate extract some 150 tonnes of dry matter each 
year (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 13). Eurotunnel is in the process of examining the 
installation of a piece of apparatus that can recycle the water used by the 
cooling plants (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 13). Feasibility studies on this machine are 
currently being carried out, and providing that the financial and technological 
aspects of the project can be justified, Eurotunnel will potentially be able to 
recycle between 5,000 and 10,000 cubic metres of water per annum 
(Eurotunnel, 2003a, 14). At present, lime is added at a level of 28% to the dry 
matter to stabilise waste sludge (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 14). This results in a total 
of 800 tonnes of raw sludge being disposed of each year (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 
14). The law currently allows Eurotunnel to dispose of this lime sludge on 
neighbouring farmland (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 15).  
 
Since the Channel Tunnel commenced its operations, Eurotunnel has been 
legally obliged to comply with the maximum and minimum waste water 
discharge levels. This compliance is done in accordance with the standards 
set out by the independent legal statutes that govern waste water 
management in France and Britain (Eurotunnel, 2002, 8). In accordance with 
these standards of legislation, Eurotunnel continuously monitors the “pH, 
temperature and ratio of suspended solids in the wastewater discharged” to 
ensure that storm and waste water toxicity levels comply with the regulatory 
requirements (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 13). To do this Eurotunnel employs people 
to take water samples from a variety of discharge points. Full laboratory tests 
are conducted and it has been reported that the water from all the points 
tested complies with the maximum and minimum toxicity levels (Eurotunnel, 
2002, 8).  
 
Preventative measure like those mentioned above help to ensure that polluted 
water does not seep into local waterways, yet these systems do not 
necessarily ensure that contamination will not occur. While Eurotunnel does 
comply with the guidelines in the appropriate legal statutes, these pieces of 
legislation only stipulate that water discharge pollution levels should not go 
above a predetermined rate. That said, the water released still contains a level 
of contaminants. Although the level of contamination will not endanger human 
life, pollutants are being released into waterways that are used for human 
cultivation. This means that people are watering plants, feeding crops and 
nourishing animals with water that contains low levels of contaminants.  
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7.4  Noise disturbance 
 
Eurotunnel recognised that noise pollution was going to be an ongoing 
concern generated through the operation of the Channel Tunnel. While noise 
concerns were an issue for those working within the compounds of the 
Channel Tunnel infrastructure, the predominant concern came from local 
residents in Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent. There has been a large volume of 
concern expressed about the noise disturbance caused by the Channel 
Tunnel. This is one reason why the two Channel Tunnel terminals have been 
the seed of major concern for local residents. The long term nature of this 
issue has meant that Eurotunnel has to continually acknowledge and address 
the concerns of local residents.   
 
Figure 7.4.1  Cheriton terminal  
 
 
 
This is a picture of the Channel Tunnel terminal in Kent, Britain. It illustrates 
the size of the terminal and shows how close the structure is local housing  
(Wikipedia, 2005, 1).    
 
Eurotunnel has performed noise surveys and inaugurated a programme that 
measures noise levels at both terminals (Eurotunnel, 2002, 9). The objective 
of these programs is to monitor any changes in noise levels and to ensure that 
Eurotunnel is in compliance with the legislation that stipulates noise levels 
(Eurotunnel, 2002, 9).  
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A corollary of these studies shows that Eurotunnel has made a number of 
adaptations to its existing infrastructure to minimise the noise disturbance for 
local residents, for example, loudspeakers were identified as a considerable 
disturbance. In light of this, Eurotunnel has prohibited the use of the public 
address systems between the hours of 22.00 and 7.00 except in the case of 
an emergency (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 15). Eurotunnel employees also have to 
ensure that messages are not simultaneously broadcast inside and outside 
the passenger buildings (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 15). Finally, public addresses are 
not made when there are strong winds “as the messages are frequently 
inaudible in such conditions and serve to be a considerable disturbance to 
residents living in close proximity to the Channel Tunnel entranceways” 
(Eurotunnel, 2003a, 15).    
 
A number of mechanisms were used to minimise the disruption that this 
venture had on local residents. These measures included, covering the UK 
terminal, installing soundproof dwellings on the UK side and the establishing 
an embankment surrounding the Sangatte site (Eurotunnel, 2002, 9). 
Extensive noise barriers and earth bunding has also helped shelter 
communities from the noise of the trains (Channel Tunnel Rail Link, 2002, 7). 
Eurotunnel has continued to implement and identify noise mitigation 
strategies. In 2002, timber wayside barriers and low level steel barriers on 
bridges were installed to reduce noise (Channel Tunnel Rail Link, 2002, 7). 
Measures such as this have helped to reduce this problem, but ‘noise’ will 
remain an issue for the duration that the Channel Tunnel continues to operate.    
 
Since the Channel Tunnel started operating in 1994 the noise emissions 
created by this development have been deemed satisfactory as they comply 
with the standards set out in the appropriate legal statutes. However, looking 
into the public sphere, a different perception emerges. Many residents argue 
that the noise emissions from the Channel Tunnel remain an annoying 
disturbance. Noise pollution has an impact on people’s lives as it affects 
sleeping patterns, particularly for shift workers and those residents who spend 
the majority of their day at home, such as the elderly, homemakers and home 
based employees and employers. Although Eurotunnel is continually making 
an effort to minimise noise disruption wherever possible, it appears that this 
issue will continue as long as the Channel Tunnel operates.  
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7.5  Energy consumption 
 
Over the last 50 years there has been a dramatic shift in focus towards 
environmental sustainability. One aspect of considerable concern is energy 
consumption. Eurotunnel recognised this and has worked towards creating 
energy efficient operations since the design phase of the development. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that Eurotunnel chose to employ electric trains as 
the means of transport to travel through the Channel Tunnel. Their energy 
saving policies has meant that their electronic locomotive fleet has been 
continuously upgraded. Eurotunnel currently operates a number of 7 MW8 
electronic locomotives (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 17). Aside from this example, 
Eurotunnel has been seen to minimise energy consumption from Channel 
Tunnel operations through other means.  
 
Since 1994, Eurotunnel has worked towards making the overall operation of 
the Channel Tunnel more energy efficient through adaptations to the existing 
infrastructure. Alterations have been made to terminal lighting, cooling and 
pumping systems, lamps and lighting paraphernalia (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 17). 
Furthermore, electricity metres have been assessed and modified in an 
attempt to reduce energy consumption (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 17). In 2002 and 
2003 additional alterations where made to the existing electrical equipment. 
Twilight sensors were installed to optimize on/off lighting (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 
17). It has been estimated that these modifications have saved one hour’s 
worth of energy each operating cycle (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 17). In addition, 
research has been performed that examines the voltage regulation techniques 
and a variety of different lamps have been installed in accordance with 
recommendations made from a two year comparative study (Eurotunnel, 
2003a, 17). 
 
A number of long term energy saving strategies have been appraised by 
Eurotunnel over recent years. Examination of this nature has seen Eurotunnel 
participating in software development that will reduce future electricity 
consumption (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 17). Eurotunnel also signed an energy 
agreement with a French electricity company (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 17). This 
covenant is seeking to establish a wind farm near the French terminal 
although this initiative is still subject to the approval of planning consents. 
Investigation into the viability of this renewable energy source reiterates 
Eurotunnel’s stated commitment to long term environmental sustainability for 
Eurotunnel. The benefits of energy efficient systems are two-fold. Firstly, they 
are publicly seen to be concerned with environmental sustainability and 
secondly, a reduction in energy usage will reduce the Channel Tunnel’s 
running costs.  
 
                                                 
8 A locomotive is a railway vehicle that provides the motive power for a train. Electric trains 
are cheaper to run than steam fueled trains and environmentally friendlier. This is because 
electronic trains they do not emit the same levels of carbon dioxide (CO2) into the atmosphere 
as steam fueled trains. MW refers to the amount of power used to run a train. The 7 MW 
electric locomotives are the most energy efficient, high speed power systems currently 
available on the market.  
 
 77
Energy consumption affects us all in some way. Many natural resources used 
to create energy, such as water, are renewable yet resources used to 
generate energy, such as coal, are non-renewable. Across the globe natural 
resources are depleting and in recognition of this there has been a move 
away from using non-renewable resources whenever it is feasible to. Once 
the natural resources that are currently used to create energy are destroyed, 
our only option will be to find alternative energy sources. An alternative energy 
resource will come at a considerable financial cost to society because of the 
extensive research and development required. Another corollary of this is that 
as our natural resources become scarce the prices for these products will 
increase. Eurotunnel is a large company that consumes extraordinary 
amounts of energy through their operations. Energy consumption of this 
nature affects us all, and it is imperative that Eurotunnel continually seeks to 
minimise energy consumption wherever possible. If these effects are not 
clearly visible to us now, it is inevitable that we will bear the brunt of this 
impact in the years to come.  
 
7.6  Waste sorting 
 
Large volumes of waste are generated from the daily running of the Channel 
Tunnel. That waste is a social and environmental concern which will exist for 
as long as the Channel Tunnel continues to operate. Developers were aware 
of this issue during the initial planning of the project. Recognising this issue 
and in accordance with the environmental constraints placed on the 
development, Eurotunnel sought to implement systems and use materials to 
minimise the waste produced from the Sangatte and Folkestone terminals. A 
major component of this focus was waste management.  
 
Overhauling equipment and facilities, modification of waste flows and the 
establishment of a waste flow facility at the French terminal are ways in which 
Eurotunnel has sought to minimise the environmental impacts of this 
development (Eurotunnel, 2002, 11). Hazardous waste products are collected, 
stored and disposed of by companies that specialise in waste management. 
The 2002, figures released demonstrated that there had been a tangible 
reduction in the quantity of waste disposed of via landfills (Eurotunnel, 2002, 
11). This reduction was achieved by Eurotunnel focusing on alternative waste 
disposal methods such as recycling. This is not to say that the situation is 
perfect, there is still a considerable amount of waste that is not disposed of in 
an environmentally friendly manner, but the systems currently in place are a 
step in the right direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 78
Figure 7.6.1  Breakdown of processing method of waste disposal 
from the French terminal in 2003 
 
Waste Disposal in France.
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Recycled
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 Sourced from (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 15).   
 
 
The graphs above illustrate the current means of disposal for the waste 
generated from the French and British terminals and demonstrate 
Eurotunnel’s focus on the environment, epitomised by a significant proportion 
of waste in each region being recycled. These graphs were adopted from 
Eurotunnel’s 2003 environmental report (Eurotunnel, 2003a, 15).   
 
Waste disposal has a direct and acute impact on the environment and people. 
The primary reason that there are government restrictions placed on waste 
disposal is because if waste is not discarded in an environmentally friendly 
manner, waste contamination can occur. Waste contamination can be 
potentially hazardous to human life if it manages to seep into waterways used 
for agricultural or drinking purposes. Given this fact, it becomes obvious how 
human lives can potentially be affected when polluted water or other waste is 
not disposed of in an environmentally acceptable manner.      
     
 7.7  Fire prevention 
 
Fire prevention was an issue that was recognised early on in the design 
phase.  In compliance with the Channel Tunnel Act, safety measures were 
incorporated into the design of the Channel Tunnel. While fires can potentially 
threaten human life they can also cause devastation to vegetation and wildlife 
if appropriate fire prevention methods are not established. Eurotunnel has 
established a safety authority for advising and assisting the Inter Government 
Commission on all safety matters concerning the operation of the Channel 
Tunnel’s systems (Officers of Devon Council et al., 1989, 21). Fire prevention 
measures have been established in the Channel Tunnel. Materials that are 
hard to ignite and do not release dangerous fumes when ignited were used 
(Institution of Electrical Engineers, 1997, 5). In addition to this, control 
systems and detection measures were installed in the trains and the Channel 
Tunnel itself to extinguish fires should they ignite (Institution of Electrical 
Engineers, 1997, 6).  
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In November 1996, the Channel Tunnel fire control systems were tested by a 
fire that erupted in freight containers (Neerhout, 2001, 26). Two security 
guards noticed smoke coming from one of the freight containers prior to the 
train entering the Channel Tunnel (Neerhout, 2001, 3). By the time Channel 
Tunnel officials were notified of the fire the train had entered the Channel 
Tunnel and the smoke and fire alarms within the fixture simultaneously alerted 
officials to the fire (Neerhout, 2001, 3). The train became enveloped in smoke 
and the control centre pulled the train to a stop. In the time that followed, the 
passengers and crew inside the train were evacuated by a rescue team 
(Neerhout, 2001, 4). The fire continued to burn throughout the night damaging 
the Channel Tunnel, it took over seven months to repair the damage 
(Neerhout, 2001, 3). Investigations later showed that the fire was a result of 
arson but it gave Eurotunnel the chance to show the critics that the fire control 
systems they had implemented were effective. In the long term, Eurotunnel 
has to ensure that the fire prevention and fire control systems are continually 
updated to protect the safety of all.  
 
Fire safety was an issue of concern due to the fact that fires can potentially 
threaten human life. If a fire should erupt within the Channel Tunnel a 
person’s ability to escape is limited due to the fact that they are trapped in an 
enclosed space. To ensure the safety of all passengers travelling through the 
Channel Tunnel, Eurotunnel has installed facilities to prevent and eliminate 
fires should they occur. In addition to being life threatening, fires have the 
ability to turn fertile land into barren deserts, destroying homes, infrastructure, 
wildlife and vegetation if they are not contained. If adequate preventative fire 
systems are installed, the risk of fire breakouts and fire damage dramatically 
reduces. Eurotunnel has recognised this and been seen to have employed a 
variety of measures to ensure fire prevention and containment within the 
Channel Tunnel infrastructure and the Channel Tunnel's terminals.     
 
 7.8  Asylum seekers 
 
The impact of asylum seekers was not fully understood until after Channel 
Tunnel began operating. This can in part be attributed to the fact that national 
circumstances of a number of European countries changed significantly after 
the construction of the Channel Tunnel had commenced. The fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(USSR) in 1991 are examples of changes in national circumstances that 
indirectly influenced the asylum situation in France. Eurotunnel’s terminal in 
Sangatte is the main location asylum seekers look towards when trying to 
travel from France to Britain. Immigration procedures are legislated in the 
Channel Tunnel Act. This act allows for immigration controls to be enforced on 
people entering and departing from the Channel Tunnel (The Crown, 2000, 1). 
Agreements between the British and French governments mean that all 
people leaving Nord-Pas de Calais are subject to immigration controls 
(Simmons, 1986, 2).   
 
Refugees who arrive at the Channel Tunnel entranceways have commonly 
fled their homelands to escape persecution, civil war, poverty, dictatorship and 
grinding deprivation. A diverse range of nationalities from around Europe are 
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captured at the gates of the Channel Tunnel. Some prominent groups include 
Kurds, Turks, Afghanis, Iranians and Iraqis (Henley, 2001a, 1). French 
authorities used strict immigration controls to manage the French border in 
Colloquies. In an attempt to prevent asylum seekers, British immigration 
officials stringently scrutinise everyone travelling on the Eurostar service from 
France to Britain (Tyler, 2001, 2).  
 
Eurotunnel has been working towards establishing effective systems that may 
alleviate the issue of asylum seekers. In accordance with this, Eurotunnel has 
invested £6 million into increasing their security (Henley, 2001b, 1). The tools 
implemented to maintain security include surveillance cameras, razor wire 
fences and infrared imaging equipment (Henley, 2001b, 1). In addition to 
these security mechanisms, Eurotunnel has had to consistently increase 
security guard numbers to patrol the Channel Tunnel’s entranceways (English 
Welsh et al., 2002, 57). Eurotunnel currently uses over 200 CCTV cameras, 
the gates are monitored by 24 hour surveillance and the site is engulfed by 23 
miles of razor wire which acts as a means of deterrence (James, 2001, 2).  
 
The systems identified above have come at a considerable financial cost to 
Eurotunnel. However, in light of the proposal from the British government 
which suggested that Eurotunnel should pay £2,000 for each illegal immigrant 
who was caught entering Britain via the Channel Tunnel, implementing 
systems such as these was in Eurotunnel’s interest (Henley, 2001b, 1).  
 
Prior to 1998, the Carrier Liability Act meant that aircraft operators could be 
fined up to £2,000 for every person caught entering the country on an airline 
(James, 2001, 2). This changed in 1998 to incorporate road haulers along with 
aircraft (James, 2001, 2). This Act means that drivers of the vehicles that 
cross via the English Channel can potentially be fined up to £2,000 for any 
person found upon a vehicle entering Britain.   
 
Although legislation that would have made Eurotunnel financially liable for 
illegal immigration was never adopted, the idea of making Eurotunnel 
financially responsible highlights the pressure from government for Eurotunnel 
to be held accountable for illegal immigrants that cross the English Channel 
via the Channel Tunnel. Accountability under the current system remains 
highly contentious. France, Britain and the private entity Eurotunnel are all 
adversely affected by the growing problem of illegal immigration, yet no one is 
officially accountable for this quandary.   
 
It has been reported that the French Channel Tunnel terminal faces surges of 
up to 400 asylum seekers every evening (Henley, 2001b, 1). A spokesperson 
for Eurotunnel stated that “the moment it gets dark the refugees start the short 
trek to the terminal, and you can literally see a stream of people” (Henley, 
2001b, 1). Neighboring the Collegues centre in Sangatte sits a refugee centre 
that was established by the Red Cross in 1999 (Tyler, 2001, 1).  
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Figure 7.8.1  The Sangatte refugee camp 
 
 
 
Sourced from (BBC News, 2001, 1).   
 
The photograph above depicts the refugee centre at Sangatte. The cross 
above the door illustrates the presence of the Red Cross in the running of this 
facility (BBC News, 2001, 1).   
 
This building was originally used by Eurotunnel to store building materials 
during construction (Francais, 2000, 3). After conversion this centre was 
initially established to house up to 400 asylum seekers needing refuge around 
the Calais area (Tyler, 2001, 1). While it was equipped to house 400 
individuals the centre is currently home to over 1,600 refugees (Tyler, 2001,). 
Eurotunnel strongly opposed the centre being located in the Sangatte region. 
They have described this establishment as being a logistical “base for illegal 
immigration” (Henley, 2001a, 1). The Times released an article stating that 
“though no fault of its own except function and location, Eurotunnel is at the 
frontline of Britain’s defenses against illegal immigration” (James, 2001, 1). 
Eurotunnel holds a similar opinion believing that as a legally ascribed 
company they should not be held responsible for an issue that falls under the 
jurisdiction of the respective governments. Eurotunnel has argued that this is 
a European problem that needs to be addressed by the appropriate political 
powers. 
 
The refugee centre has been the seed to much animosity between the British, 
French and Eurotunnel. The British media spotlight has played an 
instrumental role in heightening this Anglo-French conflict. British media 
institutions have served up a concoction of articles commenting on the 
Sangatte refugee centre and asylum seekers. While the British tabloids have 
criticised the French for establishing the centre so close to the Channel 
Tunnel entrance, the British government has suggested that the French 
government has closed “its eyes to the situation at Sangatte” (Tyler, 2001, 2). 
This has been rebutted by the French who have argued that if the British were 
to institute more stringent asylum procedures, the refugee predicament would 
improve (Tyler, 2001,2). The ideology behind this notion is if more stringent 
procedures were applied then asylum seekers would be deterred from coming 
to Sangatte and attempting to enter Britain via the Channel Tunnel. Although 
deterrence theory may be pertinent to this situation, Britain already has in 
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place some of the harshest asylum procedures in the European Union (Tyler, 
2001, 2).  
 
Eurotunnel has fought through the appropriate legal channels to annul the 
protectoral decree that allowed the refugee centre to be opened in 1999 
(Tyler, 2001, 2). The administrative court in Lille received the application to 
close the refugee centre. The courts later denied the application, allowing the 
camp to continue being a safe house for refugees found around the area. 
Although this decision was made, France has agreed to drop the proposal to 
establish another Red Cross refugee center near the Channel Tunnel terminal 
in Calais (Henley, 2001b, 2). Furthermore, French officials have reaffirmed 
that they will take stronger measures against refugees that are caught 
breaking into Eurotunnel’s compounds (Henley, 2001b, 2). This is by no 
means an end to this saga, on the contrary, the current arrangements will 
continue to fuel the conflict between the French, British and Eurotunnel.  
 
Asylum seekers have had a colossal impact on one of Eurotunnel’s vital 
business ventures, freight. The laudable objectives of Eurotunnel to increase 
their freight industry have been undermined by continual penetration of 
asylum seekers into the freight storage and holding facilities. Fréthum Yard 
remains the major storage facility designed to house freight in transience 
(English Welsh et al., 2002, 57). This yard had been the scene of sabotage 
from asylum seekers since November 2001 (English Welsh et al., 2002, 57). A 
substantial number of issues have arisen as a result of these activates. It has 
been suggested that Eurotunnel could take a more active role in prevention by 
installing adequate surveillance such as infra-red cameras and 24 hour 
gendarmes, establishing adequate fencing and overhauling all asylum seeking 
policy.   
  
Eurotunnel is aware that stringent measures need to be installed to prevent 
the unlawful crossing of the Channel Tunnel. This is explicitly illustrated by the 
border control stations that have been installed at the British and French 
terminals. The French and British have been working collectively to develop 
tougher measures to deal with the asylum problem. The EU has also been 
seen as a crucial tool that can be employed to help combat this issue. The 
role that the EU currently plays will be discussed at length in the following 
chapter. During 2002, Eurotunnel mitigated these issues further by clearing 50 
hectares of scrubland at the French terminal in an attempt to prevent asylum 
seekers from unlawfully entering the French terminal (Eurotunnel, 2002, 14). 
While this exercise was essentially a security measure, it also sought to 
prevent asylum seekers from disrupting Eurotunnel’s commercial services 
(Eurotunnel, 2002, 14). It is inevitable that scrub clearance has had a colossal 
impact on the ecology of the area. 
  
The impact of the asylum situation on individuals is twofold. Firstly, this issue 
directly impacts people living around the Channel Tunnel entranceways. 
Security is one example of this. Given that refugees have no legal status they 
cannot legally work in France or Britain, how do they survive? One survival 
mechanism for those in this situation is crime. The freight companies have 
reported that they have fallen prey to such activities. This has meant that 
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people living around the Channel Tunnel entranceways have had to become 
‘security conscious’ to protect their rights and property. The security threat 
imposed by asylum seekers is an excellent example of how people are being 
affected by this issue.   
 
The second issue major of concern relates to the asylum seekers themselves. 
As previously identified, such people have characteristically fled their 
homeland escaping persecution, civil war, poverty, dictatorship and grinding 
deprivation. Refugees are protected by international law which articulates that 
they are entitled to all basic human rights. Was living in civil war a violation of 
their basic human rights? If so, does living in an overcrowded refugee centre 
in France also contravene their human rights? It is not my intent to discuss 
these questions in depth as examination of this kind adds no value to this 
thesis. The purpose behind presenting these questions is to demonstrate how 
the current asylum situation impacts on the people living in close proximity to 
the Channel Tunnel entranceways as well as impacting on the refugees 
themselves. This issue is further examined in the chapter that follows. The 
following analysis illustrates that impact the asylum seekers have had on the 
political arena and public resources. 
 
  7.9  Impact on local transportation facilities 
 
It was unquestionable from the beginning that the Channel Tunnel would have 
a profound effect on the transportation facilities in Nord-Pas de Calais and 
Kent. This impact was not exclusive to these regions. This is illustrated by the 
fact that the Channel Tunnel has also impacted on the transportation facilities 
around the major centers that link these two regions and one of the less 
desirable consequences is that traffic volumes in Nord-Pas de Calais and 
Kent have increased (Fayman & Metge, 1995, 2). In light of this increase in 
demand, pressure was put on the respective governments to upgrade and 
extend existing roading facilities around the two Channel Tunnel 
entranceways. Under the Channel Tunnel Act the responsibility of roading 
maintenance and upgrading is assigned to the appropriate governments 
(Channel Tunnel Act, 1989, 1911). Because of the decentralisation of the two 
governments’ upgrades, extensions of this nature became the responsibility of 
local councils.  
 
The increase in demand for rail transportation networks around these regions 
heightened the need for local councils to upgrade the high speed railways link 
connecting to Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent. The driving force behind this 
need is that Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent have laid witness to increased 
levels of traffic volume generated through the “growth of cross-Channel traffic 
and of additional traffic attracted by the [Channel] Tunnel” (European 
Commission, 1996, 220).   
 
Local councils assigned with the task of providing appropriate roading 
infrastructure and supplying high speed rail links have shown some response 
to the increase in demand. The British government has, however, been openly 
criticised for its lack of response and for not providing “properly planned 
transport infrastructure” (Essex & Gibb, 1994, 51). As a result, regions have 
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not been provided with the tools to “maximize potential benefits and minimise 
detrimental impacts” associated with the Channel Tunnel venture (Essex & 
Gibb, 1994, 51). Page suggests that the constrained response by central 
government reflects the absence of transportation orientated policies (Page, 
1994, 6). One example that illustrates some response to the increase in 
demand is shown by the limited developments that have been made to the 
British high speed rail link, coined the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL)9.      
 
The lack of adequate transportation infrastructure has become a frustrating 
issue for local residents and people crossing under the English Channel. An 
increasing number of travellers and business people use the Channel Tunnel. 
In line with this, visitation to Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent has risen 
dramatically. As numbers increase so do the demands on infrastructure. One 
impact that we can all empathise with is road congestion. The solution to this 
issue is for the respective governments to further mitigate this issue by 
upgrading existing infrastructure to accommodate the volume of people that 
demand transportation facilities on a daily basis.  
 
7.10  Conclusion   
 
In summary, the previous analysis has examined the major issues associated 
with the construction of the Channel Tunnel including, public opposition, 
environmental disturbance, water pollution, noise disturbance, energy 
consumption, water contamination, fire danger, asylum seekers and the 
increase in demand for transportation networks. All of these issues have come 
as a direct result of Channel Tunnel operations and were in part inevitable, 
although the magnitude of their impact depended upon the strategies 
implemented to mitigate them. Eurotunnel has been seen to have made an 
effort to recognise, manage and allay the impacts.  
 
From an environmental standpoint Eurotunnel was made to take responsibility 
for the development. The environmental impacts that have arisen from the 
construction and operation of the Channel Tunnel have been mitigated in a 
manner that has been deemed satisfactory in relation to their statutory 
obligation. The standards are in compliance with the legal statutes governing 
the development and in accordance with the Channel Tunnel Act. In addition 
to this, Eurotunnel has consulted with environmental groups, interested 
parties and the general public in relation to the operational issues that have 
come to be associated with this venture.  
 
 
 
                                                 
9 Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) is the consortium that is responsible for operating and 
maintaining the high speed rail link (informally known as the tube) in and around Britain. This 
infrastructure links the Channel Tunnel entranceway on the British side. Since 1994, the 
British government has made a variety of adaptations to the high speed rail link CTRL around 
metropolitan London area. This has partially accommodated the increasing number of 
travellers that seek transportation after travelling through the Channel Tunnel. Although some 
adaptations to the existing rail have been made it has been suggested that this facility is still 
inadequate for the volume of travellers that demand services in and out of the Kent region. 
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The Channel Tunnel has had a direct effect on people’s lives including, traffic 
congestion, noise disruption, security issues and fire concerns. All of these 
effects have been concentrated on people who live in and around Nord-Pas 
de Calais and Kent. While some of these issues were apparent throughout the 
construction phases of this project, the nature of these effects changed from 
the construction to the developmental phase. It is evident that Eurotunnel has 
to continue to address the concerns of the general public and seek to operate 
the Channel Tunnel in a socially and environmentally acceptable manner as 
required under the Channel Tunnel Act.  
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8.0  Economic impacts 
 
Examining the economic impacts that have come as a result of the Channel 
Tunnel provides greater insight into the overall impact that this venture has 
had on the social spheres of Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent. This chapter 
identifies the challenges that occur when exploring the economic impact 
associated with a particular development. Further to this, the evaluation of 
economic impacts within the field of social and environmental impact 
assessment is demonstrated. This chapter also examines the relationship 
between regional development and transportation infrastructure. As part of 
this analysis, the regional responses shown by the French and British 
governments are also explored. The impact that this development was 
projected to have on employment is the next point considered.  
 
The freight industry is a central discussion point of this chapter. The first part 
of this section identifies the impact that this development was projected to 
have had on the freight industries in Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent. This 
discussion extends to investigate the consequences that have arisen since 
the Channel Tunnel commenced operations. In addition, this chapter 
appraises the impact that the Channel Tunnel has had on the tourism 
industries in Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent. Tourism is considered separately 
because this industry remains a dominant economic force for the regions 
under examination. The final section of this chapter explores the impact that 
the Channel Tunnel has had on investment within the regions of Nord-Pas de 
Calais and Kent.  
 
8.1  Background 
 
Social and environmental assessments characteristically examine economic 
impacts at a regional and local level (Taylor et al., 2004, 157). Identifying the 
direct economic impact of the Channel Tunnel on the residents of Sangatte 
and Folkestone is difficult, but identifying the widespread economic 
implications on Europe and Britain is an even more ambiguous process. In 
line with accepted practice, and the difficulties associated with determining the 
wider economic implications, this chapter focuses on investigating the 
economic implications that the Channel Tunnel has had on the local 
economies of Nord-Pad de Calais and Kent.   
 
Data inconsistencies are another challenge faced when assessing the 
economic impacts associated with a venture. There are data inconsistencies 
apparent within the literature that records the actual dollar amounts of various 
components of the project. This fact is visible throughout a variety of literature 
that documents the total cost of the venture. It has been ‘estimated’ the 
Channel Tunnel came at a cost of £21 billion (European Commission, 1996, 
77). Other sources suggest that the whole project came to a cost of around 
£10 billion (Eurotunnel, 1994, 1). It is indifferent to the following analysis 
which figure is correct or closest to the overall cost. The point to take from 
these figures is that the financial costs of this development were colossal in 
comparison to previously assembled international infrastructural 
developments. In recognition of these data inconsistencies, the actual dollar 
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amounts relating to various aspects of the Channel Tunnel are not extensively 
used throughout the following analysis. 
 
In addition to data inconsistencies there are a number of limitations 
associated with the analysis of quantitative data. This means ad hoc 
assumptions have to be made about the actual impact that the Channel 
Tunnel has had on the regional economies of Nord-Pas de Calais, Kent and 
the European Union. In light of this, undertaking a study of ex post impacts is 
just as fraught as conducting an ex ante study of this development. This 
occurs because although “it is possible to document the changes which have 
happened since the opening of the [Channel] Tunnel ascribing these to the 
[Channel] Tunnel in a period which has seen many other changes in the 
economy is more difficult” (Hay et al., 2004a, 1).  
 
Significant changes within Europe and the UK include such things as the 
movement towards the Single European Market, intra-EU movement towards 
duty free sales, the collapse of the Berlin Wall in1989 which opened the EU to 
Eastern Europe and the enlargement of the EU in 2004 (Hay et al., 2004a, 1). 
In addition, changing transport policies, the privatisation of the rail network, 
the growth of affordable air travel and the Euro as a European currency have 
also all directly impacted on the economic structure of Nord-Pas de Calais 
and Kent. That said, it is difficult to separate the economic impacts that have 
come as a result of the Channel Tunnel from the economic impacts that have 
arisen as a result of events that have occurred within wider Europe and the 
UK.   
 
8.2  Regional development and transportation infrastructure 
 
The link between major transportation infrastructure and regional 
development has been debated (Vickerman, 1994, 9). In most cases these 
debates have centered on the relationship between economic performance, 
the level of competitiveness of a region and amendments made to 
transportation amenities (Vickerman, 1994, 9).  
 
Throughout the design phase of the Channel Tunnel project, local councils 
looked to develop a greater understanding of the relationship between 
regional development and transportation infrastructure. It was extremely 
important that both regions placed some emphasis on understanding this 
relationship (Fayman & Metge, 1995, 2). One reason for this is because the 
better access a region has to markets and materials ceteris paribus3, the 
more competitive, productive and effective that region will be (Fayman & 
Metge, 1995, 2). In addition, regions that have efficient transportation systems 
find it easier to attain economic stability as opposed to regions that have 
inferior access to materials and markets (Fayman & Metge, 1995, 2).  
 
                                                 
3 Ceteris paribus is a Latin term that is commonly used within the field of economics. In 
essence it means “all things being equal or unchanged” (Google, 1). This means that market 
comparisons between components of the market can be compared without all other market 
factors having to be taken into consideration. This provides for basic market comparisons to 
be made as it is unfeasible to address all market variables when examining different markets.   
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The relationship between regional development and transportation 
infrastructure remains difficult to verify empirically (Fayman & Metge, 1995, 2). 
It is however, commonly accepted that there is a positive correlation between 
the transportation infrastructure endowment, interregional accessibility and 
economic indicators such as GDP4 per capita (Fayman & Metge, 1995, 2). 
That said, large scale transportation developments such as the Channel 
Tunnel have the potential to have a strong positive impact on regional 
development (Fayman & Metge, 1995, 2).  
 
The two dominant discussions relating to the relationship between regional 
development and transportation infrastructure are in stark contrast to one 
another. One widely accepted theory suggests that this relationship 
contributes to polarisation while the other accepted argument claims that this 
connection results in decentralisation (Fayman & Metge, 1995, 2). In light of 
this, it has been mooted that regional policies that are established or adapted 
on the induction of new transportation infrastructures are not necessarily 
effective in reducing disparities (Fayman & Metge, 1995, 2). On the other 
hand, it is thought that there is a lack of evidence to support the idea that the 
reduction of regional barriers disadvantages peripheral regions (Fayman & 
Metge, 1995, 2).  
 
In theory both of these viewpoints occur when a new transportation facility is 
established. When applying these ideas to the Channel Tunnel it becomes 
apparent that this new piece of infrastructure did make it easier for producers 
in Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent to move their products to larger regions. That 
said, these markets have however, been subject to competition from products 
originating in other regions. This has meant the markets in Nord-Pas de 
Calais and Kent that were once protected through a lack of adequate 
transportation facilities, have become endangered by market inputs from 
larger regions.    
 
The government’s regional responses to development did have an influence 
on the economic benefits that have been felt by Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent. 
The British government’s response to date has focused around the regulatory 
structures needed to facilitate the development and operation of the Channel 
Tunnel. In retrospect, regional authorities should have placed a greater 
degree of emphasis on upgrading existing transport networks linking to the 
Folkestone and Sangatte terminals which would have helped ensure that the 
regions in question were able to maximise the economic benefits associated 
with the development (Essex & Gibb, 1994, 53).   
 
The British regional response was in stark contrast to the response that was 
shown on the other side of the English Channel. On the French side, regional 
bodies achieved a greater degree of coordination between national and local 
policies as policy networks were extended from the centre to the periphery in 
a sequenced fashion (Essex & Gibb, 1994, 53). Hindsight shows the impact 
that the lack of regional transportation development had on Nord-Pas de 
                                                 
4 GDP stands for gross domestic product. This acronym refers to the total amount of goods 
and services produced within a region. The higher a region’s GDP per capita the better their 
economy is believed to be. 
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Calais and Kent. This has meant that Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent have not 
gained the potential economic benefits that were predicted to happened as a 
result of this venture.   
 
8.3  Impact on employment 
 
It was anticipated that the economic benefits accrued from the Channel 
Tunnel would be two-fold. Firstly, residents believed that economic activity in 
Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent would be enhanced and secondly, high levels of 
unemployment within the two areas would decline (Officers of Devon Council 
et al., 1989, 20).  In addition to these regional benefits, early predictions 
suggested that the economic impacts of this venture would flow onto Britain, 
France and the wider European Union (Officers of Devon Council et al., 1989, 
20).   
 
It can be assumed that the construction of any large scale infrastructural 
project will have a direct, positive, yet short term effect on employment. (Hay 
et al., 1989, 2004b, 3). It was categorically assumed that between 1986 and 
1994 the Channel Tunnel would promote employment in Kent and Nord-Pad 
de Calais. Employment issues were an important consideration for local 
residents and employment predictions directly contributed to the level of 
support that was shown for the project (Simmons, 1986, 14).  
 
Employment predictions outlining the growth in employment proved to be 
attractive to local residents and businesses owners in the both regions.   
Forecasts predicted the peak construction period on the UK side would be 
during 1990 when Eurotunnel would require over 4,000 employees (Hay et al., 
2004b, 3). Predictions in France were more conservative as it was planned 
that the majority of the construction would be performed on British soil.  
 
Statistics released validate that employment from the construction of the 
Channel Tunnel peaked in 1990 although, the actual impact was significantly 
smaller than earlier anticipated (Hay et al., 2004b, 3). Over 8,300 workers are 
recorded to have been involved with constructing the Channel Tunnel in Kent 
between 1986 and 1994 (European Commission, 1996, 77). Further to this 
1,827 people were employed at the peak of employment in 1990 on sub-
contracts in the UK (Hay et al., 2004b, 3). Of this total, 35% of employees 
were sourced from within Kent (Hay et al., 2004b, 3). A further 3,000 people 
came from Ireland (European Commission, 1996, 77). Although the Irish do 
appear to contribute to a large proportion of this total workforce, local based 
employment was higher than developers had originally predicted (European 
Commission, 1996, 77). Nord-Pas de Calais, however, reaped a more direct 
benefit from the development. Of the 5,114 jobs that are recorded to have 
been established as a result of the construction of the project in Nord-Pad de 
Calais, 90% of the total workforce were recruited from the local labour market 
(European Commission, 1996, 77). 
 
One employment issue during the construction and operation of the Channel 
Tunnel was, and is, skill shortages. During the construction phase there were 
staff shortages within the fields of engineering, maintenance, administrative, 
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clerical, catering, cleaning and sales (Channel Tunnel Working Group, 1989, 
6). As a result, Eurotunnel recruited employees from outside Nord-Pas de 
Calais and Kent because a large number of the specialists needed for 
construction could not be sourced from the local labour markets (Hay et al., 
2004b, 3).  
 
Since the construction phase the Channel Tunnel has continued to generate 
employment. Eurotunnel currently employs a substantial labour force to 
manage and operate the running of the Channel Tunnel. Employees include 
engineers, mechanics, electricians, ticket staff, administration staff and 
security guards. In total there were 3,309 people employed by Eurotunnel on 
fixed and long term contracts in 2003 (Eurotunnel, 2003b, 1). Of this total 
workforce, 1,946 staff were employed at the Coquelles terminal and 1,357 
staff worked at the Folkestone terminal (Eurotunnel, 2003b, 1). It is important 
to recognise that a number of people contract their services to Eurotunnel are 
excluded from this figure. For example, sub-contractors who hire their 
services to Eurotunnel are classified in labour market statistics as being self 
employed. Recognising this demonstrates that Eurotunnel employed over and 
above the 3,309 employees as illustrated by their 2003 employment statistics. 
 
Although employment rose during the construction period, the Channel 
Tunnel did not have the significant impact on employment as earlier predicted. 
A generally accepted characteristic of the construction labour force is that 
they are migrant. In accordance with this, British construction workers have 
moved on to work further afield since the Channel Tunnel was completed 
(Laing, 1995, 71). France has proved to be the exception to this rule. 
Literature indicates that a large proportion of the workforce employed during 
the construction of the project still reside in Nord-Pad de Calais (Laing, 1995, 
71). These people have since found alternative work, often in other industry 
related jobs.     
 
8.4 The impact on the ferrying industries in Nord-Pas de Calais  
and Kent 
 
It was projected that this facility would have two main consequences for the 
ferry industries in Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent. Firstly, it was forecasted that 
there would be a direct impact felt through the conversion of freight and 
passenger traffic (European Commission, 1996, 79). Secondly, it was 
anticipated that the changes in freight and transportation flows would have an 
indirect impact on port employment (European Commission, 1996, 79). 
Studies predicted the loss in ferry related employment to be around 7,400 and 
7,480 jobs for Kent ports (Hay et al., 2004a, 13). Further forecasts projected 
that the Channel Tunnel would promote between 1,500 and 2,000 jobs from 
Channel Tunnel operations in the UK. These figures combined resulted in a 
predicted loss of between 5,980 and 5,480 jobs in the Kent region.   
 
One accepted theory proposed that this development would change the 
nature of the freight and passenger markets in Nord-pas de Calais and Kent. 
Price competition was a major concern identified early on in the development 
phases of this venture. It was suggested that the Channel Tunnel proposal 
 91
might result in a price war between ferry companies and Eurotunnel (The 
Royal Town Planning Institute, 1990, 23). It was claimed that this might 
eventually drive one of these services out of business leaving the remaining 
supplier with the market monopoly5 (The Royal Town Planning Institute, 1990, 
23).  
 
Vickerman and Flowerdew rebutted this argument claiming that three factors 
would prevent a monopolised market situation occurring. Firstly, the Channel  
Tunnel was not projected to influence markets outside the immediate sphere 
of the Channel Tunnel entranceways (The Royal Town Planning Institute, 
1990, 23). This fact alone would prevent Eurotunnel from obtaining market 
domination. In addition, “whilst the ferries themselves could readily be 
transferred away from the short sea crossings if…operation[s] ceased to be 
profitable, they could equally readily be brought back if the [Channel] Tunnel 
tried to exploit a local monopoly” (The Royal Town Planning Institute, 1990, 
23). Furthermore, it was anticipated that the Channel Tunnel would have 
reasonably low margins and operation costs. This meant that should the 
Eurotunnel consortium enter into financial hard times, the rights to operate the 
structure could easily be sold to another operator (The Royal Town Planning 
Institute, 1990, 23). This situation would act as a buffer to ensure that the ferry 
companies themselves did not acquire the monopoly.  
 
Since the Channel Tunnel commenced operations in 1994, a considerable 
amount of interest has been paid to the actual impact that the Channel Tunnel 
has had on the ferry industry in Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent. This 
development has transformed that nature of the freight industries in northern 
France and southern Britain. Furthermore, the transference of freight 
transportation has had a direct impact on employment. In Britain researchers 
have identified that tunnel traffic was “partially pulled away from Kent and 
Nord-Pad de Calais ports”, yet the “net balance of traffic flows into and out of 
these regions was overwhelmingly positive” (European Commission, 1996, 
76). The majority of the traffic that the Channel Tunnel has taken was once 
secured by the ferry industry (European Commission, 1996, 76).  
 
Since operations commenced in 1994 the market share held by the ports on 
both sides of the English Channel have continued to diminish (Hay et al., 
2004a, 23). On the British side by 1999 Eurotunnel had redistributed 25% of 
freight traffic that had once gone through ports to their rail system (Hay et al., 
2004a, 23). In addition to freight transportation, Eurotunnel secured a 
significant proportion of the passenger flows that the port sector had once 
secured. As a result the market share of passenger transportation fell 
continuously from 1994 onwards on both sides on the English Channel (Hay 
et al., 2004a, 23).  
                                                 
5 Within the field of economics the term monopoly describes when an entity is the sole supply 
of a particular commodity and as a result they have the power and discretion to determine the 
market price. Price fixing of this nature means that companies are not subject to pressure 
from normal market forces and entities in this position are given the opportunity to exploit 
customers.  
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Figure 8.4.1  Share of road goods vehicles between Britain and 
Continental Europe by port group 
 
        %share       
  1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Channel Tunnel  2 12 15 7 17 19
Dover Strait ferries 47 46 39 37 46 39 40
North Sea ferry routes 41 40 37 36 37 35 34
English Channel ferry 
routes  12 12 12 12 10 9 7
(Hay et al., 2004a, 28).  
 
The table above illustrates the percentage of the market share of road goods 
vehicles that the Channel Tunnel, Dover Strait ferries, North Sea ferry routes 
and English Channel ferry routes held from 1993 to 1999. The declining rates 
above were also accompanied by a general decline in other port routes and 
the absolute number of vehicles carries through each route also deteriorated 
(Hay et al., 2004a, 28).  
The ferry industry has also been directly affected by a reduction in passenger 
flows. Between 1985 and 1995, the passenger numbers of travellers using 
ferries steadily decreased (Hay et al., 2004a, 33). On the British side, ports 
recorded almost 24 million passengers used their services in 1997. This 
decreased by 14% in 1998 and numbers continued to decline until 2001 (Hay 
et al., 2004a, 33).  
It is important to recognise that the changes shown above could have, in part, 
come as a result of other economic changes within wider Europe during the 
1990’s. For example, in 1992 the Ecofin Council set the date for abolition of 
intra-EU duty-free sales to be the June 30, 1999 (Union Franceileene Contre 
les Nuisances Aerriennes, 2). Duty-frees were actually meant to be abolished 
with the coming of the SEM in 1993, but a number of EU member states, led 
by Britain, managed to win a six-year reprieve which meant that duty-free 
sales were eventually abolished in 1999 (Union Franceileene Contre les 
Nuisances Aerriennes, 2).  
Wider EU changes did directly affect the ferry industries in France and Britain 
however, for the purposes of this research the impact of external factors such 
as this will not be extensively examined. The main point to recognise here is 
that there were other important changes that occurred within the EU during 
the 1990s that had an affect on the ferry industry. This invariably means that 
assessing the exact impact the Channel Tunnel had on the ferry industries in 
France and Britain is problematic. That said, it is undisputable that the 
reduction in passenger and goods vehicles using the ferry services which has 
resulted in a loss of income for these service providers can in part, be 
attributed to Channel Tunnel operations. The economic components of this 
market restructuring could pertain to a thesis in itself, so for the purposes of 
this analysis employment is the only impact on the ferry industry that will be 
appraised.  
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One of the first areas reviewed when a company is looking to increase 
efficiency is employment. In turn, one of the quickest and most effective ways 
to reduce costs and raise profits is to reduce labour. Unemployment affects 
people in a number of ways. Given that port employees are often unskilled 
workers, their employment options are often limited. In light of this, many 
people made redundant may not be able to find alternative employment and if 
they do, in many instances employment in a new position may not be 
immediate. People in this position often end up taking up precarious 
employment which affects all aspects of their families lives. Loss of income 
invariably means that families are subjected to extremely hard times. 
 
8.5  Changes in tourism 
 
Europeans have always had the ability to cross frontiers with relative ease 
because of the geographical layout of the European continent. These 
circumstances were further facilitated by the advent of the fixed rail link which 
allowed for greater ease of travel between Europe and the UK. London and 
Paris have been locations that have attracted large volumes of tourists for 
generations. Ex ante studies demonstrated that tourism was one of the 
principal sectors that would be affected by the existence of the Channel 
Tunnel and associated infrastructure (Hay et al., 2004b, 3). It was anticipated 
that this development would create significant opportunities for tourism and in 
turn increase tourism employment and allow for the strengthening of the 
tourist industries in Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent. The strengthening of the 
tourism industry was dependent on that fact that external visitors would stop 
over whilst en route to, or from, the Channel Ports and the Channel Tunnel. 
This development has intensified visitation and ease of travel to these tourist 
locations. 
 
The Channel Tunnel extended road and rail networks, redistributing tourist 
flows away from traditional transportation routes and destinations (Fayman & 
Metge, 1995, 10). It was thought that the Channel Tunnel would provide a 
platform for the strengthening of the tourist industries in Nord-Pas de Calais 
and Kent. Local government bodies needed to ensure that marketing 
strategies were tailored to allow for their tourism industries to be bolstered 
through increased visitation to these areas. Successful tourism development 
for both these areas remained heavily reliant on new regional policies 
(European Commission, 1996, 85).  
 
Both regions looked to implement systems to promote Nord-Pas de Calais 
and Kent as travel destinations rather than stopovers. Firstly, the Channel 
Tunnel was recognised as a resource that could the be used to promote these 
two regions as tourist locations for international travellers and secondly, there 
were new found opportunities for the British and French to travel across the 
English Channel on brief trips (Bruyelle & Thomas, 1994, 95). It was projected 
that the increases in traffic flow would act as a catalyst for economic growth 
for Nord-Pad de Calais and Kent.   
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Incoming car based tourism was seen to be an instrument that would provide 
financial benefits for both regions. One of the initial benefits of the Channel 
Tunnel experienced in Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent came through tourism in 
1987 (Bruyelle & Thomas, 1994, 95). Since the Channel Tunnel opened for 
operation in 1994, Kent and Nord-Pad de Calais have experienced an 
increase in tourist numbers. Over 500,000 travelers visit the French terminal 
per annum, while the British site receives this and more (European 
Commission, 1996, 2). Figures reveal that there were approximately 203,000 
day trips from Europe to Kent with a further 405,000 incoming trips generated 
from within the UK (Hay et al., 2004b, 3). While these figures appear 
considerable there is no direct evidence on how many UK residents choose to 
travel to Kent to make short trips via the Channel Tunnel. Early forecasts had 
predicted there would be approximately 203,000 day trips from Europe to 
Kent with a further 405,000 incoming trips from within Britain generated (Hay 
et al., 2004b, 3). That said, it cannot be disputed that the Channel Tunnel has 
increased tourism visitation and stopovers at these two regions. Economic 
benefits associated with this include, increased demand for commodities such 
as food, increased foreign spending and heightened demand for tourist 
services, retail and accommodation facilities. 
 
8.6  Investment 
 
With new found interest in Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent, land prices were 
directly affected. One of the principal theories of economics asserts that as 
demand rises, so too does price. This theory applies to all economic goods. In 
relation to land value this means that the greater the demand for land and 
dwellings the higher the market price that is paid for these two goods.  
 
New found interest in Dover and Nord-Pas de Calais meant that the demand 
for land and dwellings rose. Construction workers, investors and consultants 
were some of the people who required facilities in and around these regions. 
Much of the work force employed during the construction of the Channel 
Tunnel was housed locally (Laing, 1995, 71). This inflated house prices and 
boosted revenue for local accommodation facilities. While in the short term 
demand inflates prices, market prices do plateau over time. This meant that 
although prices rose exponentially during the planning and construction 
phases of the development, this trend has since dissipated.  
 
A region’s locality plays an important role in how attractive an area is to invest 
in. In the instance of the Channel Tunnel the industrial location of Nord-Pas 
de Calais and Kent meant that these areas were attractive to investors. Both 
prior to, and during, the construction phase considerable interest was shown 
by property developers looking to make capital gains on investments in these 
two areas. Investors projected that the surrounding areas would be 
regenerated by the Channel Tunnel development. Investment interest in this 
area came from an assortment of people from all corners of the globe.   
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Interest from the United States has dominated foreign investment in Nord-Pas 
de Calais and Kent (Collier, 2001, 5). There has also been an increase in 
British investment in France and vice versa. In 2001, French firms accounted 
for around 11% of foreign investment stock in Kent, employing over 3,000 
employees while United States investors held 30% of total foreign stock 
(Collier, 2001, 7). Collier suggests that the Channel Tunnel has enabled 
Britain and France to enter into neighboring markets via cross border 
investment (Collier, 2001, 7). Such activity denotes the way in which “border 
regions…..act as staging posts for mobile factors and thus have to recognise 
the need for continuing activity to attract new firms and retain existing ones” 
(Collier, 2001, 7).   
 
The impact of increasing interest in investment in Nord-Pas de Calais and 
Kent has been twofold. Firstly, increasing demand in dwellings and land 
meant that prices increased. In accordance with this, it became more 
expensive for local residents to purchase property. Secondly, the flip side of 
this is that people selling properties within these two regions received greater 
capital gains for their amenities and land. This effect was concentrated on 
properties that were not in the immediate vicinity of the Channel Tunnel 
entranceways or placed along the main arterial routes linking to the London 
railway system. Properties in these positions often diminished in value 
because of the detrimental impact associated with the construction and 
operation of this new piece of infrastructure. Noise disturbance is one 
example of an impact that negatively affected the price of land and amenities 
in and around the Channel Tunnel terminals. 
 
8.7  Conclusion 
 
Social and Environmental Assessments characteristically examine economic 
impacts at a regional and local level. Data inconsistencies and evaluating 
qualitative data are two challenges relevant to assessing the economic 
impacts associated with a particular venture. It was important that region 
understood the relationship between transportation infrastructure and regional 
development. One reason for this is because it is thought that the better 
access a region has to the locations of input markets and materials ceteris 
paribus, the more competitive, productive and effective the region will be 
(Fayman & Metge, 1995, 2).  
 
Employment was one area in which it the impact of the Channel Tunnel 
cannot be disputed. It was projected that the Channel Tunnel would have a 
positive impact on employment within these two regions. Employment figures 
illustrate that during the construction phase Eurotunnel employed over 5,600 
employees and in 2003, employed 3,309 individuals to manage and operate 
the Channel Tunnel. These figures demonstrate the level of employment that 
was, and is, currently generated through the operation of this development.  
 
Tourism is another aspect of the economy that has been directly affected. As 
tourism visitation increases, regions receive greater economic benefits. 
Positive impacts associated with the development of this industry include an 
increase in demand of tourist facilities, consumer products and tourist 
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services. Foreign investment in this area was another economic indicator that 
changed as a result of this development. Furthermore, the Channel Tunnel 
development increased the price of land and dwellings which had both 
negative and positive outcomes for locals.  
 
On the whole the Channel Tunnel has been an instrument that has had a 
profound impact on the economic dimensions of Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent 
and it is currently a useful piece of infrastructure that can be exploited to help 
promote economic growth in these two regions. 
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9.0  The impact of the Channel Tunnel on the European Union 
 
This chapter examines the impact that the Channel Tunnel has had on the 
European Union since operations commenced in 1994. The relationship 
between the Channel Tunnel and the European Union is the first point 
discussed in this chapter. Following this, the impact that this development has 
had, and continuous to have, on the transportation networks in and around 
Europe is examined.  
 
The impact that asylum seekers are having on countries within the EU is the 
next point considered. The effect that this issue has had, and continues to 
have, on freight companies is discussed in this analysis. Furthermore, the 
systems implemented to help alleviate this issue are acknowledged, along 
with notes provided on the impact that this issue has had on the political 
arena. The final section of this chapter explores the impact that the Channel 
Tunnel has had on economic dimensions the EU.  
 
This chapter identifies the widespread impacts that have been associated with 
the Channel Tunnel development. While issues are commonly examined from 
a local and regional perspective, there is also value in examining the effects 
that issues have on people nationally and internationally. In accordance with 
this, this section discusses the impact that the Channel Tunnel has had, and 
continues to have, on people living in areas outside the immediate vicinity of 
the Channel Tunnel’s entranceways.   
 
9.1  The Channel Tunnel and the European Union 
 
Despite the volume of literature written on the Channel Tunnel development, a 
number of important issues are virtually invisible throughout these works. 
While regional impacts are often discussed, until recently there had been little 
or no emphasis placed on the impact that the Channel Tunnel has had on the 
European Union. Prior to the Channel Tunnel opening, “supporters and critics 
of the scheme have been insistent that it [would be] inextricably involved in 
the economic, political, social and psychological integration of Europe, and 
notably with British relations” with the European Union (Church, 1989, 2). This 
idea is discussed further throughout this chapter. 
 
While there has been a lack of literature produced on the relationship between 
the Channel Tunnel and the EU, member states recognised from the early 
stages of the development that the Channel Tunnel would have an impact on 
areas far outside the boundaries of Britain and France. The European 
Parliament released a statement predicting that “ a fixed transportation link 
across the English Channel will stimulate, facilitate passenger and goods 
traffic…generating positive direct and indirect effects…not only between the 
United Kingdom and France but also with other Member States of the 
Community” (TED Case Studies, 2). The EU’s involvement in this 
development has become a subject of major debate. Some believe that 
support for the Channel Tunnel was partially generated because the 
European Union was seen to be in favour of constructing a fixture to bridge 
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the English Channel.  Although the EU did display a supportive demeanour 
towards a development of this nature, there is no direct evidence to suggest 
that the interests of the EU were, or have been, addressed at any stage 
throughout the selection, development, construction or operation of this 
development.  
 
The European Union has unified Europe in a number of ways. The Single 
European Market (SEM)6 came into effect on 1 January 1993 (Encyclopaedia, 
1). This market has been an influential unification tool for the EU. The 
Channel Tunnel has also played a historic role in undermining one of the 
more influential barriers that once so strongly divided the European Union. In 
doing this, the Channel Tunnel has ended Britain’s insular seclusion, turning 
the ‘megalopolis London Milan’ from myth to reality and making the British 
Isles an authentic part of the European continent (Fayman & Metge, 1995, 1).  
 
The impact that the Channel Tunnel has had on European integration is one 
interesting debate that has emerged since the Channel Tunnel commenced 
operations in 1994. Through providing cross border transportation, the 
Channel Tunnel has facilitated cultural understanding between Britain and 
Europe. As demonstrated earlier in this thesis, there was a considerable level 
of scepticism displayed by the British towards the French throughout the initial 
stages of this development. Although it is challenging to determine the level of 
scepticism that still exists, it has been argued, that the Channel Tunnel has 
brought forward a “greater awareness of shared culture, history and interests” 
(Church, 1989, 6).  
 
While it is clear how greater cultural understanding affects the ‘individual’, 
when psychological changes are made within a person they often end up 
modifying their behaviour (Church, 1989, 6). This impact is then transferred as 
people behave and respond differently towards people, issues and ideas 
because they have greater level of cultural understanding. Greater cultural 
understanding has helped augment the bond between Britain and Europe 
which has, in turn, strengthened the European Union. 
 
The Channel Tunnel has also had a significant impact on the political arena. 
This is disposed by the fact that the French and British governments welded 
closer political ties as a result of bi-national consultation that occurred 
throughout the developmental stages of the Channel Tunnel. Church 
reiterates this point, suggesting that as contact grows and trips to Britain are 
made easier, passenger traffic grows, and in turn, as visitation increased so 
would the level of mutual understanding and contact between Britain and 
Europe (Church, 1989, 8). Recognising that the Channel Tunnel has had 
some impact on the European Union further demonstrates how this 
development has had an impact on areas far beyond the boundaries of the 
regions adjacent to the Channel Tunnel entranceways. It is difficult to unravel 
                                                 
6 Single European Market (SEM) contract was constructed by policy makers throughout the European Union in an 
attempt to facilitate the “process of European economic integration, involving the removal of obstacles to the free 
movement of goods, services, people, and capital between member states of the EC” (Encyclopaedia, 1). Some of 
the major aspects it covers, among other benefits include the “elimination of customs barriers, the liberalization of 
capital movements, the opening of public procurement markets and the mutual recognition of professional 
qualifications” (Encyclopaedia, 1).  
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the extent of the impact that the Channel Tunnel has had on the political 
arena, although it is impossible to ignore that this development has played a 
part in politics, both prior to its establishment and thereafter.   
 
While the assumptions made above are somewhat speculative and rhetorical 
in nature, it has to be acknowledged that this development has had some 
influence on European integration and the on political arena within Europe 
and Britain. These impacts have in turn raised a number of valuable 
questions. As social perceptions change so does individual behaviour. The 
Channel Tunnel has bridged a physical and cultural barrier. If cultural 
appreciation can facilitate unification, then the more the British and French 
understand about one another the more unified Europe becomes. In line with 
this, it can be argued that the Channel Tunnel has played an important role in 
worldwide politics as it provided a stage to unite two countries. Church 
suggests that, the Channel Tunnel has cemented “European Political Co-
Operation, and chang[ed] the way others see Europe” (Church, 1989, 6). This 
in turn has helped to dissipate the age old trepidation that once so strongly 
divided these two countries.   
 
9.3  Transportation 
 
The Channel Tunnel has also had a positive and significant impact on the 
EU’s transportation networks. The Channel Tunnel currently provides for ease 
of passenger travel and freight transportation in and around the EU. 
Transportation is a chief priority for policy makers in Europe and Britain. The 
Transport White Paper and Second Railway Package produced by the 
European Commission identifies growth in rail freight and international freight 
as being matters of considerable concern (English Welsh et al., 2002, 3). The 
Channel Tunnel was not only seen as a mechanism to increase the speed 
and reliability of transportation between Britain, France and Europe, but it is 
also regarded as having made a considerable contribution to European 
infrastructure, by being a “maillon manquant, maillon structurant de 1’ECrope 
des transports”7 (Church, 1989, 6).     
 
The idea of establishing an efficient high speed rail link throughout the EU 
came to the fore towards the end of the twentieth century. The idea was to 
provide a “high speed rail link between all the major continental metropolitan 
areas” in Europe (Vickerman, 1994, 13). The effect that the Channel Tunnel 
has had on European transportation flows is the result of a combination of 
interlinking influences (Fayman & Metge, 1995, 8). That said, the Channel 
Tunnel cannot merely be seen as an isolated piece of infrastructure, but 
rather, as an integral part of European transportation infrastructure (Fayman & 
Metge, 1995, 8).  
 
The Channel Tunnel has also had an indirect influence on the way 
environmental and social concerns are addressed and mitigated within the 
EU. Since the 1980s, a large number of high speed transportation networks 
                                                 
7 The translation of this quote is “missing link, formative link of the transport system in Europe” 
(Church, 1989, 6).     
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within Europe have been improved. As a result of these upgrades, high speed 
transportation links now connect all the major centres of the European Union. 
The Channel Tunnel has proved to be a useful case study for developers 
involved in upgrading these systems. Although the construction and 
operational impacts that come as a result of upgrading existing transportation 
infrastructure were not as intense as in the Channel Tunnel example, many of 
the social and environmental implications were similar in nature. Developers 
have been able to use the Channel Tunnel development as an example which 
has helped them to identify mitigation strategies to employ to alleviate the 
social and environmental issues that came as a result of their large scale 
infrastructural developments.  
 
The Channel Tunnel has heightened the demand for adequate transportation 
links in France and Britain. The EU had recognised this and established a 
Trans-European Transport Network policy that provides funding for 
transportation projects that will be of benefit within the EU (Europa, 1). It is 
thought that these policies support the “implementation and development of 
the internal market, as well as re-enforcing economic and social cohesion” 
while assisting “economic competitiveness and a balanced and sustainable 
developed European Union (Europa, 1). 
 
Growing demand has spurred the need for more efficient transportation 
networks. It is interesting that the high speed transportation links on the 
European side of the Channel Tunnel have been developed considerably 
faster than in Great Britain. For example, Europe has two excellent high 
speed links that connect from the Channel Tunnel Rail Link to Brussels and 
Paris. On the British side, the links that connect the Channel Tunnel to 
metropolitan London have in parts been upgraded, although British Rail has 
not approved plans to upgrade the entire railway link, as was done within 
Europe (Grayson, 1990, 61). The increase in demand and the subsequent 
lack of adequate transportation infrastructure has directly affected travellers 
and local residents. An example of one issue that has come as a result of this 
as identified in Chapter Seven is road congestion which has sparked traffic 
delays in and around Kent. 
 
Such lack of development could in part be attributed to the lack of trust 
apparent between the British and French. Although this may be 
circumstantial, it is not absurd to think that some parts of Britain may want to 
maintain their British character. The Channel Tunnel has destroyed not only a 
geological barrier between France and Britain, but it has also infiltrated the 
psychological barrier that once so strongly divided these two nations. After the 
development of the Channel Tunnel, many may have seen the development 
of the high speed link as another move that would bring them both 
geographically and psychologically closer to their European neighbours. 
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9.4  Asylum seekers 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter Seven, asylum seekers have had an immense 
impact within France and Britain. The impact of this issue has also been felt 
within the wider EU. As discussed earlier the installment of security 
equipment, additional immigration personal, changes to immigration policy, 
damage to freight and political conflict have all surfaced as a result of asylum 
seekers. The political impact of asylum seekers is best seen through the way 
that this issue demands an EU level rather than a national level solution.   
 
The asylum problem will continue until the parties with power are able to 
identify effective strategies to mitigate the impacts associated with this issue. 
That said, EU member states have to some extent recognised the importance 
of the issues that have come as a result of the Sangatte refugee situation. 
This is illustrated by the fact that member states have met to confer about the 
notion of strengthening measures to combat and prosecute asylum seekers 
throughout the EU (Tyler, 2001, 1). In addition, the British Home Secretary 
and the French Interior Minister have publicly called for swifter “progress to 
agree and implement common EU procedures for dealing with asylum 
seekers” to help inhibit “asylum shopping” (Tyler, 2001, 1).  
 
The asylum situation has heightened the need for the EU to engage with 
member states to adopt legislation that will make someone legally responsible 
for the situation in Sangatte. This is an ongoing challenge amplified by the fact 
that the Schengen Agreement (1985) and the Schengen Convention (1990) 
established areas within the European Union without internal borders 
(European Council on refugees and Exiles, 1). It is thought however, that as a 
corollary to the removal of internal borders, the Schengen system has 
harmonised and strengthened the enforcement of external border controls 
within individual countries (European Council on refugees and Exiles, 1). The 
Schengen system has allowed for the freedom of movement of people within 
the EU. The "Schengen Area" which once included five Member States, grew 
to include 13 Member States in 1997, however, interestingly Britain is not 
party to the Schengen agreement (European Council on refugees and Exiles, 
1). As a result, British border controls remain fully operational through the 
Channel Tunnel and within British airports. This in turn, has meant that the 
EU’s, SEM is not yet fully operational.   
 
Although the impacts of asylum seekers have been, and still are, 
predominantly felt within France, the issue of asylum seeking is a European 
problem that is in desperate need of being addressed. The EU has displayed 
some form of response to this issue in that they have “resolved to create a 
Common Asylum System throughout Europe” although, this as yet, has had 
no notable impact on the current refugee situation (Craig, 2002, 492). 
 
Although the asylum question has been a seed of conflict between France 
and Britain, these countries have made some form of a collaborate approach 
towards addressing the issue. A number of changes have been made to 
public policies in response to this problem, although the adaptations to 
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existing policies have not significantly changed the nature or impacts 
associated with this issue.  
 
Keeping in mind that Britain is not party to the Schengen system, in early 
2004, the Home Secretary and the French Interior Minister met and decided 
that all individuals travelling from Calais to Dunkirk would be subject to 
immigration checks as of 1 February 2004 (Craig, 2002, 1). This means that 
people with the incorrect documentation are refused permission to enter the 
UK. This agreement is reciprocal which means that the French authorities can 
check travellers at Kent and UK immigration officials also have the authority to 
do so in Nord-Pas de Calais (Craig, 2002, 3).  
 
The Channel Tunnel has played an instrumental role in facilitating the shift of 
freight transportation from road to rail. However, the current problems 
associated with asylum seekers are jeopardising the long term viability of this 
shift in transportation mode. Asylum seekers have been of major concern to 
freight transporters. English Welsh Scottish Railway, Britain’s largest rail 
freight operator complained directly to the European Parliament’s Petition 
Committee about the Sangatte refugee situation (Craig, 2002, 3). This 
company explained that they were enduring financial losses because of 
delays in freight trains travelling through the Channel Tunnel (Craig, 2002, 3). 
Added expenses associated with routine business operations are 
characteristically passed on to the consumer. This means, that over time, the 
price of goods and service rises to accommodate for the additional costs 
imposed on transportation companies. English Welsh Scottish Railway 
believes that France is in breach of EU law as they are not ensuring the “free 
movement of goods” (Craig, 2002, 3). Concerns relating to asylum seekers 
such as this have spurred much debate and ill feeling between Britain, 
France, Eurotunnel and the wider European Union.   
 
While France and Britain have extensive and encompassing immigration 
policies, there has been no specific response made to the asylum problem in 
France. On the contrary, policy instruments, such as visas, have been used to 
mitigate this issue. Such systems have been employed in an attempt to 
prevent asylum seekers from crossing European borders without the correct 
paperwork. This method of deterrence has had no significant impact on the 
current situation and refugees are still arriving in droves at Sangatte.  
 
Within Europe the restrictive measures of the Schengen Agreement has 
serious implications for asylum seekers, particularly the requirement that 
signatory states fine carriers who transport refugees into the Schengen Area 
without proper documentation (European Council on refugees and Exiles, 1). 
It has been suggested, that policies such as this have not helped the problem 
of asylum seekers but instead, criminalised the migrants and heightened the 
demand for illegal smuggling networks (Guiraudon, 2002, 4). While visas may 
have enhanced the demand for smuggling networks, the most concerning 
impact of the current policies is that they criminalise refugees.  
 
Although the effects of this issue have been predominantly felt by those living 
in close proximity to the Channel Tunnel entranceways, asylum seekers are 
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having a significant impact on people who live outside of Nord-Pas de Calais 
and Kent. One example of the widespread impact of asylum seeking is 
discernible when examining public funding. The French and British 
governments have a restricted pool of money available to fund public 
services. Immigration controls are one example of a government funded 
service. These controls come at a considerable financial cost to the respective 
governments. When governments have to increasing funding in one area, it 
means that there is less money available to allocate to other parts of the 
economy that require public funding. For example, the more money required 
to provide sufficient immigration services, the less money available for service 
such as roading, health care and education. This illustrates how the asylum 
problems impacts on public resources and the lives of people living outside 
the areas adjacent to the Channel Tunnel entranceways. 
 
 9.5  Impact on trade and travel in the European Union 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter Eight, the Channel Tunnel has had a direct and 
indirect impact on the economic dimensions of Nord Pas de Calais and Kent. 
Furthermore, the economic impacts of this development do transcend far 
beyond the boundaries of these two regions. Britain, France and the wider 
European Union have all been affected by this piece of infrastructure. 
Widespread economic impacts were predicted from the initial stages of the 
development. This is exposed by the fact that during a franchise award 
speech made to Eurotunnel, the Secretary of State for Transport Rt. Hon. 
John MacGregor announced that the “link in operation will bring direct 
benefits….these benefits can be expected to increase the level of UK’s trade 
with continental Europe and contribute to economic growth and employment 
throughout the UK” (Gibb & Dundon-Smith, 1994, 179).  
 
While this facility has provided easy access to goods and services for 
producers and consumers, it has also proved itself to be a cost effective 
means of freight transportation. The EU has consistently worked towards 
bridging the barriers that have hindered trade transportation between EU 
member states. The Channel Tunnel has played a significant role in 
facilitating the movement towards achieving a single integrated European 
market, which has been a long term policy focus for the EU. Establishing an 
integrated market would facilitate the flow of goods and services within the EU 
and Britain. In line with this, the Channel Tunnel has been seen as “an 
important element of the implementation of the major European policy for 
promoting the development of economic and cultural activities throughout the 
community,” while it has helped towards creating “a single, integrated market 
and a people’s Europe” (Officers of Devon Council et al., 1989, 22). 
 
Another industry in which the Channel Tunnel has had a significant impact on 
is transport. The Channel Tunnel has provided a transportation alternative for 
travellers and commuters. It is a time and cost effective means of transport 
that has facilitated the ease of travel between the UK and Europe (Fayman & 
Metge, 1995, 2). Prior to the establishment of the Channel Tunnel, the journey 
from Paris to London took around eight hours (Fayman & Metge, 1995, 2). 
Much of this time was consumed by the ferry crossing and waiting in ferry 
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terminals for ferries to be loaded. In 2001, figures released illustrated that the 
time of travelling from London to Paris has been halfed from eight to four 
hours (Fayman & Metge, 1995, 2). The isochrones highlight the impact that 
the establishment of the high speed rail link and the Channel Tunnel has had 
for travellers. This time reduction does however, primarily benefit those who 
choose to travel by rail as time reductions for those commuting by car has 
been minimal. Another significant benefit of the Channel Tunnel is that it 
provides all weather transportation. As identified earlier, the English Channel 
is plagued by unpredictable weather. The Channel Tunnel means that 
travellers are no longer delayed due to difficult weather conditions.    
 
 9.6  Conclusion 
 
The Channel Tunnel has had a direct impact on not only Nord-Pas de Calais 
and Kent, but the impacts of this venture have also been felt within the EU. 
Towards the end of last century, the European Union began to play a more 
important role in international politics. The Single European Market is one 
system established by the European Union to promote European integration. 
The Channel Tunnel has also helped to unify the EU as it has had a 
psychological impact on people living in the UK and Europe. This is illustrated 
by the fact that the Channel Tunnel had brought a greater level of cultural 
understanding between the French and British. In addition, France and Britain 
have welded closer political ties as a result of binational consultation. The 
Channel Tunnel has also had a considerable impact on freight and passenger 
transportation, further facilitating the ease of transporting products and people 
around the EU.  
 
The asylum situation in Sangatte is an issue that has come as a direct result 
of Channel Tunnel operations. This issue is affecting the whole of the EU in 
some way. It has been suggested that the asylum situation in northern France 
is having a major impact on public funding. Although Britain is increasingly 
concerned about the number of refugees reaching British soil, they perceive 
the issue to be France’s responsibility.  Some have suggested that the 
refugee problem is a European problem and should be addressed by EU 
member states.  Whatever the case, there is a need for the parties concerned 
to take responsibility for this problem and begin working collectively to 
develop effective strategies to mitigate this issue.   
 
The economic impacts of the Channel Tunnel have reached far beyond the 
boundaries of France and Britain. Although economic impacts are difficult to 
pinpoint, it has to be recognised that the Channel Tunnel has proved itself to 
be an affordable trade and travel alternative for people travelling and 
transporting goods between the Britain and Europe. There is a need for the 
EU to play some part in developing solutions to the issues that have come to 
be associated with this development. This is fuelled by the fact that although 
the dominant impacts of these issues have been concentrated on areas within 
France and Britain, the flow on effect has meant that countries and people all 
over Europe have been, and are currently being, affected by the operation of 
the Channel Tunnel.  
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 10.0  Conclusion 
 
This thesis has examined the social and environmental impacts that have 
come as a result of the Channel Tunnel development. In doing this, this 
research identifies how this development has impacted and continues to have 
an impact on the social, political and environmental contexts of Nord-Pas de 
Calais, Kent, France, Britain and the EU. The background of the idea to 
bridging the English Channel is discussed in this chapter. Following this, the 
main points identified in the examination of the legislative background and the 
social, economic and political contexts of Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent are 
outlined.  
 
The next section of this chapter presents the significant construction impacts 
that were found to have arisen as a result of the Channel Tunnel 
development. Furthermore, the impacts that have come as a result of Channel 
Tunnel operations are summarised. Notes are then provided on how the 
impacts from the construction and operational phases of the development of 
the Channel Tunnel affected people in Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent. In 
addition, the methods that were seen to be employed by Eurotunnel in an 
attempt to address these issues are identified. The significant economic 
impacts that were found to be associated with the Channel Tunnel 
development is the next point outlined. The impact that the Channel Tunnel 
was found to have had on the European Union is also considered. The final 
sections of this summary chapter identify the limitations of this study, 
challenges associated with data collection and the value of this piece of 
research. 
 
10.1  Summary 
 
The idea of building a fixed transportation link connecting Britain with Europe 
dates back centuries. Chapter Two found that political uncertainty and a 
perceived threat to security were two significant factors that prevented this 
idea from coming to fruition before the twentieth century. A long period of 
European peace and closer bi-national relations between the British and 
French helped to reunite these two nations. This context set the scene for 
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and the French President Francois 
Mitterrand to meet, discuss and eventually commit to proceed with 
constructing a fixture to physically bridge the two continents.  
 
The English Channel or the La Manche is the part of the Atlantic Ocean that 
separates Britain from Northern France (Dictionaries, 1). This stretch of ocean 
was the area the Channel Tunnel venture was designed to cross. The groups 
of people predominantly affected by this venture lived in Nord-Pas de Calais 
and Kent. This occurred because these areas would come to house the 
Channel Tunnel terminals.  
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The analysis from Chapter Three identified that the Act of Canterbury 1986 
and the Channel Tunnel Act 1987 were the two pieces of legislation that 
played a prominent role in the planning, development, construction of the 
Channel Tunnel. In addition, these two pieces of legislation still play an 
important role in the current operation of this development. Under the 
legislative framework people who were concerned about aspects of the 
Channel Tunnel were able to voice their concern against the proposal to the 
selection committee providing that they could prove locus standi. This thesis 
suggests that the concerns of local residents were not necessarily adequately 
addressed throughout the planning, construction or subsequent operation of 
the Channel Tunnel.   
 
The discussion in Chapter Four demonstrates that Kent’s economy had 
historically been driven by agriculture and mining, while Nord-Pas de Calais’s 
economy was once sustained through old industry. Both regions felt the 
repercussions of the demise of old industry during the 1960s and 1970s.This 
left both regions with GDPs that fell below the national averages of their 
respective countries and the EU15 (Collier, 2001, 23). As shown, the 
economic benefits projected to be accrued from this development were 
warmly welcomed by people living within these two regions.  
 
Chapter Five shows that after the political powers had condoned the 
development of a structure to bridge La Manche, the next point to be 
considered was what type of structure would be chosen to physically bridge 
the English Channel. In early 1985, the French and British governments called 
for project tenders to be submitted by 31 October 1985. Ten proposals were 
received but after official consultation by the selection committee, a shortlist 
was established comprised of four contenders to be further scrutinised. The 
proposals short listed contrasted greatly, varying in design, cost and mode of 
transport. Channel Tunnel Group- Franche-Manche (CTG- FM) produced a 
well researched proposal suggesting that the English Channel should be 
bridged by a tunnel. CTG-FM was made up of 16 separate entities these 
being five British contractors, three British banks, five French contractors and 
three French banks (Neerhout, 2001, 5). In the years that followed, this group 
came to be an established company named Eurotunnel.   
 
In early 1986, after deliberations, Prime Minister Thatcher and President 
Francois Mitterrand met and made a joint announcement confirming that 
CTG-FM had been awarded the mandate “for the development, construction 
and operation of a fixed link across the English Channel”. This structure in 
time came to be internationally recognised as the Channel Tunnel. The 
reasons given for this decision as identified by the selection committee were 
as follows:   
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1) Financially it was the most sound 
2) It carried the minimum amount of technological risks 
3) It was viewed to be the safest alternative for passengers 
4) Maritime problems were rendered invisible 
5) It was seen to be the least vulnerable to terrorist threats and 
sabotage 
6) Experts anticipated that the environmental impacts associated with 
this proposal could be adequately contained (Hunt, 1994, 179).   
 
 10.2  Construction impacts 
 
This development was a pioneering feat due to the amount of logistical, 
political, financial, environmental, and social challenges associated with 
building a tunnel below the sea bed of the English Channel. It was expected 
that this anticipated would have a significant influence on the:  
 
1) Political arena: primarily through bi-national consultation between 
the respective governments and as a result of Eurotunnel being made 
up of a collection French and British syndicates.   
  
2) Environment: it was unavoidable that this development would have a 
substantial impact on the natural habitats of Nord-Pad de Calais and 
Kent as a result of the construction and subsequent operation of the 
Channel Tunnel. 
 
3) Economy: it was projected that economic impacts associated with 
this development would be felt by the regions bordering the Channel 
Tunnel entranceways. In addition, it was projected that this venture 
would also have some impact on the economics of other European 
Union member states.  
 
4) Society: it was apparent from the design phase that the construction 
and operation of the Channel Tunnel would have a number of direct 
impacts on the people living in and around Nord-Pas de Calais and 
Kent.  
 
Chapter Six shows that a number of impacts were felt within Nord-Pas de 
Calais and Kent as a result of the construction of the Channel Tunnel. 
Conclusions from this chapter outline that public opposition, disruption to the 
local landscape, changes in land use, temporary and permanent land 
possession, soil disposal and noise pollution were significant issues that 
arose as a result of the construction of this development. These issues 
affected people in Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent in a variety of ways. Lifestyle 
changes, loss of income through temporary and permanent land acquisition, 
changes to house prices, evening traffic disturbance and road congestion are 
all examples of how the Channel Tunnel impacted on those living in close 
proximity to the Channel Tunnel entranceways.  
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Eurotunnel recognised that the construction of the Channel Tunnel would 
have a negative impact on the environment and people living in Nord-Pas de 
Calais and Kent. By the end of 1990, 378 people out of a population of 37,960 
living in the Kent region had lodged 618 complaints against the construction 
works.  
 
It has been shown that Eurotunnel did seek to mitigate the issues that came 
as a result of the Channel Tunnel however, this is not to say that Eurotunnel 
was concerned with the environment or the impact that the Channel Tunnel 
would have on society. That said, the main motivator that ensured that 
Eurotunnel mitigated issues was the legislative framework enacted to govern 
the development.  
 
The covering of soil during transportation, recycling waste, chalk grassland 
topsoil being taken from temporary work areas and re-spread at different 
areas, managed for the duration of construction period and then replaced 
after construction was completed, half of Holywell Coombe being left 
undisturbed, the establishment of Samphire Hoe and Fond Pigon, excess soil 
and equipment being moved during working hours, are all examples of 
mitigation methods employed by Eurotunnel in an attempt to alleviate the 
social and environmental effects of this development. Although some of these 
issues had a long term impact on the regions in question, the nature and 
magnitude of these issues changed dramatically between the construction 
and operational phases of this development.   
 
 10.3  Operational impacts 
 
Chapter Seven found that the opening of the Channel Tunnel in 1994 
generated a new set of issues for Eurotunnel and for residents living in Nord-
Pas de Calais and Kent. Significant impacts shown to have arisen as a result 
of the operation of the Channel Tunnel include public opposition, 
environmental disturbance, water pollution, noise disturbance, energy 
consumption, water contamination, fire safety and asylum seekers. Impacts 
on society from tunnel operations included noise and road congestion from 
increases in traffic volumes, the contamination of waterways, noise pollution 
arising from tunnel operations, the impairment of natural resources, 
consumption of public funding, threats to household security and safety 
concerns. 
 
Eurotunnel employed a number of systems to manage and mitigate these 
issues. For example, ensuring waste was disposed of in an environmentally 
friendly manner, establishing extra immigration controls, restricting loud 
speaker broadcasts to work hours and restoring the landscape.  
 
The Channel Tunnel has also had a considerable impact on the economic 
dimensions of Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent. Economic impacts identified 
throughout this thesis include the growth in employment opportunities, 
increased demand for tourism services, increases in foreign investment and 
changes in the supply and demand of transportation facilities. These impacts 
affected people in a number of ways. Impacts felt by local residents included 
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capital gains on property, employment losses for those working in the freight 
industry and increased economic growth generated through increased tourism 
visitation. 
 
Chapter Nine establishes that that the Channel Tunnel also had an impact on 
the European Union. Asylum seekers, increase in demand for transportation 
networks, strengthening the idea of the Single European Market, adaptations 
to immigration policy and tourism are all examples of affects that have been 
felt by the EU. These impacts have affected people on a variety of levels. On 
the positive side, this thesis demonstrates that the Channel Tunnel has had a 
positive impact on people living within the European Union as it has proved an 
efficient, affordable, timely, all weather means of transport for goods 
transportation and travellers from around the globe. Findings do however, 
identify that there were some negative effects felt within the European Union. 
For example, local residents were affected by traffic congestion and delays, 
threat to household security due to asylum seekers and affordable 
transportation of goods and services.   
 
The conclusions from this research demonstrate that a number of issues 
prevailed throughout the construction and subsequent operation of the 
Channel Tunnel. However, the nature of these issues did change throughout 
various stages of the development. The findings from this chapter establish 
that the Channel Tunnel resulted in:  
 
1) Increased traffic flows from visitation and the transportation of 
goods: impact on residents includes noise, road congestion and 
dust contamination 
2) The asylum situation at Sangatte: impact on people includes 
straining public resources, adaptations being made to existing 
public policy, additional immigration controls being implemented, 
threatened security of local residents and imposed additional 
financial costs on freight transporters.  
3) Impact on property: decrease in property prices for properties in 
close proximity to the Channel Tunnel infrastructure, dissatisfaction 
of local residents with the financial reimbursement given for 
temporary or permanent property acquisition, loss of livelihood and 
lifestyle, capital gains received through investment interest. 
4) Interest in investment: increase in foreign investment in both 
regions.     
5) Transportation infrastructure: timely, safe, easily accessible, 
effective all weather mode of transportation for people. 
6) Changes in employment: created employment opportunities 
throughout the construction of the Channel Tunnel, shortage in 
skilled workers in some areas. Since operations commenced the 
Channel Tunnel has created job opportunities through tunnel 
operations and tourism.  
7) Significant impact on the environment- destruction to vegetation, 
mammals and amphibians, negative impact on ecological systems, 
flora and fauna.  
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It has been shown that Eurotunnel did implement a variety of strategies to 
manage and mitigate the impacts identified when appropriate. That said, there 
is come disparity between what Eurotunnel deemed to be satisfactory 
mitigation measures and the level of management that the public view 
adequate. One example of this outlined within this thesis is land acquisition. In 
many instances land owners believed that they were insufficiently 
compensated. However, Eurotunnel believed the financial reparations paid 
were adequate for the inconvenience caused to local residents. 
 
Asylum seekers have been discovered to be a significant impact that has 
come as a result of the Channel Tunnel venture. This thesis has argued that 
this impact is the most significant long term impact that has occurred as a 
consequence of this development. There is a desperate need for the parties in 
powers to recognise and address this issue through effective mitigation 
methods. It is suggested that additional public policy may be a tool that could 
be used in an attempt to alleviate this issue. To date, immigration controls 
have been the instrument employed by the British and French in an attempt to 
alleviate this issue although, these systems have had little impact on the 
situation to date. This is by no means going to be an easy feat, yet, it is an 
issue that needs to be collectively addressed by the influential powers in 
France, Britain and the EU.   
 
It has been argued that, despite the fact that the Channel Tunnel development 
received international exposure on a number of levels, the environmental 
aspects of this project have received relatively little attention (Goodenough & 
Page, 1994, 27). This is somewhat surprising considering the fact that 
transport and the environment have become “firmly established on the 
research agenda at a government level” (Goodenough & Page, 1994, 26). To 
understand the emphasis that was placed on the environment, one has to 
recognise the context that this project was developed within. The new found 
interest in social and environmental awareness during the 1980s resulted in 
the Eurotunnel being made accountable for some of the impacts that came as 
a result of the Channel Tunnel development. The legislative provisions 
developed to govern this development were thorough in comparison with the 
constraints that had been historically placed on large scale infrastructural 
developments. Although the environmental provisions would be deemed 
inadequate within the development arena in modern times, these provisions 
were thorough in light if the era that the development was conducted within. 
 
10.4  Value of this research 
 
One final question in need of being addressed is, how does this research add 
value? This piece is valuable for two distinct reasons. Firstly, the examination 
provided, and the variety of other works produced that examine the impacts 
associated with the development of the Channel Tunnel, prove to be useful 
reference cases. “Many projects will contain similar sets of circumstance, 
including initial lack of technical definition and simultaneous external pressure 
for definite information, and therefore it is suggested that the objectives, 
strategies and actions described in this paper could be adopted to advantage 
for other developments” (Kershaw & McCulloch, 1993, 30). Reports of this 
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nature are of particular use to people that are embarking on developments of 
a similar nature such as a large infrastructural project or a complex bi-national 
venture.  
  
Secondly, social and environmental impact assessments facilitate our 
understanding of the impacts that developments have on the environment and 
society. Understanding of this nature alerts, amongst other groups, the 
government and the general public to the relationship between impacts and 
developments. The more robust and effective the policy instruments 
employed throughout the design, construction and operation of a 
development, the easier it is for issues to be managed and mitigated 
accordingly. Furthermore, S&EIA reports allow easy identification of the links 
between a development and issues. This allows people to distinguish how 
their lives may potentially be affected by a development proposal. This in turn, 
provides the public with information needed to understand how the 
development will affect them. Future research is required in the field of social 
and environmental impacts assessment, so that developers are better able to 
design and implement environmentally sustainable developments.  In addition 
to the points made above, the format adopted by this thesis is a useful 
framework that can be adopted, reformulated and easily applied to assist in 
the evaluation of other developments.  
 
Environmental and social impact assessments are increasingly being seen as 
an important component of post modern development. “EA techniques for 
new transport infrastructure are now an integral part of the planning process 
for transport projects and growing ‘environmentalism’ has led to greater public 
interest in the impact of such projects” (Page, 1994, 6). This global shift has 
allowed for public consultation to become a vital part of modern day 
development. Established consents processes in France and Britain now 
allow for public concerns to be heard and addressed throughout the 
developmental phase. As awareness towards the environmental and social 
impacts associated with developments augments, the process of development 
becomes more effective, sustainable and socially and environmentally 
friendly.  
 
10.5  Difficulties with data collection  
 
It is important to identify the inherent difficulties of drawing concise 
conclusions about the social and environmental impacts that have come as a 
result of the Channel Tunnel development. Firstly, the nature of the project 
itself poses a range of challenges. The sheer size of the project meant that a 
collection of overlapping political and economic principles needed to be 
examined in order to understand the developmental processes. In addition, a 
number of issues arose in relation to data used and analysed throughout the 
body of this thesis. It is important to recognise that some of the data collected 
was produced by organisations that had a vested interest in promoting a 
particular viewpoint. In an attempt to combat the issues associated with 
inaccurate or ‘selected’ data, a wide variety of sources were consulted and 
subsequently analysed in the writing of this thesis. Drawing from a wide range 
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of data sources has ensured that this work provides a balanced perspective of 
the overall development as far as is possible. 
 
In addition to the points made above, there were some data collection 
problems associated with obtaining information from bodies who opposed the 
fixed transportation link. Simmons reiterates this point in his analysis of the 
Channel Tunnel development stating that “the public information on the 
project is insufficient and the planning process prevents any real and 
meaningful dialogue with the opponents of the fixed link project” (Simmons, 
1986, 14). This is in part a reflection of the legislative framework that was 
employed to govern the development as demonstrated in Chapter Three.  
 
10.6  Limitations of this Study 
 
It took an assortment of specialists years of collective consultation, testing, 
observation and analysing to design the intricate workings that would come to 
be part of the Channel Tunnel development. The engineering, financial, legal 
and environmental aspects of the Channel Tunnel were all complex 
components in their own right. Documenting and analysing all the 
components of the Channel Tunnel would have been an unrealistic exercise 
within the framework of this thesis. The two main restrictions governing this 
piece of work were time restrictions and word limitations. Work for this report 
commenced in February 2004 and was concluded by February 2006. This 
timeframe provided the scope to investigate this topic in its present fashion.  
 
This thesis has identified, summarised and examined the social and 
environmental issues that came as a result of the development and continued 
operation of the Channel Tunnel. The early chapters of this thesis are 
provided as an accompaniment to this analysis, while the later chapters are 
designed to act as a guide to the actual impacts that the Channel Tunnel has 
had on Nord-Pas de Calais and Kent and wider European Union. It was 
essential that the early sections of this thesis were included as it is impossible 
to understand the impacts of the development without having some 
knowledge of the background of the idea of bridging the English Channel, the 
geography of the areas under examination, the legislative processes 
underpinning the development and an appreciation of the alternatives 
considered. Understanding these facets enhances our ability to properly 
understand the issues and impacts that came as a result of the Channel 
Tunnel development.  
 
The social and environmental impacts associated with the Channel Tunnel 
are inseparable from the economic impacts of the development. This occurs 
because all economic implications have an affect on the social. That said, it 
would have been misleading to render the economic components of the 
project invisible, yet unfeasible to examine them comprehensively. For this 
reason they have been identified, examined and explained in accordance with 
my abilities and the limited scope of this report. 
 
The major data difficulties relevant to this work came from the lack of 
independent commentary produced on the Channel Tunnel development. 
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While there were extensive ex ante analysis of the Channel Tunnel produced, 
there “has been little or no development of ex post studies to assess what the 
impacts have been” (Hay et al., 2004b, 1). In addition, the fact that there was 
a lack of public information released by those who opposed the development 
meant that there was a limited amount of information available about public 
concerns.  
 
It is also important to recognise that there is value in collecting and employing 
primary data when producing a S&EIA. There were geographical challenges 
associated with this piece of research and as a result there was no direct 
public input used in the writing of this thesis. However, geography willing 
conducting public surveys and questionnaires can add value to a piece of 
work of this nature. That said, the main limitations placed on this thesis were 
time constraints, geographical location, volume restrictions and a lack of post 
construction studies produced on the impacts that the Channel Tunnel has 
had since operations commenced in 1994. 
 
10.7  Concluding comments 
 
The road to the construction of the Channel Tunnel was by no means a 
smooth one. On the contrary, the path was littered by an assortment of 
engineering, logistical, financial, environment, social and legislative 
challenges. One academic that has produced a great volume of valuable 
literature on the topic of the Channel Tunnel is a gentleman by the name of 
Roger Vickerman. It seems appropriate as an acknowledgement of his work in 
this field to conclude this piece with his insightful words. It is outstanding “ 
how many teachers and students have used the Channel Tunnel as a subject 
for projects, how many businesses and local government authorities want to 
access its impacts on their interests, and how many groups in other countries 
have been watching the impacts to learn lessons about the effect of major 
new infrastructure projects on their own regions. New generations of students, 
researchers, teachers, consultants and business people will find this a 
wonderful starting point for thinking about projects. However small we might 
wish to make the Channel Tunnel and its effects seen, the world will never be 
quite the same again” (Grayson, 1990, 7).  
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Appendix One 
 
 The diagram below shows the British Government’s Structure. 
 
 
 
Parliament 
Monarchy House of Lords House of Commons 
Queen Elizabeth II  People with inherited and assigned titles Prime minister and members of 
parliament 
Secretary of States 
County Councils
The figure above illustrates the basic government structure of the British 
government as it sits today. Britain head of state is constitutionally the 
monarch although the monarch’s powers are mostly of symbolic (The Free 
Dictionary, 1). The house of Lords is made up of a collection of individuals 
that have inherited esteemed family titles and those who have been given 
national acclaim for their outstanding work in any particular field (The Free 
Dictionary, 2). This section of parliament plays a part in all changes made to 
British law. The House of Commons is made up of the Prime Minister and a 
cluster of other party representatives (The Free Dictionary, 3). The Prime 
Minister is the leader of the partly that holds the most seats in parliament. The 
head of this party appoints the ministers who head the individual government 
departments. These individual departments are formally known as the 
Secretary of States. At the bottom of the political hierarchy lies the regional 
bodies which are formally know as county councils.  
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Appendix Two 
 
The appendix below shows the evolution of the European Union structures.  
 
 
 
(Wikipedia, 2005, 2). 
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Terms of Reference 
 
 
BR/SNCF  British Rail and the Société Nationale des Chemins de Fer 
Francis 
CEC  Commission of the European Communities  
CTA  Channel Tunnel Act 
CTM-FM Channel Tunnel Group- Franche-Manche  
CTRL  Channel Tunnel Rail Link  
EEA  European Environmental Agency  
EIA  Environmental Impact Assessment  
EMS  Environmental Management System  
EWS  English Welsh & Scottish Railway  
GDP  Gross Domestic Product  
S&EIA Social and Environmental Impact Assessment  
SEM  Single European Market  
SIA  Social Impact Assessment 
EC   European Community  
EEC    European Economic Community  
EU   European Union  
USSR  Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
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